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People v. Longoria

Court of Appeal of California
Apr 23, 2009
G040258 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009)

Opinion

G040258

4-23-2009

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDGAR LONGORIA, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Karl Terp and Angela M. Borzachillo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Not to be Published in Official Reports


Defendant contends the trial court erred when it denied his motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of counsel. He also argues error because he was not advised of his constitutional rights before he admitted the truth of his prior conviction and prison term. We affirm.

I

FACTS

A jury found defendant Edgar Longoria guilty of criminal threats as charged in count one of the amended information and guilty of stalking as charged in count two. Defendant moved for a new trial and his motion was denied.

A 90-day diagnostic evaluation under Penal Code section 1203.03 was conducted. The report from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to the court said defendant is unsuitable for probation. The court sentenced defendant to state prison for four years eight months.

At the start of the trial, before the pretrial motions and jury selection, the following colloquy took place: Defense lawyer: "Actually, prior to the start of the 402s I believe we could address the prior conviction." [¶] The Court: "Okay." [¶] Defense lawyer: "At this time, your Honor, were prepared to admit the 667.5(b) prior allegation from December 19, 2001." [¶] The Court: "All right. Mr. Longoria, do you admit that on or about December 19, 2001 you were convicted in the County of Orange of a violation of Penal Code section 245 [subdivision] (a)(1)? Thats assault with a deadly weapon, or was it force likely?" [¶] Prosecutor: "It was originally deadly weapon and then it was amended to force likely." [¶] The Court: "So its not a strike?" [¶] Defense lawyer: "It is not." [¶] The Court: "And that you served a separate term in prison for that offense? Do you admit that all of that is true?" [¶] Defendant: "Yes, sir. I served the whole term for that same thing. I never had an assault with a weapon. It was a likely — it was like force." [¶] The Court: "You were convicted of aggravated assault with force likely to produce great bodily harm; is that right?" [¶] Defendant: "I believe so, yes, sir."

Sandra Torres testified she met defendant at a market near her job. Defendant was standing next to a public telephone and smiled at her. Outside the market, they chatted and exchanged telephone numbers. Defendant telephoned Torres that night. The two spoke on the phone three or four times a day for about two weeks. After two weeks of telephone conversations, defendant told Torres he loved her. She agreed to see him. The two went for coffee and a walk on the beach for their first date.

During the first week they were going out, defendant said he wanted to marry her. Torres asked him to slow down "because first [she] had to get to know" defendant. Torres said at times defendant seemed angry when she did not return his declarations of love for her and he scared her. He called her a prostitute and a drug addict. When he was angry, defendant "would hit the car, he would hit anything." One time, defendant told her he had "friends who kill" and that he was going to take Torres to Mexico.

He ripped some of Torress skirts while she was doing her laundry the next day. As he ripped them, he said Torres dressed like a prostitute and he was "laughing weirdly." Torres said defendant "went crazy" and "got very mad" and "his face was red." She was scared of him.

The day after he ripped her skirts, and after dating defendant for two weeks, Torres decided to end the relationship. She explained she would have broken up with him the night before, but she was scared "he would have killed me at that moment."

She staged the breakup to take place outside her place of employment because she felt safer near her friends, while she had no one at the residence where she rents a room. She was afraid of being beaten or kidnapped. After she broke up with defendant, Torres went inside a Subway sandwich shop next to her hair salon where her friend worked. Defendant telephoned her and told her to step outside. She asked her friend in the sandwich shop to keep an eye on her because she was afraid and that he should call the police in case something happened to her.

When she stepped outside, defendant was inside his car. He asked her to get inside, but she refused. Defendant told her they could not break up and he started crying. He asked for a second chance. Torres declined, telling him he was impossible and defendant said she would regret saying that. He said "he was going to kill [Torres] and that he was going to burn [Torres] with gasoline, that he was going to start a fire with [Torress] body outside [Torress] job."

After defendant left, he telephoned Torres about two minutes later. She told him to "keep on with his life and to leave me alone." By the time the two parted in front of the salon around 7:00 p.m. and midnight, defendant called Torres approximately 25 times at which point Torres turned off her phone. Messages from defendant were left on the phone; he said he loved her and they could not end the relationship. He also said he could not live without her and that "if [Torres] did not go back with him that he would take [her] to Mexico and not even [her] parents would know where [she] was."

Instead of going home that night, Torres stayed at a girlfriends house. Torress landlady told her defendant came to the house looking for her that night.

