Opinion
233 KA 13–01831
06-14-2019
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rodney J. LOWMAN, Defendant–Appellant.
JEFFREY WICKS, PLLC, ROCHESTER (JEFFREY WICKS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
JEFFREY WICKS, PLLC, ROCHESTER (JEFFREY WICKS OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
SANDRA DOORLEY, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, ROCHESTER (LISA GRAY OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., SMITH, CARNI, NEMOYER, AND CURRAN, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.
Memorandum: Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, upon a jury verdict, of resisting arrest ( Penal Law § 205.30 ). The conviction arises out of a 2012 incident in which a police officer stopped a vehicle in which defendant was a passenger. Upon entering defendant's name in a database, the officer discovered that defendant had an outstanding bench warrant in connection with a 2005 harassment charge. The officer and a colleague then approached the vehicle and attempted to execute the warrant. As the officers tried to handcuff defendant, however, he pulled away and ran down the street.
A "person is guilty of resisting arrest when he intentionally prevents or attempts to prevent a police officer ... from effecting an authorized arrest" ( Penal Law § 205.30 [emphasis added] ). Insofar as relevant here, "[i]t is an essential element of the crime of resisting arrest that the arrest be authorized and, absent proof that the arresting officer had a warrant ... to arrest defendant for commission of some offense, a conviction cannot stand" ( People v. Alejandro, 70 N.Y.2d 133, 135, 517 N.Y.S.2d 927, 511 N.E.2d 71 [1987] ). For these purposes, only a facially valid warrant will confer authority to arrest (see People v. Franklin, 288 A.D.2d 751, 754–755, 733 N.Y.S.2d 283 [3d Dept. 2001], lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 728, 740 N.Y.S.2d 701, 767 N.E.2d 158 [2002] ; People v. Winslow, 153 A.D.2d 965, 967–968, 545 N.Y.S.2d 405 [3d Dept. 1989] ).
Defendant contends that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence with respect to the officer's authority to arrest him. We reject that contention. "An arrest warrant is valid on its face when it follows the statutory form" ( Boose v. City of Rochester, 71 A.D.2d 59, 66, 421 N.Y.S.2d 740 [4th Dept. 1979] ; see McIntyre v. State of New York, 142 A.D.2d 856, 857, 530 N.Y.S.2d 898 [3d Dept. 1988] ), and there is no dispute that the bench warrant in this case fully complied with the governing statutory provisions (see CPL 530.70 ). Thus, it is undisputed that the warrant was facially valid, and it necessarily follows that the officer was authorized to arrest defendant for purposes of the resisting arrest statute (see Winslow, 153 A.D.2d at 967–968, 545 N.Y.S.2d 405 ; cf. Franklin, 288 A.D.2d at 753–754, 733 N.Y.S.2d 283 ).
Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that the statutory speedy trial period had expired on the charge underlying the bench warrant did not vitiate the warrant's facial validity and thereby negate the officer's authority to execute it for purposes of the resisting arrest statute (see Matter of James T., 189 A.D.2d 580, 580, 592 N.Y.S.2d 36 [1st Dept. 1993] ; Matter of Charles M., 143 A.D.2d 96, 96–97, 531 N.Y.S.2d 346 [2d Dept. 1988] ; see generally People v. Coffaro, 52 N.Y.2d 932, 934, 437 N.Y.S.2d 666, 419 N.E.2d 344 [1981] ). Indeed, it is well established that an officer's authority to arrest does not hinge on the ultimate success of the underlying prosecution, if any (see People v. Laltoo, 22 A.D.3d 230, 230, 801 N.Y.S.2d 591 [1st Dept. 2005] ; People v. Thomas, 239 A.D.2d 246, 247, 657 N.Y.S.2d 184 [1st Dept. 1997], lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 911, 663 N.Y.S.2d 523, 686 N.E.2d 235 [1997] ; People v. Martin, 222 A.D.2d 528, 529, 635 N.Y.S.2d 246 [2d Dept. 1995], lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 850, 644 N.Y.S.2d 696, 667 N.E.2d 346 [1996] ; People v. Bertino, 93 A.D.2d 972, 972–973, 461 N.Y.S.2d 613 [4th Dept. 1983] ).