Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, No. FBA700493, Steven A. Mapes, Judge.
IRION, J.
Ervin McMichael Collins Longstreet contends that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's true finding that he suffered a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction in Illinois under the name Irving Collins. As we will explain, we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the trial court's true finding, and we accordingly affirm the judgment.
I
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An information charged Longstreet with assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to produce great bodily injury (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and alleged that Longstreet personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)). For sentencing purposes the information alleged that Longstreet had incurred a 1991 conviction in Illinois that qualified both as a prior strike under the "Three Strikes" law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i)) and a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
In a bifurcated proceeding, the jury convicted Longstreet and then found that he was legally insane at the time of the offense.
Longstreet waived his right to a jury trial regarding the prior offense allegations, and the trial court found that Longstreet had incurred a prior strike and a prior serious felony. (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d), 667, subds. (b)-(i), 667, subd. (a)(1).) To support its finding, the trial court relied on (1) Longstreet's rap sheet printed from the California Law Enforcement Telecommunications System (CLETS); and (2) certified court records from Cook County, Illinois, showing a 1991 robbery conviction for an individual known as Irving Collins.
The trial court ordered Longstreet committed to Patton State Hospital for a maximum confinement of 16 years.
II
DISCUSSION
Longstreet's sole appellate argument is that insufficient evidence supports the trial court's finding that he incurred a prior strike and prior serious felony conviction under the name Irving Collins.
The prosecution has the burden "to prove beyond a reasonable doubt those alleged prior convictions challenged by a defendant." (In re Yurko (1974) 10 Cal.3d 857, 862.) We apply a substantial evidence standard of review in evaluating a challenge to a trial court's finding that the defendant incurred a prior strike or prior serious felony conviction. (See People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1067.) "In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence of the prior convictions, we determine ' "... whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this determination, [we] must consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the judgment and presume the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence in support of the judgment." ' " (People v. Jones (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th 1312, 1315.)
To determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Longstreet incurred a prior conviction for robbery in Illinois, we turn to the evidence presented to the trial court on that issue.
The first category of evidence the trial court considered was a packet of certified court records from Cook County, Illinois, showing that a person known as Irving Collins was convicted of armed robbery in 1991. According to the records, the robbery was committed on or about July 20, 1991, and the defendant was sentenced on December 18, 1991, to a term of six years' imprisonment.
The second category of evidence the trial court considered was a packet of printouts from CLETS. The CLETS printouts all pertain to a single individual, who is identified on the printouts by FBI No. 451260LA0, and who has been verified as being the same individual based on fingerprint comparisons. The CLETS printouts also state that the individual with FBI No. 451260LA0 has been known by several different names, including Ervin Longstreet, Ervin McMichael Longstreet, Ervin Collins and Irving Collins. According to the CLETS printouts, the individual identified by FBI No. 451260LA0, under the name Irving Collins, was received by the state correctional center in Joliet, Illinois, on December 20, 1991, after being convicted of robbery. The CLETS printouts also establish that an individual with the same FBI number was charged in the instant case with assault with a deadly weapon.
Our Supreme Court has held that computer printouts from CLETS are admissible under the official records exception to the hearsay rule for the purpose of establishing the fact that a criminal defendant incurred prior convictions. (People v. Martinez (2000) 22 Cal.4th 106, 134.) At trial, defense counsel argued against the admissibility of the CLETS printouts. However, Longstreet does not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting the documents. He only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's finding.
Specifically, the CLETS printouts state that "[a]ll arrest entries contained in this FBI record are based on fingerprint comparisons and pertain to the same individual."
Although the CLETS printouts are set forth in a somewhat confusing format and contain numerous abbreviations, the most reasonable interpretation of the entry for December 20, 1991, is that on that date an individual named Irving Collins was received and classified by the Illinois Department of Corrections at the state correctional facility in Joliet after having been convicted of robbery. We note that the trial court stated that the December 20, 1991 CLETS entry could be interpreted in that manner.
Longstreet contends that the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to establish that he was the same person who was convicted of robbery in Cook County, Illinois, in 1991. Longstreet argues that "[n]o direct evidence of identity was presented, linking [Longstreet] with the offense; no fingerprint evidence or booking photo was presented"; and therefore "the evidence was insufficient to prove [Longstreet] committed robbery in 1991."
As the Attorney General correctly points out, however, the CLETS printouts contain the criminal records of a single individual based on fingerprintinformation. The CLETS printouts therefore provided substantial evidentiary support for the trial court's finding that Longstreet was the same person who incurred the 1991 robbery conviction under the name Irving Collins. Because the CLETS printouts set forth Longstreet's criminal history based on identifying fingerprint data tracked by a unique FBI number, and the CLETS printout establishes that Longstreet suffered a robbery conviction in 1991 under the name Irving Collins, the trial court's finding that Longstreet incurred a prior strike and a prior serious felony conviction is substantially supported by the evidence presented at trial.
Longstreet also points out that there are certain discrepancies between the Cook County, Illinois, certified court records and the information contained in the CLETS printouts. For example, the abbreviated information in the CLETS printouts could be read to state that the sentence imposed for the robbery conviction was four years, whereas the court records state that the sentence was six years. The trial court concluded that such discrepancies could be attributed to data entry errors, and stated that the errors did not give rise to reasonable doubts about whether Longstreet suffered a prior conviction for robbery. We conclude that that trial court's approach to the discrepancies between the CLETS printouts and the court records was reasonable and supported by the evidence. Regardless of the discrepancies, the CLETS printouts establish that Longstreet (as identified by his FBI number) was convicted of robbery in 1991 under the name Irving Collins.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: McCONNELL, P. J., AARON, J.