The day after the breakup, Torres went to work. Defendant called her on the telephone, which she did not answer, and "would drive by the store" in his car with a "sarcastic smile." Torres was terrified because of defendants threat to pour gasoline on her body and burn her outside the salon. Torres called the police.

After the police left the salon, defendant came inside. He handed Torres a letter. She read a little of the letter and then threw it in the trash. The part she read said he loved her and could not live without her and that he would "never, never leave" Torres.

After that, Torres did not return home or work for the next 20 days. Torres said she wanted defendant to "believe that I had been fired from my job and kicked out of the house so he would leave me alone and also because I was very afraid." While she stayed with a friend, Torres would not even go out to the street. During that period, defendant continued to call her. At first, he called 10 times a day. Usually he left a message. She answered it one time, and defendant said he loved her and that she would regret the breakup, and that she had to go back with him.

The first day Torres went back to work, she saw defendant driving by the salon. He continued to call Torres, telling her she had to go back with him.

In lieu of using an audio presentation, the parties reached the following stipulation which was read to the jury: "`All parties, including the prosecution, defendant and defense counsel stipulate to the following: that the defendant, Edgar Longoria, left three voicemail messages on the cell phone of Sandra Torres after they broke up on March 3d, 2007. These messages were received on March 6th, March 7th and March 8th of 2007. They were turned over to the Costa Mesa Police Department by Ms. Torres. The messages contain the following statements by Mr. Longoria: "I love you." "I miss you." And, "I want you to stop using drugs.""

Maria Aguilar, Torress landlady, testified she heard loud banging on the door the evening Torres broke up with defendant. She did not open the door. She asked who it was and the person responded, "Edgar." He said he was looking for Sandra. Aguilar said she saw defendant was the person at the door. She told him Torres was not there, but "he was insisting she was there." Defendant told Aguilar "he was looking for Sandra because he had some problem with her and he was going to ask her to forgive him." Then defendant told Aguilar that Torres was a drug addict and he was trying to help her. Aguilar testified she lived with Torres for three years and knew she did not use drugs. She said she was trembling when defendant finally left.

After the verdict, defendant filed a motion for new trial. In it, he said he was wrongfully convicted because of "his trial counsels failure to investigate the case in a manner consistent with Mr. Longorias defense which amounted to crucial impeachment information being left out of the trial thereby constituting a deprivation of Mr. Longorias constitutional rights to a fair trial . . . ." Attached to the motion is a declaration which states: "I am Lorena [Castanada] and I am a friend of Edgar Longoria. [¶] I knew Mr. Longoria around March 2007 and knew of his interaction with Ms. Sandra Torres. [¶] I know and believe that Ms. Torres was a drug user around March of 2007 and have observed her personally and believe her to be a drug user. [¶] I am familiar with what drug users look like and how they act. [¶] I made contact with Mr. Longorias trial counsel Ms Apkarian on several occasions providing her with names and phone numbers of individuals Mr. Longoria wanted her to contact. To my knowledge she did not contact them. [¶] I made myself available to Mr. Longorias Ms. Apkarian and even called and spoke to a representative from her office about having me subpoenaed to court so that I could be available to testify during the trial. [¶] I was repeatedly told that my testimony was not needed even though Mr. Longoria kept insisting that he had witnesses testify for him at trial. . . ."

During argument of the new trial motion, the prosecutor pointed out that, had defendant testified, she would have brought out his prior crimes, stating that "most of them involve[ed] violence against women." Defendants lawyer informed the court: "We have a witness who is percipient to her drug use and to her drug habits . . . ." The court denied the motion, stating: "I believe that Ms. Apkarians defense was not constitutionally deficient. I believe that Mr. Longoria got a better than average defense in this matter, and the motion for new trial is denied."

II

DISCUSSION

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Defendant contends he established in his motion for new trial that he was provided ineffective assistance of counsel. He bases his argument "upon trial counsels failure to investigate and present evidence which would have led to appellants acquittal."

At trial, the defense theory "was, or would have been, that appellants obsession with Torres was, even if misguided, that he was concerned for her welfare and not that he intended to `have her or `kill her." Defendant argues his trial counsels failure to call Lorena Castaneda as a witness "undercut [his] defense" and "had jurors received testimony corroborating appellants version of the facts, that Torres was a drug abuser, especially from a female friend of appellants, it is more than likely a different verdict would have been reached."

To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, defendant bears the burden of establishing both deficient performance and prejudice. (Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687.) He must show that counsels representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional standards and that there is a reasonable probability that, "`"`but for counsels unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." [Citations.]" (People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 569; see also Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 687-688.) Where an ineffective assistance claim can be resolved solely on lack of prejudice, it is unnecessary to determine whether counsels performance was objectively deficient. (In re Jackson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 578, 604, disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 545, fn. 6.)

