Opinion
April 27, 1992
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Kings County (Heller, J.).
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contentions, the police possessed probable cause to arrest him. The record reveals that Officer Anthony DeLustro and his partner observed the complainant — an Asian man — screaming and waving his arms while chasing three men. Officer DeLustro and his partner immediately gave chase. DeLustro then noticed that two other officers from his unit, who had also observed the complainant chasing the three men, joined the pursuit. At about this time, the complainant stopped running and informed Officer DeLustro that he had been robbed by the men he had been chasing. Meanwhile, the other officers from DeLustro's unit — Officers Marx and Nupe — caught up to one of the running men who had been "lagging behind" the two others. This individual told Officer Marx that he had been chasing the other two men and that these men had just robbed an Oriental man. Officers Marx and Nupe continued the pursuit and observed the two men on the corner of Fulton and Hoyt Streets. Officer Marx then saw one of the men, the defendant, remove his jacket and hand it to the other suspect. At this point, the officers were able to arrest the defendant and his accomplice.
Under the circumstances, we find that the hearing court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress. Here, the arresting officers observed the complainant pursuing the suspects, at whom he was yelling and waving his arms. Upon immediately joining the chase, the arresting officers were informed that an Oriental complainant had been robbed by the fleeing men, information whose reliability was buttressed by the officers' own personal observations at the scene (see, People v Harris, 175 A.D.2d 713; People v DeJesus, 169 A.D.2d 521; People v Crosby, 91 A.D.2d 20, 28). Thereafter, one of the officers observed the defendant hand his coat to the other suspect, in what appeared to be an attempt to disguise his identity. Considering all of the attendant factors, we conclude that the arresting officers possessed probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that the defendant was one of its perpetrators (see, People v Carrasquillo, 54 N.Y.2d 248, 254; People v Harris, supra; People v DeJesus, supra; People v Duke, 160 A.D.2d 1017; People v Davis, 144 A.D.2d 379, 380; People v Chapman, 103 A.D.2d 494; see also, People v McRay, 51 N.Y.2d 594; People v Ortiz, 103 A.D.2d 303, affd 64 N.Y.2d 997).
We have reviewed the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit (People v Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541; People v Hicks, 68 N.Y.2d 234; People v Conyers, 176 A.D.2d 340; People v Perez, 135 A.D.2d 665; see also, People v Brnja, 70 A.D.2d 17, affd 50 N.Y.2d 366). Thompson, J.P., Lawrence, Miller and Ritter, JJ., concur.