People v. Lucas

8 Citing cases

  1. People v. Simon

    101 Ill. App. 3d 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)   Cited 7 times

    People v. Pickett (1973), 54 Ill.2d 280, 296 N.E.2d 856. Defendant also contends that the People failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he organized a calculated criminal conspiracy, relying on People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 337 N.E.2d 103. In Lucas, the court stated that in order to prove that a defendant either organized or directed a conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, there must be evidence which shows in substance that the defendant either had sufficient influence over his co-conspirators to be in a position to systematize their activities or to give orders or instructions that would to some extent be binding. 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314, 337 N.E.2d 103, 107.

  2. People v. Melgoza

    231 Ill. App. 3d 510 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992)   Cited 32 times
    Finding that suspicious activities together while an illegal transaction was in progress were sufficient for a prima facie case of conspiracy

    To prove that a defendant organized or directed such a conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, there must be evidence which shows that the defendant either had sufficient influence over his co-conspirators to be in a position to systematize their activities or to give orders or instructions that would to some extent be binding. People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314-15, 337 N.E.2d 103. Defendant contends on appeal that the State failed to prove that such a conspiracy existed between defendant, Victor and Jiminez on May 25. Defendant notes that Jiminez was acquitted and the State failed to present any evidence that the three agreed to do anything.

  3. People v. Garcia

    195 Ill. App. 3d 621 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)   Cited 4 times

    The court in People v. Lucas held: "In order to prove that the defendant either organized or directed a conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance there must be evidence which shows, in substance, that the defendant either had sufficient influence over his coconspirators to be in a position to systematize their activities or to give orders or instructions that would to some extent be binding." ( People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314-15, 337 N.E.2d 103, 107.) The Lucas court also held that the degree to which a defendant participates in a transaction must be measured against the amount of participation of the other parties. Lucas, 33 Ill. App.3d at 315, 337 N.E.2d at 107.

  4. People v. Unes

    143 Ill. App. 3d 716 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)   Cited 3 times

    ) This court has previously held that the offense of calculated criminal drug conspiracy requires proof "that the defendant either had sufficient influence over his co-conspirators to be in a position to systematize their activities or to give orders or instructions that would to some extent be binding," and in keeping with legislative intent, the statute "must be read to be confined to those offenders who can be said to exercise a governing or determining influence over narcotics violations." ( People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314, 337 N.E.2d 103, 107.) Further, to determine whether any one of the defendants in a conspiracy has the requisite sufficient influence, the extent of his involvement must be measured against that of his co-conspirators.

  5. People v. Shimkus

    482 N.E.2d 194 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 4 times
    In Shimkus, 135 Ill. App.3d at 988, 482 N.E.2d at 197, the defendant had actual possession of $4,000 in drug proceeds for a period of time; thus, the jury could have inferred that his share would have been more than $500.

    (Emphasis added.) People v. Biers (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 576, 581, 353 N.E.2d 389, 393; accord, People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314, 337 N.E.2d 103, 107 ("The statute * * * penalizes those * * * who profit * * * in the amount of at least $500."). • 3 The sole authority cited by the Biers court for its "profits" language is the legislative intent expressed in section 100 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act to "penalize most heavily the illicit traffickers or profiteers of controlled substances, who propagate and perpetuate the abuse of such substances with reckless disregard for its consumptive consequences upon every element of society."

  6. People v. Jones

    75 Ill. App. 3d 214 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 14 times
    Finding "substantial evidence that defendant had a means of knowing that the substance in question contained cannabis" where the "evidence revealed that defendant smoked some of the substance *** and that after smoking some of it *** he agreed with *** characterization of the marijuana as "fair stuff for being Mexican."

    In fact, he was the only conspirator involved in the transaction. Moreover, there is sufficient evidence to establish that defendant directed the conspiracy as well. Although no court has construed what is necessary to prove that one has organized or directed a conspiracy under this statute, the Illinois Appellate Court, Third District, in People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 337 N.E.2d 103, has answered this question with respect to the calculated criminal drug conspiracy statute (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56 1/2, par. 1405), which is substantially identical to the provision here in question. What the court there stated applies with equal vigor to the cannabis conspiracy provision:

  7. People v. Hickman

    163 Ill. 2d 250 (Ill. 1994)   Cited 109 times
    Finding no violation of the proportionate penalties clause based on a comparison of criminal drug conspiracy to calculated criminal drug conspiracy

    The offense punishes the organizer of the conspiracy more severely than the other, less culpable members thereof, without regard to the amount of drugs that is the object of the conspiracy. 720 ILCS 570/405 (West 1992); see People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 314-15. Accordingly, Moreno's due process challenge fails.

  8. People v. Lane

    478 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985)   Cited 3 times

    • 4 Finally, defendant argues that if this court affirms his conviction under the drug conspiracy statute, it must vacate his additional conviction for the delivery of a controlled substance, which is a lesser included offense of the conspiracy crime. We agree with defendant that it was error to convict and sentence on both the offense of delivery of a controlled substance and the offense of calculated criminal drug conspiracy because both offenses arose from the same conduct (see People v. Lucas (1975), 33 Ill. App.3d 309, 337 N.E.2d 103), and, accordingly, we affirm defendant's conviction and sentence for calculated criminal drug conspiracy and reverse his convictions and sentences for delivery of a controlled substance. Affirmed in part, reversed in part.