Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Superior Court County of San Luis Obispo, Ct. No. F443114 Barry T. LaBarbera, Judge
Gerald J. Miller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, A. Scott Hayward, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERREN, J.
Joey Lorta appeals the order committing him for treatment as a mentally disordered offender (MDO) (Pen. Code, § 2962). He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that the criminal offense upon which his commitment is based, arson of property (§ 451, subd. (d)), is a qualifying offense under subdivision (e) of section 2962. We affirm.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In August 2006, appellant was convicted of arson of property and was sentenced to two years eight months in state prison. On January 29, 2010, the Board of Prison Terms (BPT) determined that appellant qualified as an MDO. Appellant petitioned for a hearing to challenge that determination. At a court trial held in March 2010, the parties submitted the matter on documents that included an MDO status report prepared by Dr. Timothy Nastasi, a forensic psychologist. The report states that appellant suffers from schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type, which constitutes a severe mental disorder under the MDO law. Appellant's symptoms include hallucinations, delusions, and bizarre behavior. Dr. Nastasi opined that "[t]hese symptoms have significantly impaired his thinking, perception of reality, emotional process, judgment, and behavior."
Dr. Nastasi also concluded that appellant's commitment offense qualified him for MDO treatment under subdivision (e) of section 2962. The doctor's report summarized the facts underlying the offense as follows: "On 03/17/06, Mr. Lorta was arguing with a female friend and then ran behind the residence, grabbed a plastic gasoline can that was under a boat trailer, poured the gasoline on a dog blanket that was on a patio attached to the house which had people inside, and ignited the gasoline." The doctor also opined that (1) appellant's mental disorder was a cause or aggravating factor in his commission of the offense; (2) the disorder was not in remission and could not be kept in remission without treatment; (3) appellant had received at least 90 days of treatment for the disorder during the year prior to his scheduled release; and (4) appellant represented a substantial danger of physical harm to others by reason of his mental disorder.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that appellant met all the criteria for MDO treatment and accordingly denied his petition. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends his MDO commitment must be reversed because the evidence is insufficient to support the finding that his commitment offense, arson of property, is a qualifying crime under subdivision (e) of section 2962. He argues that the facts underlying the conviction fail to sustain a finding that the crime either (1) "posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others, " as contemplated by subdivision (e)(2)(L), or (2) was one in which the perpetrator "expressly or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm" as contemplated by subdivision (e)(2)(Q).
In considering the sufficiency of the evidence to support MDO findings, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine if there is any reasonable, credible evidence to support the challenged finding. (People v. Beeson (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1398.) We do not reweigh the evidence. (People v. Clark (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1072, 1082-1083.)
To commit a prisoner under the MDO law, the prosecution must prove among other things that he or she was convicted of a qualifying offense. Subdivision (e)(2)(L) of the statute enumerates "[a]rson in violation of subdivision (a) of Section 451, or arson in violation of any other provision of Section 451... where the act posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others." The statute also contains a "catch-all" provision that includes "[any] crime in which the perpetrator expressly or impliedly threatened another with the use of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm...." (§ 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q).)
Substantial evidence supports the finding that appellant's offense qualified him for treatment under subdivision (e)(2)(L) of the MDO law. In People v. Macauley (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 704, we concluded that "overwhelming" evidence supported the finding that the acts resulting in the prisoner's conviction under section 451, subdivision (d) posed a substantial danger of physical harm to others. In reaching that conclusion, we reasoned: "The record reveals that [the prisoner] poured gasoline over his wife's car and set it on fire while it was parked in a residential neighborhood 'very close' to the house where her boyfriend lived. The fire caused about $2,000 in damage to the car. An expert witness on arson testified that car fires are inherently dangerous because they can get out of control very quickly and the flammable liquids create a risk of explosion. This risk was enhanced by the use of gasoline to set the fire. Appellant's arson offense posed a substantial danger to the occupants of nearby structures, and thus falls within section 2962, subdivision (e)(2)(L)." (Id. at p. 709.)
Here, the record reflects that appellant was in an agitated state when he grabbed a gasoline can, poured its contents on a blanket that was on the patio of an occupied residence, and lit the blanket on fire. Although no expert witness testimony on the subject of arson was presented, it is common knowledge that gasoline is a highly volatile and flammable substance. The trier of fact could easily infer from this that the fire posed a substantial danger of spreading to the adjacent structure, and thereby posed a substantial danger of physical harm to the structure's occupants.
Appellant also cites People v. Kortesmaki (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 922, in support of his contention that his crime did not pose a substantial danger of physical harm. Kortesmaki did not involve a conviction of arson under section 451, so subdivision (e)(2)(L) of section 2962 was not implicated. Rather, the issue in that case was whether the prisoner's commitment offense (possessing flammable or combustible materials with the intent to set fire to property, in violation of subdivision (a) of section 453) involved an implied threat of force or violence and thus fell within the MDO law's "catch-all" provision (§ 2962, subd. (e)(2)(Q)). (Kortesmaki, supra, at pp. 926-929.) As we have noted, we need not decide that issue here.
In light of our conclusion, we need not decide whether the evidence is sufficient to support the court's finding that appellant's commitment offense involved an express or implied threat of force or violence likely to produce substantial physical harm, as contemplated by subdivision (e)(2)(Q) of section 2962. We note, however, that the court's finding in that regard is necessarily premised on its conclusion the crime involved a substantial danger of physical harm to others. We also note that any error in the court's analysis of the issue is irrelevant because "'[a] decision right in result will not be reversed even though the stated reason is wrong.' [Citation.]" (People v. Evans (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 254, 257; People v. Singh (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1343, 1381 [quoting same].)
The judgment (order of commitment) is affirmed.
We concur: GILBERT, P.J., YEGAN, J.