Intoxication is defined as "a disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body" and is either voluntary or involuntary. § 18-1-804(4), C.R.S. (2004); People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 627 (Colo. 1987). Voluntary, or self-induced, intoxication is caused by "substances which the defendant knows or ought to know have the tendency to cause intoxication and which he knowingly introduced or allowed to be introduced into his body, unless they were introduced pursuant to medical advice or under circumstances that would afford a defense to a charge of crime."
Although a defendant has a constitutional right to offer evidence to contest the culpable mental state of a crime charged, the accused is not allowed to present evidence in support of an affirmative defense when such defense has not been raised in accordance with the applicable statutory requirements for raising that defense. People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 632 (Colo. 1987). It is within the General Assembly's authority to formulate statutory affirmative defenses, or defenses based on principles of justification or excuse, and to place appropriate limitations on the assertion of those defenses.
¶ 2 Because the trial court based its findings (in part) on our prior dictum suggesting that insanity cannot be temporary under Colorado's statutory framework, we take this opportunity to clarify People v. Garcia, 113 P.3d 775, 782 (Colo.2005), and Bieber v. People, 856 P.2d 811, 817 (Colo.1993). As we noted in People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 626 n.4, 632 (Colo.1987), Colorado does not have a special statutory provision for “temporary insanity” because the general definition of insanity outlined in section 16–8–101.5, C.R.S. (2013), encompasses both temporary and long-term bouts of insanity. Accordingly, a defendant who was found to be legally insane at the time of the offense, but shortly thereafter regains sanity, may assert insanity as an affirmative defense if he or she meets all of the other relevant requirements.
§ 18-1-804(5), C.R.S. 2007. Self-induced intoxication serves only as a defense to specific intent crimes. People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo. 1987). Involuntary intoxication is a defense to all crimes.
Under the Colorado Criminal Code, which was enacted in 1971 and became effective on July 1, 1972, ch. 121, secs. 1-5, 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 388-490, insanity is an affirmative defense to conduct proscribed as criminal. § 18-1-802, 8B C.R.S. (1986). "[A]n insane person is absolved of [criminal] responsibility for all crimes, including those that do not require proof of a mens rea element." People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 629-30 (Colo. 1987); see generally People v. Chavez, 629 P.2d 1040, 1046-48 (Colo. 1981).
The power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested with the General Assembly. People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 627 (1987); Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 390 (Colo. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1225 (1983).
Before analyzing the language in section 18-1-804 as it applies to Mion’s proffered defense, we note that there are no published Colorado cases with similar facts to those presented in this case—namely, where a defendant ingests something he knows to be an intoxicant but asserts that a different intoxicant that he didn’t know was present caused his inability to conform his conduct to the law. Both parties compare and contrast this case to People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987), and Mion also relies on People v. Turner, 680 P.2d 1290 (Colo., App. 1983). But neither of those cases is particularly instructive here.
Intoxication has been defined as a “disturbance of mental or physical capacities resulting from the introduction of any substance into the body.” People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 627 (Colo. 1987).
Under this provision, voluntary intoxication is a defense to specific-intent crimes, but not to general-intent crimes. See People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622, 628 (Colo. 1987); People v. Aragon, 653 P.2d 715, 719 (Colo. 1982). Thus, Vigil was entitled to an intoxication instruction only if the legislature has designated sexual assault on a child as a specific-intent crime.
See Colo. Const. art. V., § 1; Gorman v. People, 19 P.3d 662, 665 (Colo. 2000) ("The power to define criminal conduct and to establish the legal components of criminal liability is vested in the General Assembly."); Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Colo. 2000); People v. Low, 732 P.2d 622 (Colo. 1987); People v. Childs, 610 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1980). II.