Opinion
E077970
06-02-2022
In re L.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L.S., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles Ragland, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. J290728, Charles J. Umeda, Judge. Affirmed.
Mi Kim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles Ragland, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Heather B. Arambarri, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MENETREZ J.
Defendant L.S., a minor, appeals from an order of wardship (Welf & Inst. Code, §§ 602, 725), which was based on a finding that he possessed a firearm at school in violation of subdivisions (b) and (f)(1) of Penal Code section 626.9. L.S., who was 13 years old at the time of the violation, contends that the record does not contain clear and convincing evidence that he understood the wrongfulness of his actions, so the presumption that children under age 14 lack criminal capacity was not rebutted. (Pen. Code, § 26.) We affirm.
BACKGROUND
On September 27, 2021, campus safety officer Brown received an anonymous call identifying L.S. by his first name and stating he was on the middle school campus with a gun in his backpack. Brown and an assistant principle escorted L.S. from his class to the office, where Brown explained to L.S. that he had received a report that there was a firearm in L.S.'s backpack. L.S. denied having a firearm and said they could not search him. The school principal arrived and spoke with L.S., who eventually gave him the backpack. Another safety officer, Rodriguez, searched the backpack and felt the firearm inside but could not figure out how to retrieve it. Brown then opened a concealed zippered compartment on the underside of the backpack and retrieved a black handgun containing a loaded magazine.
A petition was filed pursuant to subdivision (a) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, alleging L.S. possessed a firearm in a school zone in violation of Penal Code section 626.9, subdivisions (b) and (f)(1). At the contested jurisdiction hearing, after the People rested, defense counsel argued that the prosecution had failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that L.S. understood the wrongfulness of his conduct. (See In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 234 (Manuel L.) ["the prosecution must present clear and convincing evidence that the minor knows the wrongfulness of his conduct in order to sustain a finding that he is a person falling within [Welfare & Institutions Code] section 602"].) The prosecution argued that there was clear and convincing evidence that L.S. knew his actions were wrong in that he had intentionally concealed the weapon in a place that was difficult to find and denied possessing the firearm when confronted. The court took the matter under submission.
The day after the jurisdiction hearing, the People filed a motion to reopen the case to introduce further evidence on the issue of capacity, namely, a Gladys R. questionnaire that had been administered to L.S. The court denied the motion. The court subsequently found the petition's allegations true beyond a reasonable doubt, found by clear and convincing evidence that L.S. understood the wrongfulness of his actions, declared him a ward of the court, and placed him in the custody of his mother on terms and conditions of probation.
A "Gladys R. questionnaire" documents questions and responses "designed to determine if an arrestee under the age of 14 understands the wrongfulness of his or her actions, within the meaning of [Penal Code] section 26." (In re Joseph H. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 517, 529 (Joseph H.); In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855 (Gladys R.)
DISCUSSION
L.S. argues there was insufficient evidence to rebut the statutory presumption of incapacity of children under 14 years old. Penal Code section 26 provides in pertinent part: "All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [¶] One-Children under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness." (Pen. Code, § 26.) The statute "embodies a venerable truth . . . that a young child cannot be held to the same standard of criminal responsibility as his [or her] more experienced elders." (Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 864.) "[Welfare and Institutions Code s]ection 602 should apply only to those who are over 14 and may be presumed to understand the wrongfulness of their acts and to those under the age of 14 who clearly appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct." (Id. at p. 867.) The presumption of incapacity for children under 14 may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the child appreciated the wrongfulness of the conduct when it was committed. (Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 232.)
"[W]e review the juvenile court's ruling under Penal Code section 26 to determine if it is supported by substantial evidence." (In re J.E. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 309, 313 (J.E.).) "Substantial evidence is 'evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value-from which a reasonable trier of fact could have made the requisite finding under the governing standard of proof.'" (Ibid.) "When reviewing a finding that a fact has been proved by clear and convincing evidence, the question before the appellate court is whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highly probable that the fact was true." (Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1011.) "In conducting its review, the court must view the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and give appropriate deference to how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibility of witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence." (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) "The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the defendant's guilt, and if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact's findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal of the judgment. [Citation.]" (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 298 (Jerry M.).) "We do not reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment, but merely determine if there are sufficient facts to support the findings of the trial court." (In re Matthew S. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 315, 321.)
"In determining whether the minor knows of the wrongfulness of his conduct, the court must often rely on circumstantial evidence [citation] including the minor's age, experience and understanding, as well as the circumstances of the offense including its method of commission and concealment [citation]." (Jerry M., supra, 59 Cal.App.4th at p. 298.) Here, L.S. was 13 years 4 months old at the time of the violation. The closer a child is to the age of 14, the more likely they are to appreciate the wrongfulness of their conduct. (In re Cindy E. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 393, 399 & fn. 3.; In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 53 (Paul C.).)
