Our standard of review on a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Lovings, 275 Ill. App.3d 19, 22 (1995). We will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
Where the evidence is conflicting, it is the prerogative of the trier of fact to ascertain the truth and resolve minor discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses. People v. Lovings, 275 Ill. App.3d 19, 22 (1995). Accordingly, a reviewing court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence presented at trial is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.
People v. Peterson, 2015 IL App (3d) 130157, ¶ 188. Although recognizing that the Collins standard of review generally applies to sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments (see People v. Lovings, 275 Ill.App.3d 19, 22 (1995) (explaining that the Collins standard of review is appropriate for sufficiency-of-the-evidence arguments)), defendant argues that de novo review applies here because the question is whether an undisputed set of facts was sufficient as a matter of law to prove an element of the offense.
See 720 ILCS 5/18-3(a)(West 2014) (the offense of vehicular hijacking is established when a defendant knowingly takes a motor vehicle from the person or the immediate presence of another by the use of force or threatening the imminent use of force.); People v. Lovings, 275 Ill. App. 3d 19, 22, (1995) (the threat of imminent force is satisfied if the fear of the alleged victim was of such a nature as in reason and common experience is likely to induce a person to part with property against his will). ¶ 19 Thus, these separate and distinct acts were sufficient to support defendant's convictions for aggravated battery, robbery and vehicular hijacking.
In this case, self-defense is not at issue, and it does not apply to an attempted robbery charge. See 720 ILCS 5/2-8, 7-4(a) (West 2002) (self-defense does not apply in cases where one commits, or attempts to commit, a forcible felony such as robbery); see also People v. Lovings, 275 Ill.App.3d 19, 24-25, 211 Ill.Dec. 769, 655 N.E.2d 1152 (1995) (declining to extend Lynch to apply to a robbery charge).
Where the evidence is conflicting, it is the prerogative of the trier of fact to ascertain the truth and resolve minor discrepancies in the testimony of the witnesses. People v. Lovings, 275 Ill. App.3d 19, 22 (1995). Nevertheless, despite the deference accorded to a jury's determination of guilt, we are mindful that we have a duty to set aside a conviction when the evidence raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt.