Opinion
F080392
05-21-2020
In re L.S., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.S., Defendant and Appellant.
Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. JJD070843)
OPINION
THE COURT APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Robin L. Wolfe, Judge. Kristen Owen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jeffrey A. White, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Franson, J. and Snauffer, J.
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INTRODUCTION
Appellant L.S. was declared a ward of the court after a Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 petition was filed and he admitted committing first degree burglary, receiving stolen property, committing battery on school, park, or hospital property, and resisting arrest. L.S. spent 33 days on electronic monitoring before being placed in a custodial program. He contends he is entitled to custody credits for the 33 days of electronic monitoring. We disagree and affirm.
References to code sections are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise specified. --------
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Because L.S. raises only a legal issue of whether he is entitled to custody credit for time spent on electronic monitoring, we dispense with a detailed recitation of facts.
A section 602 petition was filed against L.S. on August 21, 2017, alleging he committed first degree burglary, received stolen property, dissuaded a witness, committed battery on school, park, or hospital property, and resisted arrest. On September 6, 2017, he admitted all but the dissuading a witness count and that count was dismissed. The juvenile court set a maximum period of confinement at six years eight months, and L.S. was released to his mother's custody on electronic monitoring pending the disposition hearing.
On September 12, 2017, L.S. was ordered detained pending the disposition hearing for violation of a court order. On October 10, 2017, the juvenile court declared L.S. a ward of the juvenile court, placed him on probation, and released him to his mother's custody on electronic monitoring.
On November 6, 2017, L.S. was taken into custody for a violation of probation. He admitted the violation and the juvenile court continued him as a ward and ordered him to complete one year of confinement in the mid-term program.
A second notice of violation was filed on December 19, 2017. L.S. again admitted the violation and the juvenile court continued him as a ward. L.S. was placed in the long-term program. His placement was modified on March 7, 2018, to the mid-term program.
L.S. violated probation a third time and was ordered to restart the mid-term program. After a fourth violation of probation, he was ordered committed to the short-term program.
On September 18, 2018, L.S. was released from custody and placed with his father. The case was transferred to Santa Barbara County. The case was transferred back to Tulare County on April 10, 2019.
A second section 602 petition was filed against L.S. on June 27, 2019, alleging he resisted arrest. He was released from custody on July 1, 2019, and placed on electronic monitoring pending disposition.
On July 9, 2019, the probation department asked the juvenile court to terminate electronic monitoring due to L.S. violating the terms and conditions. The juvenile court issued an order for the arrest of L.S.
The second section 602 petition was amended to allege two counts of resisting arrest. L.S. admitted one count and pled no contest to the other count.
On October 22, 2019, L.S. was committed to the long-term program for 24 months. The maximum term of confinement was set at seven years and he was awarded 417 days of credit for time served.
L.S. filed a timely notice of appeal on November 27, 2019.
DISCUSSION
The parties agree that L.S. spent a total of 33 days on electronic monitoring. They disagree on whether L.S. is entitled to custody credits for the 33 days of electronic monitoring.
Physical confinement is defined under the statute as "placement in a juvenile hall, ranch, camp, forestry camp or secure juvenile home pursuant to Section 730, or in any institution operated by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Justice." (§ 726(d)(5).) In In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, our Supreme Court held that a minor is entitled to credit for any time spent in physical confinement, not through direct application of Penal Code section 2900.5 or via equal protection concepts, but as an interpretation of legislative intent behind the expression " ' "maximum term of imprisonment which could be imposed upon an adult" ' " in section 726. (In re Randy J. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1497, 1503 (Randy J.).) Moreover, section 726 specifically defines " 'physical confinement' as excluding time not spent in a secure facility." (In re Randy J., at p. 1505.)
Although L.S.'s liberty was restricted somewhat by wearing an electronic monitor, his home did not qualify as a secure placement within the meaning of section 726. L.S.'s time on electronic monitoring was spent while he was in the custody of a parent and at home, where he was able to leave the home, including to go to and from school. In the case of In re Lorenzo L. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1076, the appellate court held that time spent by a juvenile on electronic monitoring does not qualify for custody credits because it is not time spent in physical confinement. (Id. at p. 1080.)
L.S. argues that People v. Raygoza (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 593 entitles him to custody credit for time spent on electronic monitoring. However, the defendant in Raygoza was an adult and the provisions of Penal Code section 2900.5, addressing custody credit, applied. (Id. at pp. 598-599.) The case does not support L.S.'s position that he is entitled to credit for electronic monitoring as a juvenile.
Electronic monitoring was specifically added to Penal Code section 2900.5 by the Legislature in 1991. (People v. Lapaille (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1163-1164.) However, Penal Code section 2900.5 does not apply to the juvenile court system. (In re Michael W. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 946, 953-954.) The Legislature could have provided similarly for juveniles. The Legislature has not.
Thus, we conclude that appellant is not entitled to credit for the days he participated in the electronic monitoring program while at home in the custody of a parent. (In re Lorenzo L., supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 1080; Randy J., supra, 22 Cal.App.4th at p. 1505.)
DISPOSITION
The disposition order, including the award of custody credits, is affirmed.