Circumstantial evidence tending to show consciousness of guilt, such as efforts to deny or conceal the unlawful conduct, is commonly found to constitute sufficient evidence establishing knowledge of wrongfulness under Penal Code section 26. (See, e.g., People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 379 ["Defendant's flight from the scene and his conflicting statements to detectives constitute clear proof that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his act."]; Paul C., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 53 [minor's knowledge of wrongfulness could be inferred from his having chosen a secluded location for the offense, which indicated his desire to minimize the risk of detection and punishment, as well as his initial denial in response to questioning]; In re James B. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 862, 873 ["Having initially lied and hidden the evidence, and then leading the deputy to it, all indicate that minor was aware of the wrongfulness of his actions."].) Here, the court inferred that L.S. knew the wrongfulness of his actions because L.S. concealed the weapon and denied possessing it when confronted by school authorities. When Brown told L.S. there was a report that he had a gun in his backpack, L.S. denied having a gun but declined to consent to a search of his backpack. The juvenile court reasonably inferred from L.S.'s conduct that L.S. knew having a gun at school was wrong and that he could be punished for having it. After L.S. handed over his backpack to be searched, Rodriguez felt the gun inside but could not figure out how to retrieve the weapon, because it was inside "a hidden compartment." Brown eventually located the compartment on the bottom of the backpack, opened the zipper, and reached his hand up inside the compartment to retrieve the gun. Brown testified that the compartment was on the underside of the backpack and was secured by a zipper that slid inside so it was not visible and would not be accessible to someone unfamiliar with that particular style of backpack. The court properly inferred from L.S.'s concealment of the gun that he knew it was wrong to possess a firearm at school. (See In re Marven C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 482, 487 [knowledge of wrongfulness inferred from conduct, including that "appellant carried a concealed weapon to the school," displayed it to victim, then left the premises when a school security guard appeared]; Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 539 [minor's knowledge of wrongfulness was shown by "the fact he hid the gun under his bed to avoid getting caught"].)
L.S. argues that because he denied having a gun only after Brown told him that there was an accusation against him, an investigation would be conducted, and the police were on their way, the denial does not show consciousness of guilt. L.S. argues that the prospect of a police investigation and punishment prompted his denial, rather than any prior understanding that his conduct was wrong. In support of that argument, L.S. cites a narrative summary contained in a probation report, but the testimony presented to the court at the jurisdiction hearing never mentioned any of the facts on which the argument relies: There was no testimony that L.S. was told there would be an investigation or that police had already been summoned. Moreover, even if the evidence before the juvenile court showed the facts on which L.S. relies, his argument would still fail because it misconstrues our task in reviewing for substantial evidence. We must review the record in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's determinations and draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence to support its findings and orders; we do not reweigh the evidence or draw contrary inferences from the facts. (J.E., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pp. 313-314.)
L.S. also argues that a single denial, standing alone, cannot overcome the Penal Code section 26 presumption, citing In re Michael B. (1975) 44 Cal.App.3d 443. In Michael B., the only evidence regarding the nine-year-old minor's capacity "was the brief statement of the police officer that Michael said yes when asked if he knew the difference between right and wrong." (Id. at p. 446.) Here, by contrast, the court expressly considered L.S.'s age, experience, and understanding and reviewed all the evidence, making detailed findings on the record regarding how the circumstances support a finding that L.S. had the requisite criminal capacity. At the time of the offense, L.S. was roughly eight months away from attaining the age at which the law presumes him to have capacity. (See Paul C., supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 53 [minor was "13 years and 4 months old" when offense was committed].) Taken together, L.S.'s age, his denial that he possessed the firearm, and his intentional concealment of the weapon constitute substantial evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that he appreciated the wrongfulness of his actions.
L.S. also argues that the inference of intentional concealment is undercut by the facts that Rodriguez was able to feel the gun and that the anonymous tip indicated that L.S. must have told someone he had the weapon. We are not persuaded. L.S. did not carry the gun openly or in a main compartment of his backpack. Rather, he carried it in a compartment that was particularly difficult to locate and access. The juvenile court could reasonably infer that L.S. was trying to hide it. Facts showing the minor did not succeed in concealing his conduct "may raise an inference that [he] was not a sophisticated criminal, but they do not support an inference that he failed to appreciate the wrongfulness of his act." (Joseph H., supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 540.) The fact that L.S. apparently revealed his possession of the firearm to another student but then denied possessing it to the school safety officer only reinforces the inference that L.S. understood the wrongfulness of his actions.
Finally, L.S. points to other cases that found substantial evidence to support a finding under Penal Code section 26 from other sources, including evidence of prior similar conduct for which the minor had been punished, testimony from the minor's relatives regarding the child's understanding of right and wrong, and psychological evaluations. While those sources may provide evidence of a minor's capacity, L.S. points to no authority holding that evidence from such sources is required. An appellant "does not show the evidence is insufficient by . . . arguing about what evidence is not in the record . . . ." (People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.)
For all of the reasons above, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's determination that when L.S. possessed the gun at school, he knew the wrongfulness of his conduct.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: SLOUGH Acting P.J., RAPHAEL J.