Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, No. 03HF0556, Carla M. Singer, Judge.
Gideon Margolis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Murphy and James D. Sutton, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
Suzan Lucero pleaded guilty to possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378) and misdemeanor child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (b)), and admitted she was on bail or recognizance at the time of the crimes (Pen. Code, § 12022.1), and had suffered two prior drug-related convictions (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.2; Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b).) She argues the trial court erroneously denied her motion to suppress evidence (Pen. Code, § 1538.5) because police officers detained her in violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. As we explain below, we affirm the judgment.
I
Factual and Procedural Background
On the afternoon of April 15, 2003, five Laguna Beach police officers conducted a search of a residence shared by probationer Kirt Storm and defendant. Investigators had received information from two informants that Storm and defendant had been selling methamphetamine from the residence. According to two of the officers, defendant had been working as a confidential informant at the time of the search, and had earlier informed investigators that Storm had been dealing drugs. Based on their previous encounters with defendant, the officers believed defendant also had been selling drugs.
Officer Jeff Calvert knocked on the screen door and yelled, “Laguna Beach Police Department.” Through the open front door, officers saw Storm run from the living room toward a back bedroom. Calvert and Detective Chris Heuberger entered and pursued Storm to the bedroom where they handcuffed him and returned to the living room.
Defendant was standing in the family room. Calvert and Heuberger asked her to accompany them as they escorted her outside the front door. Detective Natalie Leal accompanied them. They did not handcuff defendant or draw weapons, but she was not free to leave. Calvert explained, “we were conducting a probation search, so we wanted to insure that . . . nobody in the house had any weapons or anything like that.”
The officers informed defendant they were conducting a probation search of the residence. Calvert asked her, “Would you have a problem if we search your person?” Defendant replied, “Go ahead.” Leal searched defendant’s person and clothing but did not find anything. Calvert then directed Leal, within earshot of defendant, to search defendant in the bathroom. Calvert asked defendant if she would accompany Leal to the bathroom to have her bra searched. Defendant agreed. Calvert waited outside the bathroom while the two women went inside. A short time later, Leal emerged carrying a baggie of methamphetamine. About 10 minutes had elapsed since the officers entered the residence.
The officers made defendant sit on the couch while Calvert joined Heuberger in Storm’s bedroom. Calvert could not recall whether defendant had been handcuffed at this point. Heuberger showed Calvert a line of methamphetamine on a mirror next to the bed. A black pouch on a nightstand contained additional baggies of methamphetamine. The officers discovered defendant’s identification card under the pouch.
Calvert returned to the family room and asked defendant if she had a “problem if [he] searched her purse,” which was near a fireplace about five feet from her. Defendant consented to the search, and Calvert found what he believed was a pay/owe sheet.
Leal testified she was the last officer to enter the residence. She drew her firearm, but re-holstered it once the house was deemed “clear.” A second man was “proned out” on the floor in the kitchen area and defendant was sitting on a sofa. Eventually, Calvert or Heuberger asked Leal to search defendant for narcotics. Leal knew women often concealed contraband in their bras and undergarments. She accompanied defendant into a bathroom and asked defendant if she had drugs or weapons on her. Defendant claimed she did not. Leal asked for permission to search her, and defendant agreed. Leal detected a baggie or plastic item in the lower part of her bra, and told defendant to unsnap it. When she did, a baggie containing a crystalline substance fell out. Leal spoke briefly to defendant, completed the search, and escorted her back to the living room. She did not recall searching defendant other than the one time in the bathroom.
Defendant’s testimony contradicted the officers in several respects. She claimed the officers handcuffed her after apprehending Storm and walking him back to the living room. They lifted her up by her arms and moved her to a wall by the front door. Calvert came over and began to search her. She told him to “get his filthy hands off” her, and testified no one asked her whether she consented to a search of her person or her purse.
The court denied defendant’s suppression motion following a hearing conducted in May 2005 and January 2006. The court expressly declared it believed the officers’ account of the search and rejected defendant’s testimony as untruthful. On January 16, 2006, defendant pleaded guilty and received a nine-year prison sentence.
II
Discussion
Defendant contends the officers illegally detained her when they allegedly obtained her consent to search, therefore the trial court should have suppressed the evidence obtained from the search. (See Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 791, fn. 12.) We disagree.
The standard of appellate review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is well established. We defer to the trial court’s express or implied factual findings if supported by substantial evidence, but independently apply constitutional principles to the trial court’s factual findings in determining the legality of the search under the Fourth Amendment. (People v. Glaser (1995) 11 Cal.4th 354, 362 (Glaser).)
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits seizures of persons, including brief investigative detentions, when they are “‘unreasonable.’” (People v. Souza (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229.) A detention is not “‘unreasonable’ if the police officer [can] ‘point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,’ would warrant the intrusion.” (Ibid.) “[T]he temporary detention of a person for the purpose of investigating possible criminal activity may, because it is less intrusive than an arrest, be based on ‘some objective manifestation’ that criminal activity is afoot and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity.” (Id. at p. 230.) The court must take into account “‘the totality of the circumstances’ in determining the propriety of an investigative stop or temporary detention.” (Ibid.)
Defendant refers to cases addressing whether police may detain bystanders or visitors while lawfully searching or arresting another person during a residential search. Generally, officers may briefly detain these persons to ascertain their identity and connection to the premises, and to protect the safety of officers and other persons present. These cases permit extended detention if the officers are aware of specific facts connecting the person to suspected criminal activity on the premises or establishing a danger to the officers if the person is released. (Michigan v. Summers (1981) 452 U.S. 692; Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 363-365; People v. Matelski (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 837; People v. Hannah (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1335.)
Defendant distinguishes the above cases to support her argument officers illegally detained her. She notes the officers personally knew her and Storm, were familiar with the residence and “knew exactly what they might encounter.” She also asserts the prosecution failed to present evidence she posed a physical threat to the officers.
True, defendant was not a visitor but an occupant of the premises and the girlfriend of the probationer. But the officers had received information from defendant and other informants that Storm and defendant had been selling drugs from the residence. Defendant correctly notes the officers knew defendant personally, as a drug seller and confidential informant, but we fail to see how this fact undermines the basis for the detention. When the officers arrived, Storm immediately ran toward a bedroom, evidently trying to dispose of contraband. Given all the information available to the officers, they could reasonably suspect Storm and defendant were involved in criminal activity.
Defendant’s detention is also supported by the officers’ legitimate concern for their safety while performing a search of the residence. As Glaser recognized, “[t]he police interest in protecting against violence during the search of a home for narcotics has been widely recognized” because it is likely that drug dealers are armed or have access to firearms. (Glaser, supra, 11 Cal.4th at pp. 367-368.)
The brief nature of the detention here demonstrates the intrusion was relatively mild. According to Calvert, no more than 10 minutes elapsed between the time the officers entered and the time Leal emerged from the bathroom with the baggie of methamphetamine. According to Heuberger, it took just seconds to gain control of Storm and return him to the living room. The officers immediately walked defendant outside, where she consented to the search. Thus, the officers did not detain defendant any longer than necessary to dispel their suspicions. Nor did the officers detain defendant at gunpoint or handcuff her during their initial encounter. We therefore conclude defendant’s detention did not violate her Fourth Amendment rights.
III
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., IKOLA, J.