Opinion
D080231
04-05-2023
In re L. R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. v. L. R., Defendant and Appellant. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum, and Sahar Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County No. J243465, Robert J. Trentacosta, Judge. Affirmed in part; reversed in part; remanded with directions.
Laura Vavakin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Collette C. Cavalier, Kathryn Kirschbaum, and Sahar Karimi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
HUFFMAN, Acting P. J.
After the juvenile court denied his motion to suppress evidence, L.R. admitted possessing a firearm in violation of Penal Code section 29610. At the disposition hearing, the court took custody of L.R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (a)(3) and committed him to Urban Camp for a period not to exceed 130 days.
Statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise specified.
In exchange for the admission, the prosecution dismissed a misdemeanor count of unlawfully possessing ammunition (§ 29650).
L.R. appeals, contending the court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence and failing to express its discretion regarding whether to declare L.R.'s wobbler offense a felony or a misdemeanor. We conclude that the court did not err in denying the suppression motion. However, as the People concede, this matter should be remanded to allow the juvenile court to declare the offense to be a felony or a misdemeanor as required by Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An arrest warrant was issued for L.R. after he failed to report to his court-ordered program on a prior petition. After the arrest warrant was issued, L.R. and his mother got into an argument. L.R.'s mother asked the police to pick up L.R. on the warrant at a motel where they were staying.
Along with two other police officers, Officer Savannah Roberson went to a hotel in Escondido to arrest L.R. Before arriving at the hotel, Roberson confirmed with juvenile hall that a valid arrest warrant for L.R. existed.
When the officers entered the motel room, L.R. was sitting on one of the two beds. A black backpack was next to L.R., touching his left leg.
The officers handcuffed L.R. and searched him. Then the officers moved L.R. to the other bed, away from the backpack. Although the backpack initially was positioned near the head of the bed, at some point, L.R.'s mother moved the backpack toward the foot of the bed, closer to L.R.'s position on the opposite bed.
Officer Robert Benavente stood by the bathroom door because he had been told that L.R.'s sister was in the bathroom, but he did not know "if she was alone or who she was."
About seven or eight minutes later, while the officers were awaiting a second confirmation of the warrant (this time, from the Escondido Police Department), Benavente unzipped L.R.'s backpack to put L.R.'s belongings inside it. Although L.R. had stated that he did not want to take his belongings with him, Benavente noticed that L.R. was not wearing socks or shoes and "felt bad taking [L.R.] without any of his personal belongings." After unzipping the bag and shinning a flashlight inside of it, Benavente saw a sock inside the backpack that appeared to contain a handgun. Benavente then checked with Roberson to confirm he could search inside of the sock incident to L.R.'s arrest. Benavente then looked inside the sock and found a gun. After finding the gun, Benavente searched the rest of the backpack and found a box containing 21 rounds of ammunition.
The prosecution filed a petition alleging a felony count of possessing a concealable firearm without written permission of the minor's parent or guardian (§ 29610; count 1) and a misdemeanor count of unlawfully possessing ammunition (§ 29650; count 2).
L.R. moved to suppress the handgun and ammunition, arguing the search of the backpack was not a valid search incident to arrest. To this end, L.R.'s counsel maintained the police could have searched the backpack when they first entered the room. However, because they waited eight minutes after the backpack had been moved away from L.R. before they searched it, the search incident to arrest exception did not apply. The prosecution argued the search of the backpack was valid under the search incident to arrest exception because that exception includes the area in the immediate control of the minor at the time of the arrest. As the backpack was in that defined area when L.R. was arrested, the search was valid.
The court denied the motion to suppress, finding the search was valid under the search incident to arrest exception.
L.R. subsequently admitted count 1. The court took custody of L.R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 726, subdivision (a)(3) and committed him to Urban Camp for a period not to exceed 130 days.
