Opinion
G054911
06-12-2018
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. RICARDO LOPEZ, Defendant and Appellant.
William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. 16HF1443) OPINION Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Kazuharu Makino, Judge. Affirmed. William Paul Melcher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, Assistant Attorney General, Barry Carlton and Christopher P. Beesley, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant Ricardo Lopez appeals from a judgment entered following his guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine while carrying a loaded firearm, and possessing drug paraphernalia. As part of his sentence, defendant was ordered to pay a $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 11372.5, plus a penalty assessment under Penal Code section 1464. Defendant challenges the imposition of the penalty assessment, arguing the criminal laboratory fee is not a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" on which a penalty assessment may be levied. (Pen. Code, § 1464, subd. (a).) Given the Supreme Court's recent decision in People v. Ruiz (May 17, 2018, S235556) ___ Cal.5th ___, we disagree. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The issue presented in this case is one on which the appellate courts have been split for a number of years. Relying on cases, including one from this court, which concluded the laboratory analysis fee was an item to which penalty assessments may not be applied, defendant argued in his initial briefing that the assessments had to be stricken from his sentence. (See, e.g., People v. Martinez (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 659, 667-669; People v. Webb (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 486; People v. Watts (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 223, 233; People v. Vega (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 183, 194-195.) The decision in those cases hinged on the courts' conclusions that the laboratory analysis fee was not a "fine" or a "penalty."
After this case was fully briefed and submitted, however, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Ruiz, addressing for the first time the nature of the laboratory analysis fee. To address the question key to the issue before it—whether the laboratory analysis fee is "punishment"—the Court turned to a variety of statutory construction tools, including the ordinary meaning of words, the surrounding statutory language, and the legislative history. (Ruiz, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [pp. 6-22].) It also looked to precedent. (Id. at ___ [pp. 22-25].) Each led to the conclusion that "the Legislature intended the [laboratory analysis fee] . . . to be punishment[.]" (Id. at ___ [p. 26].)
In reaching its decision, the Court clarified that the implied conclusion underlying one of its prior decisions was that "section 11372.5's criminal laboratory analysis fee constituted a 'fine, penalty, or forfeiture' within the meaning of Penal Code section 1464 and Government Code section 76000, subdivision (a)." (Ruiz, supra, ___ Cal.5th ___ [p. 24] [discussing People v. Talibdeen (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1151].) It expressly disapproved of the cases concluding otherwise, including each of those defendant relied upon in this case. (Ruiz, at ___ [p. 26, fn. 8].)
We vacated submission of this case and invited the parties to provide supplemental briefing concerning Ruiz's impact on the issue presented by defendant. In his response, defendant conceded that Ruiz was determinative of the issue and his appeal must fail. We agree. Because the laboratory analysis fee is a "fine, penalty, or forfeiture" within the meaning of Penal Code section 1464, it necessarily follows that it is proper for a court to apply a penalty assessment to it. (Pen. Code, § 1464, subd. (a).)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
THOMPSON, J. WE CONCUR: ARONSON, ACTING P. J. GOETHALS, J.