People v. Lonzo

13 Citing cases

  1. People v. Lenzi

    41 Ill. App. 3d 825 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976)   Cited 18 times
    In People v. Lenzi (1976), 41 Ill. App.3d 825, 355 N.E.2d 153, appeal denied (1976), 64 Ill.2d 597, defendant, owner of a tavern, testified that several patrons who had previously created a disturbance and threatened him were again creating a disturbance.

    On the other hand, it is our responsibility to reverse a judgment of conviction where the record does not support the finding or where the State's evidence is improbable and unconvincing so that a reasonable doubt is apparent. ( People v. Gokey (1974), 57 Ill.2d 433, 438, 312 N.E.2d 637; People v. Patterson (1972), 52 Ill.2d 421, 424, 288 N.E.2d 403; People v. Dawson (1961), 22 Ill.2d 260, 264-65, 174 N.E.2d 817; People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 726, 315 N.E.2d 256.) When careful examination of all the evidence leaves a reviewing court with substantial and well-grounded doubt of guilt, the conviction cannot stand.

  2. People v. Green

    2015 Ill. App. 132043 (Ill. App. Ct. 2015)

    The defendant, citing three cases involving identification by civilian witnesses, claims that the omission of his name and nickname in the radio communications greatly detracted from the strength of the officers' identification of him as the person they were chasing. See People v. Johnson, 2012 IL App (1st) 091730; People v. Jackson, 348 Ill. App. 3d 719 (2004); and People 19 v. Lonzo, 20 Ill. App. 3d 721 (1974). However, those cases are distinguishable from the facts here because they do not involve officers in pursuit of a suspect whom they knew from previous encounters; do not involve officers who provided a general description of the suspect at the time of the offense; and do not involve officers who provided a more detailed account of the defendant's physical description later that same day in a case report.

  3. People v. Williams

    161 Ill. App. 3d 613 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that the aggravated battery statute applied to an offense occurring in a parking lot, which was accessible to the public and, therefore, a public way

    Here, only defendant's testimony "taxes the gullibility of the credulous." ( People v. Coulson (1958), 13 Ill.2d 290, 296, 149 N.E.2d 96.) Defendant's reliance upon on People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 725-26, 315 N.E.2d 256, is misplaced; at bar, Kimmar's account is corroborated by three witnesses whose testimony was neither inconsistent nor perfunctory. • 5 From the foregoing it is clear that the circuit court was justified in finding Kimmar's testimony and that of the other State witnesses credible and supported the finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

  4. People v. Lopez

    129 Ill. App. 3d 488 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984)   Cited 9 times

    This contention must fail. Although evidence of an accused's good reputation for honesty and integrity may raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt, it is within the province of the trier of fact to make that determination, which should not be disturbed on review except where the evidence of guilt is unsatisfactory, improbable or implausible. ( People v. Villalobos (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 6, 11-12, 396 N.E.2d 1081.) The authorities on which the defendant relies for reversal, People v. Buchholz (1936), 363 Ill. 270, 2 N.E.2d 80; People v. Ricili (1948), 400 Ill. 309, 79 N.E.2d 509; People v. Shockey (1964), 30 Ill.2d 147, 195 N.E.2d 703; People v. Eatman (1950), 405 Ill. 491, 91 N.E.2d 387; People v. Bush (1972), 4 Ill. App.3d 669, 281 N.E.2d 734; People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 315 N.E.2d 256; People v. Heilemann (1936), 362 Ill. 322, 199 N.E. 792, are inapposite and uncontrolling here. Accordingly, the trial court's finding will not be disturbed.

  5. People v. Romo

    85 Ill. App. 3d 886 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 32 times
    Vacating robbery conviction where pushing, kicking, and threatening "occurred just before defendant left the scene of the crime" and "did not immediately follow the taking or constitute part of the res gestae of the robbery"

    The testimony of the numerous reputation witnesses on defendant's behalf does not alter our conclusion on this issue. Though we are not unaware of the value of reputation evidence in certain cases, including those in which the identification is not as definite as it was in this case (see People v. Gold (1935), 361 Ill. 23, 196 N.E. 729; People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 315 N.E.2d 256), we do not find defendant's reputation testimony to be so strong or the State's case to be so weak as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt of theft. Having decided that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction of robbery but sufficient to support a conviction of theft, we must next address ourselves to the problem of whether we can reduce the conviction from robbery to theft when, as here, theft has not been charged in the information.

  6. People v. Menendez

    406 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 4 times
    In Menendez, the court stated that an alleged improper admission of hearsay evidence would be held, even if improperly admitted, not to constitute reversible error where the verdict was sufficiently established by otherwise proper evidence.

    The differences are inconsequential and since they do not involve a material fact, the discrepancy does not destroy Michel's credibility but only affects the weight to be given his testimony. See People v. Sulton (1970), 130 Ill. App.2d 1098, 1106, 266 N.E.2d 351, 358; People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 725, 315 N.E.2d 256, 259. The other "discrepancy" relied upon by defendant concerns testimony given by a witness which conflicts with that given by Michel.

  7. People v. Einoder

    403 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 3 times

    He has extensive, self-developed, active holdings in a masonry construction company and an electrical subcontracting company. There is evidence in the record showing defendant's good character and integrity. Compare People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 726, 315 N.E.2d 256, appeal denied (1974), 57 Ill.2d 605. Fifth, there were troubling inconsistencies between the testimony of Officers Seiler and Sullivan and their two memoranda regarding the statements of defendant in conversations with them on May 5 and on May 9, 1977, as related above.

  8. People v. Spurlark

    74 Ill. App. 3d 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 9 times

    Further, even if the witnesses had been uniform in their opinions as to defendant and Green's respective reputations, their testimony cannot overcome the positive testimony of an eyewitness. (See People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 315 N.E.2d 256.) People v. Ricili (1948), 400 Ill. 309, 79 N.E.2d 509, cited by the defendant, is distinguishable on the basis that in that case the prosecutrix's identification was not positive.

  9. People v. Spaulding

    68 Ill. App. 3d 663 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)   Cited 17 times

    • 2, 3 Defendants argue, however, that the testimony of three witnesses as to defendants' good reputations as peaceful and law abiding citizens was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to their guilt. Although it is true that evidence of a defendant's good character is not to be disregarded ( People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 315 N.E.2d 256), such evidence is not proof of innocence. ( People v. Ricili (1948), 400 Ill. 309, 79 N.E.2d 509.) In the present case we do not believe that the testimony regarding defendants' good reputations in the community negates the strong direct evidence of their guilt presented by the State.

  10. People v. Bradshaw

    382 N.E.2d 432 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978)   Cited 3 times

    In each of these cases there was no evidence to corroborate the faulty identification testimony. People v. Cullotta (1965), 32 Ill.2d 502, 207 N.E.2d 444; People v. McGee (1961), 21 Ill.2d 440, 173 N.E.2d 434 and People v. Lonzo (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 721, 315 N.E.2d 256, appeal denied (1974), 57 Ill.2d 605. • 4 It is true that defendant testified in his own behalf and denied that he had ever seen the ring before; although he testified two questions later to the effect that he had seen the ring at the police station.