L.R. timely filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I MOTION TO SUPPRESS
We review issues relating to the suppression of evidence obtained in a governmental search under federal constitutional standards. (People v. Troyer (2011) 51 Cal.4th 599, 606.) "The Fourth Amendment to the federal Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures." (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 365.) As the United States Supreme Court has stated," '[T]he ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is "reasonableness."' [Citation.] Our cases have determined that '[w]here a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing, . . . reasonableness generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.' . . . In the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the warrant requirement." (Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 381-382.) "One such exception is a search incident to lawful arrest....[¶] . . . [¶] A search incident to arrest 'has traditionally been justified by the reasonableness of searching for weapons, instruments of escape, and evidence of crime when a person is taken into official custody and lawfully detained.'" (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1213-1214; see Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332, 338 (Gant) [the exception "derives from interests in officer safety and evidence preservation that are typically implicated in arrest situations"].) The boundaries of an authorized search incident to a lawful arrest extend to" 'the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-constru[ed] . . . to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.'" (Gant, at p. 339, quoting Chimel v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 752, 763 (Chimel).) The United States Supreme Court has defined the exception's limited scope as "commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy." (Gant, at p. 339; accord Macabeo, at p. 1218 ["the search incident exception may be limited when attendant circumstances show the arrestee had no potential to put an officer in jeopardy, to escape, or to destroy evidence"].) The People bear the burden of establishing that the exception applies. (People v. Schmitz (2012) 55 Cal.4th 909, 933 (Schmitz).)
" 'In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence, we defer to that court's factual findings, express or implied, if they are supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] We exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts presented, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.' [Citation.]" (People v. Silveria and Travis (2020) 10 Cal.5th 195, 232.) In performing this function, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court's ruling. (People v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.) We do not reevaluate the credibility of witnesses or resolve conflicts in the testimony. Instead, the juvenile court performs these tasks and weighs the evidence. (Ibid.)
Here, the parties do not disagree on the facts underlying the search. The police arrested L.R. pursuant to a valid arrest warrant. L.R. was handcuffed and sitting on one of two beds in a motel room. L.R.'s mother and sister also were in the room. L.R.'s backpack was immediately within L.R.'s reach at the time he was arrested. After L.R. was handcuffed, L.R.'s mother moved the backpack closer to him. The backpack was searched about eight minutes after L.R. was handcuffed.
L.R. maintains that the search could not be considered incident to an arrest because he was handcuffed, no officers were in danger, and the backpack was searched eight minutes after he was arrested. To this end, he urges us to follow People v. Summers (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 288 (Summers) and People v. Leal (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1051 (Leal). Relying on People v. Rege (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1584 (Rege), the People counter that the search of L.R.'s backpack was a valid search incident to an arrest as the backpack was in L.R.'s immediate control at the time of his arrest. As such, the People insist the fact that L.R. was handcuffed at the time of the search and eight minutes transpired from the time of his arrest to when the backpack was searched is insignificant. To begin our analysis, we turn to the three cases on which the parties rely.
In Summers, police officers approached the defendant's trailer with an arrest warrant and encountered a woman, who said she was a roommate and lived there with the defendant and another man, who was nearby in the trailer park. (Summers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 289-290.) One officer roused the defendant, who was asleep in the trailer, handcuffed him, and escorted him toward the door, while the other officer "patted down" the bed where the defendant had been sleeping and discovered a sawed-off shotgun. The defendant was about 10 feet from the bed and inside or just outside the trailer door at the time of the search. (Id. at p. 290.) The court concluded that the search was justified for officer safety reasons under Chimel based on the "fluid situation in close quarters," which included one roommate present and free of police control and another roommate "unaccounted for when the weapon was chanced upon." (Id. at p. 291.)
In Chimel, the Supreme Court determined that the search of an entire house incident to the defendant's arrest inside the house on suspicion of burglary "went far beyond the [arrestee]'s person and the area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon or something that could have been used as evidence against him." (Chimel, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 768.)
