Opinion
06M-6793.
Decided July 6, 2006.
Aaron F. Glazer, Esq., Assistant District Attorney, Erie County District Attorney's Office, Buffalo, New York, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Arthur L. Pressman, Esq., Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Public Defender's Unit, Buffalo, New York, Attorneys for Defendant.
The defendant was charged on April 29, 2006, with Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree, in violation of Penal Law 195.05, and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the 7th Degree, in violation of Penal Law 220.03.
Defense counsel has moved for suppression of the evidence obtained from the defendant pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law 710. A suppression hearing was held on June 9, 2006. At that time the Court reserved decision, and this order follows.
During the hearing, a Buffalo Police lieutenant testified that he and a number of other uniformed Buffalo Police officers responded to a call of gunshots having been fired in a bar. The officer arrived on the scene within a minute of receiving the call and found approximately ten to fifteen people outside the bar and another ten to fifteen people inside the bar. At that time there were approximately six officers inside the bar. No one was in custody and the officers did not know if the shooter or the weapon were still inside the bar.
The officer testified that he was standing near the bar approximately twelve to fifteen feet from the door when the defendant bumped into him from behind and pushed past him into the crowd still inside the bar. The officer directed the defendant to stop. The defendant continued into the bar and grabbed a jacket. The officer told the defendant that the bar was a crime scene and that no one could come in and remove anything. The defendant responded by telling the officer to go "f____ himself."
At that point, the defendant began to exit the bar. The officer stated that his attention was drawn away from the defendant in connection with their efforts in trying to maintain control of the scene with the other officers; which he described as "chaotic." The officer stated that the defendant had exited the bar and the officer went to speak with him, in part to determine whether or not the defendant had removed a weapon from the bar that may have been in the jacket.
The officer testified that at the time that he went outside and located the defendant, it was apparent to him that the actual shooter had probably fled the scene. The officer testified that he was attempting to warn the defendant of the dangers of interfering with officers trying to secure a crime scene, when the defendant again became belligerent and threatened to "kick" the officer's "ass." The defendant was then placed under arrest for the obstruction charge, the police then found alleged crack cocaine in the pocket of the defendant's pants.
No other persons testified at the suppression hearing.
FINDINGS OF THE COURT
Defendant challenges the warrantless arrest, alleging that the police officers did not possess the requisite reasonable cause to believe that he had committed a crime. See, CPL 140.10(1)(b). Under the circumstances here presented, reasonable cause is equated with probable cause. The People are only obligated to show that they possessed sufficient information to convince a person of ordinary intelligence that a crime was committed by such individual. The quantum of proof need not be that necessary to support a conviction. See, CPL 70.10(2), People v. Alpern, 217 AD2d 853, 854 (3rd Dept 1985).
Additionally, while a defendant who challenges the legality of a search and seizure has the burden of proving illegality, the People are nevertheless put to the burden of going forward to show the legality of the police conduct in the first instance. People v. Berrios, 28 NY2d 361, 367 (1971). Where the officer has probable cause to believe that a person has committed a crime, an arrest is authorized. People v. Hollman, 79 NY2d 181, 185 (1992).
Here, the defendant's intentional conduct of pushing past the officer and removing the jacket from the bar, after he was told by the officer to stop and not remove the jacket from the bar, was reasonably inappropriate and disruptive, so that the officer possessed the requisite reasonable cause to believe that the defendant had committed the crime of Obstructing Governmental Administration in the 2nd Degree, in violation of Penal Law 195.05. Especially in light of the fact that the officers were trying to control a crime scene where shots were fired and the suspect or the weapon may still have been present on the scene, Matter of Quaniqua W., 25 AD3d 380, 381 (1st Dept 2006), Matter of Joshua C., 289 AD2d 1095 (4th Dept 2001), People v. Romeo, 9 AD3d 744, 745 (3rd Dept 2004).
Here, the defense alleges that the officer only arrested the defendant after he continued to be belligerent on the sidewalk in front of the bar. Regardless, a police officer's motives are immaterial with respect to the issue whether an arrest is based on probable cause. A valid arrest will not be rendered unlawful by malicious motives nor will good faith rectify an otherwise unlawful arrest. Restey v. Higgins, 252 AD2d 954, 955 (4th Dept 1998). Therefore, the defendant's motion to suppress is hereby denied.
This decision constitutes the order of this Court.