Id. See United States v. Griffin, 530 F.2d 739, 741, 743 (7th Cir. 1976) (finding voluntary consent where, in response to second request to enter, occupant "stepped back, leaving the door open, and led the officers into the apartment"; officers first explained basis for wanting to enter, defendant responded "no" to first request and shut door in their faces, indicating awareness of right to refuse entry and lack of intimidation by officers' authority); Davis v. United States, 327 F.2d 301, 302 (9th Cir. 1964) (officer in plain clothes knocked on defendant's door at noontime, said, "I would like to talk to Albert Davis," and in response, young girl said, "Come in"); United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 746-747 (11th Cir. 2002) (police stated purpose and requested entry); People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App. 3d 505, 510-511 (2000) (police sergeant had asked "if they could come in to find out what had happened" and that defendant, who was himself a police officer, voluntarily consented by opening door and stepping aside); State v. Tomlinson, 254 Wis. 2d 502, 517, 524 (2002) (consent to enter found where occupant opened door and walked into house in response to officer's request for permission to enter house; occupant did not claim coercion or duress). The Commonwealth also relies on Commonwealth v. Voisine, 414 Mass. 772 (1993), for the proposition that Rose's act of pointing to the kitchen was sufficiently consensual.
the court correctly ruled that the warrantless entry was not justified by consent.ΒΆ 31 The State's reliance on People v. Adams, 394 Ill.App.3d 217, 333 Ill.Dec. 71, 914 N.E.2d 490 (2009), and People v. Lozano, 316 Ill.App.3d 505, 249 Ill.Dec. 414, 736 N.E.2d 608 (2000), is misplaced. In Adams, the finding of consent was premised upon someone answering the door, pointing in the direction of the defendant, and stepping aside, which the court found to equal saying β βcome in.β β Adams, 394 Ill.App.3d at 220, 333 Ill.Dec. 71, 914 N.E.2d 490.
Thus, the court correctly ruled that the warrantless entry was not justified by consent. ΒΆ 32 The State's reliance on People v. Adams, 394 Ill. App. 3d 217 (2009), and People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App. 3d 505 (2000), is misplaced. In Adams, the finding of consent was premised upon someone answering the door, pointing in the direction of the defendant, and stepping aside, which the court found to equal saying " 'come in.
For example, consent to enter a defendant's apartment was found where, in response to an officer's request to enter a defendant's apartment to find out what happened and to straighten things out, the defendant did not verbally respond but did open the door and step aside. People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App.3d 505, 510 (2000). Consent to open a vial was found where an officer asked the defendant if he would show him the vial, and in response, the defendant handed the vial to the officer.
People v. Parker, 312 Ill. App. 3d 607, 616 (2000). In addition, it is well-settled that consent may be conveyed through conduct, as opposed to words. People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511 (2000). The circumstances must have been such that the police could have reasonably believed they had been given consent to enter.
at 15. "In reviewing for an abuse of discretion, '[t]he question is not whether the appellate court agrees with the circuit court, but whether the circuit court acted arbitrarily, without employing conscientious judgment, or whether in view of all the circumstances the court exceeded the bounds of reason and ignored recognized principles of law so that substantial prejudice resulted.' " People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App. 3d 505, 514 (2000) (quoting Moffitt v. Illinois Power Co., 248 Ill. App. 2d 752, 758 (1993)). ΒΆ 47 Mr. Geiger argues that, rather than conducting a balancing test, "[t]he trial court engaged in the type of reflexive, summary admission of a defendant's prior conviction that the Illinois Supreme Court cautioned against."
A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, without employing conscientious judgment, or exceeds the bounds of reason and ignores recognized principles of law resulting in a substantial prejudice to defendant. People v. Lozano, 316 Ill.App.3d 505, 514, 249 Ill.Dec. 414, 736 N.E.2d 608 (2000). After it heard arguments from defendant and the State on three separate occasions, the trial court referenced case law used to make its decision, and, even though not required to do so, noted several of the factors used to make its decision.
However, the credibility of the conflicting testimony between the defendant and Officer Willer is best determined by the trial judge, whose findings will not be overturned unless manifestly erroneous or clearly unreasonable. See People v. Lozano, 316 Ill. App. 3d 505, 511 (2000). The defendant argues that Officer Willer's statement that he would seek a search warrant and leave an officer in her residence in the meantime amounted to coercion.