In Leal, officers arrested the defendant outside his house pursuant to an arrest warrant for two (undescribed) misdemeanors and placed him in a patrol car about 30 to 38 feet away from his place of arrest. (Leal, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1058.) Several officers searched the house and found no one else present. (Ibid.) "Two or three minutes later, with the scene secure, officers' safety assured, and defendant unable to reach or destroy any evidence in the house, a police officer searched the area near the front door- the site of defendant's arrest-and found the handgun under a sweatshirt." (Id. at p. 1059.) The court found the search unlawful, stating,"' "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest." '" (Id. at p. 1060, quoting Chambers v. Maroney (1970) 399 U.S. 42, 47.) Citing Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332, the court also stated: "A different rule of reasonableness applies when the police have a degree of control over a suspect but do not have control of the entire situation. In such circumstances-e.g., in which third parties known to be nearby are unaccounted for, or in which a suspect has not yet been fully secured and retains a degree of ability to overpower the police or destroy evidence-the Fourth Amendment does not bar the police from searching the immediate area of the suspect's arrest as a search incident to an arrest." (Leal, at p. 1060.)
In contrast to both Summers and Leal, wherein the courts considered the circumstances at the time of the search, the court in Rege focused on the conditions at the time the defendant was arrested. There, police officers received a tip that the defendant was selling methamphetamine in a motel room. They found the defendant in a 12-by-15 foot motel room and ordered her to get on the floor next to the bed. (Rege, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1586-1587.) They handcuffed her and then searched the bed. The officers found a black pouch containing methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia about three feet from the defendant. (Id. at p. 1587.) The court determined the search proper under the search incident to an arrest exception. Citing Justice Bedsworth's concurring opinion in Summers, the court explained that the "proper focus" for determining whether a search is conducted pursuant to a lawful arrest "should be on the area into which the defendant could have grabbed at the time of his arrest, not the area that was under his [or her] immediate control at the time of the search." (Id. at p. 1590.) Applying these principles, the appellate court determined that "a valid search incident to arrest may take place even after the suspect has been arrested or immobilized" (id. at p. 1589) and concluded that the search was reasonable because it was "conducted within the area into which defendant could have reached at the time of her arrest," it was reasonably contemporaneous with the arrest, and no intervening events rendered the search unreasonable. (Id. at p. 1590.)
Yet, Rege was decided before the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332. In that case, the police made a pretextual stop for driving with a suspended license. After the defendant was arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, the police conducted a warrantless search of his car. They found drugs in the passenger compartment. The state sought to uphold the validity of the search on the ground that it was a search incident to an arrest. In concluding the search was unlawful, the court held that the "[p]olice may search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only if the arrestee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search or it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the offense of arrest." (Gant, at p. 351.)
Additionally, relevant to the issue before us, the Supreme Court summarized the scope of a search incident to an arrest as follows:
"In Chimel, we held that a search incident to arrest may only include 'the arrestee's person and the area "within his immediate control"-construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.' [Citation.] That limitation, which continues to define the boundaries of the exception, ensures that the scope of a search incident to arrest is commensurate with its purposes of protecting arresting officers and safeguarding any evidence of the offense of arrest that an arrestee might conceal or destroy. [Citation.] . . . If there is no possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search, both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not apply." (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 339.)
Moreover, the court applied this law in reconsidering the scope of the search-incident-to-arrest rule as applied to vehicle searches under New York v. Belton (1981) 453 U.S. 454 (Belton). The court noted that Belton had been "widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the search." (Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 341.) However, the court "reject[ed] this reading of Belton and h[e]ld that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search." (Id. at p. 343.) In finding the search unlawful, the court reasoned:
"Unlike in Belton, which involved a single officer confronted with four unsecured arrestees, the five officers in this case outnumbered the three arrestees, all of whom had been handcuffed and secured in separate patrol cars before the officers searched [defendant's] car. Under those circumstances, [defendant] clearly was not within reaching distance of his car at the time of the search." (Ibid.)
The People attempt to minimize the importance of Gant by suggesting that case is "of limited application here" because it concerns the search of a vehicle. (See Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 343.) Although we acknowledge Gant concerned the search of a vehicle following the defendant's arrest, we see no need to ignore, at the very least, any general Fourth Amendment principles the United States Supreme Court discussed and/or clarified. This is especially true because the Constitution provides greater protection for a person's home than their car. (See Payton v. New York (1980) 445 U.S. 573, 585 ["[T]he 'physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is directed' "]; Schmitz, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 919 ["Homes and cars are afforded different levels of Fourth Amendment protection"].)
