¶ 55 Our supreme court has determined the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship. Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 520-21; see also In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 36, 80 N.E.3d 694; In re Deshawn G., 2015 IL App (1st) 143316, ¶ 52, 40 N.E.3d 762; Maurice D., 2015 IL App (4th) 130323, ¶ 26; In re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327, ¶ 13, 14 N.E.3d 689. ¶ 56 The court reasoned a petition for adjudication of wardship is neither criminal in nature nor a direct action by the State to inflict punishment upon a juvenile, and thus, neither the cruel and unusual punishment clause nor the proportionate penalties clause applies in such cases.

People v. Dunn, 365 Ill. App. 3d 292, 294, 849 N.E.2d 148, 150 (2006). ¶ 36 The most serious flaw in respondent's argument lies in the fact our supreme court has determined the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship. Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 520-21; see also In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 36, 80 N.E.3d 694; In re Deshawn G., 2015 IL App (1st) 143316, ¶ 52, 40 N.E.3d 762; Maurice D., 2015 IL App (4th) 130323, ¶ 26; In re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327, ¶ 13, 14 N.E.3d 689. As noted at oral argument, neither respondent nor the State raised this in their briefs. ¶ 37 Our supreme court has held " 'Section 11 is directed to the legislature in its function of declaring what conduct is criminal and the penalties for the conduct.' "

Therefore, contrary to Easley, the State was required to give notice in the indictment of its intention to enhance Lyke's sentence based on his prior PCS conviction. See In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 26 ("Thus, notice under section 111-3(c) would have been required if respondent had been tried as an adult for AUUW where the State sought to enhance his sentence to a Class 2 felony based on his prior AUUW convictions.") ¶ 60 In the instant case, there is no dispute that the State, at sentencing, sought "an enhanced sentence because of a prior conviction." In fact, Lyke's sentence was "increased by a prior conviction from one classification of offense, to another higher level classification of offense."

Thus, respondent should be deemed to have forfeited this claim of error. See In re Janine M.A., 342 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1052, 796 N.E.2d 1175, 1184 (2003); In re Gregory G., 396 Ill. App. 3d 923, 928, 920 N.E.2d 1096, 1100 (2009); In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 22, 80 N.E.3d 694.¶ 59 We note that according to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) (eff.

Even if we were able to bypass the requirements of a complete record, Martin's brief does not contain cohesive arguments with relevant legal authority to support his conclusory allegations. See In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 22 ("It is neither the function nor the obligation of this court to act as an advocate or search the record for error."). Because we have no basis for concluding that the trial court erred in denying his motion, we affirm.

¶ 62 The most serious flaw in respondent's argument lies in the fact our supreme court has determined the proportionate penalties clause and the eighth amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause do not apply to juvenile proceedings initiated by a petition for adjudication of wardship. Rodney H., 223 Ill. 2d at 520-21, 861 N.E.2d at 630; see also In re Dave L., 2017 IL App (1st) 170152, ¶ 36, 80 N.E.2d 694; In re Deshawn G., 2015 IL App (1st) 143316, ¶ 52, 40 N.E.3d 762; Maurice D., 2015 IL App (4th) 130323, ¶ 26, 34 N.E.2d 590; In re A.P., 2014 IL App (1st) 140327, ¶ 13, 14 N.E.3d 689. Neither respondent nor the State raised this in their briefs.