Certainly, the court was concerned with the circumstances that existed at the time the vehicle was searched in Gant, not circumscribing its analysis of the relevant issues to the time at which the defendant was arrested. (See Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 344.) As such, to the extent Rege, supra, 130 Cal.App.4th 1584, stands for the proposition that, in analyzing whether a search incident to arrest is valid, the court should only focus on "the area into which the defendant could have grabbed at the time of his arrest" (id. at p. 1590), we reject that conclusion. We simply cannot harmonize that interpretation of the search incident to an arrest exception with the holding of Gant. Consequently, in considering L.R.'s claim that the search of his backpack was unlawful, we must consider what was going on during the approximately eight minutes that transpired from the time L.R. was arrested and handcuffed to when the police searched the backpack.
We conclude that the facts of this case are not so distinguishable from Summers and fall within the scope of the exception articulated in Chimel and clarified in Gant. At the time the police arrested L.R., he was in a motel room. Although there were three police officers in the room, there were also two additional individuals-L.R.'s sister and mother. The primary reason for the eight minute delay between L.R.'s arrest and the search of the backpack was the police's efforts to ensure the arrest warrant was valid. In addition, during those eight minutes, L.R.'s mother moved the backpack closer to where L.R. was sitting. Also, L.R. remained in the hotel room while the backpack was searched. Thus, perhaps not as dangerous as the situation in Summers, the circumstances under which the police arrested and then, eight minutes later, searched the backpack were sufficiently fluid to constitute a valid search incident to an arrest. (See Summers, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 290-291; cf. Leal, supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 1060.) The juvenile court did not err in denying L.R.'s motion to suppress.
II
COUNT 1 AS A FELONY OR MISDEMEANOR
We agree with the parties that the section 29610 offense is a wobbler that can be a misdemeanor or a felony. (See People v. Infante (2014) 58 Cal.4th 688, 693.) When, as here, "the minor is found to have committed an offense which would in the case of an adult be punishable alternatively as a felony or a misdemeanor, the court shall declare the offense to be a misdemeanor or felony." (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 702.) This "unambiguous" language creates an "obligatory" requirement that" 'mandates the juvenile court to declare the offense a felony or misdemeanor.'" (In re Manzy W. (1997) 14 Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (Manzy W.).)
This requirement serves two purposes. It provides "a record from which the maximum term of physical confinement for an offense can be determined, particularly in the event of future adjudications." (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1205.) It "also serves the purpose of ensuring that the juvenile court is aware of, and actually exercises, its [statutory] discretion." (Id. at p. 1207.) The juvenile court thus may make the declaration at the contested jurisdictional hearing or at the dispositional hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 5.780(e)(5), 5.790(a)(1), 5.795(a).)
When there is nothing in the record indicating that the juvenile court considered whether to deem the wobbler offense a felony or misdemeanor, we will not presume the juvenile court properly exercised its discretion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. (Manzy W., supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1209.) "[N]either the pleading, the minute order, nor the setting of a felony-level period of physical confinement may substitute for a declaration by the juvenile court as to whether an offense is a misdemeanor or felony." (Id. at p. 1208.)
Here, at the jurisdictional hearing, before taking L.R.'s admission to count 1, the juvenile court stated, "I understand that you wish to admit the truth of count one. Count one is a felony. It is a violation of Penal Code section 29610, and it is essentially unlawful possession of a concealable firearm. In exchange for your admission as to count one, the People will dismiss the rest of the charges against you. [L.R.], is that your understanding of the agreement that has been reached in your case?" L.R. answered, "Yes." Under the requirements of Welfare and Institutions Code section 702, the above exchange was insufficient. There is nothing the record to indicate the juvenile court was aware that count 1 could be either a felony or a misdemeanor. Moreover, the parties did not discuss that point either. As such, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702 and Manzy W., we remand this matter to the juvenile court for it to exercise its discretion and declare whether the offense should be deemed a misdemeanor or felony.
DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the juvenile court for an express declaration under Welfare and Institutions Code section 702. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: IRION, J. BUCHANAN, J.