Not introducing evidence that would merely impeach a witness generally is not a sufficient ground for granting a new trial. (People v. Long (1940) 15 Cal.2d 590, 607-608.) Here the motion for new trial characterizes the evidence at issue here as impeachment evidence.

Hypothetically assuming the relevance of Torres using drugs, Castanedas declaration provided no evidence of such. The essence of Castanedas declaration states: "I know and believe that Ms. Torres was a drug user around March of 2007 and have observed her personally and believe her to be a drug user." She says she observed Torres and she had a belief Torres was a drug user. If she observed Torres using drugs, she certainly did not say she did.

We cannot conclude defendant was prejudiced because his lawyer did not call a witness to say she observed Torres and had a belief she was a drug user. And we decline to infer that, had Castaneda been called, she would have testified she is an expert at detecting drug users from observing people, nor will we infer she would have testified she saw Torres using drugs. Besides, the jury heard the stipulation that defendant left a voicemail message for Torres which said, "I want you to stop using drugs." So there was evidence defendant believed Torres was using drugs, evidence to support defendants theory he acted to assist Torres to stop using drugs. Obviously the jury didnt buy it.

"The trial courts ruling on a motion for new trial `"`rests so completely within [its] discretion that its action will not be disturbed unless a manifest and unmistakable abuse of discretion clearly appears." [Citations.]" (People v. Andrade (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 651, 659.) Under the circumstances in this record, we cannot conclude the court abused its discretion when it denied defendants motion for new trial.

Admission of Prior Crime

Defendant next argues the court erred in failing to advise him of his constitutional rights prior to accepting his admission of a prior crime. The Attorney General disagrees, contending a review of defendants record demonstrates he exercised a voluntary and intelligent choice to admit the prior conviction.

"[T]he standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea `was and remains whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant. [Citations.]" (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1177.) "[A] plea is valid if the record affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances." (Id. at p. 1175.) "A review of the entire record also sheds light on defendants understanding. For instance, `a defendants prior experience with the criminal justice system is, as the United States Supreme Court has concluded, `relevant to the question [of] whether he knowingly waived constitutional rights. [Citation.] That is so because previous experience in the criminal justice system is relevant to a recidivists `"knowledge and sophistication regarding his [legal] rights."" (People v. Mosby (2004) 33 Cal.4th 353, 365, fn. omitted.)

Defendants presentence report indicates numerous contacts with the police. The records reflect that in 1993 he possessed cocaine and offered to sell some to a police officer; those charges were dismissed. When the probation officer questioned him about those charges, "defendant stated he was staying with a family who sold drugs. He was told to sell drugs if he wanted to continue residing there, so he did." When he was 19, defendant provided a false name, Jaime Guzman Luna, to a police officer when he was stopped for a traffic violation. Several months after that, defendants residence was searched pursuant to a warrant. Drugs, paraphernalia and a gun were confiscated, and defendant was placed on probation. That time, he was arrested under the name Richard Luna Gonzales.

When he was 21, defendant was arrested for possession of cocaine; again he used the name Richard Luna Gonzales. Later, he gave the name Salvador Davila to the police during a traffic stop. Police found credit cards in different names in the car he was driving. The next year he was arrested under the name Jimmy Guzman after a woman "reported he grabbed her around the neck, made a fist as if to punch her, then let go of her neck and pushed her away, causing her to fall backwards. [H]e picked up a pair of scissors, pointed them at her and said, `Do it again and see what happens." Defendant told the probation officer "He pled guilty to get out." Several months later, defendant gave the officer the name Jimmy Guzman Martinez. When defendant explained this incident to the probation officer, he said "he gave a false name to police who had been called after a fight with a girlfriend."

When he was 25, according to the version defendant told the probation officer, "his girlfriend called police because she was mad with him for breaking up with her. He reports that she was on medication for seizures, and unstable. He reported that he never touched her, but pled because he wanted out of jail." According to the victim, defendant "pulled her hair, hit her in the head, pulled her head backwards, and at one point, attempted to choke her."

Regarding an incident for which he received prison time when he was 26 years old, and in which he gave the name Richard Luna Gonzalez, defendant explained to the probation officer that, "He hit a girl because he was drunk." The probation report states: "Police records reflect police responded to a report of a battery in which the female victim had been hit in the face. Witnesses reported the defendant hit the victim without provocation. The female victim sustained two fractures to her left lower jaw, requiring surgery." When he was 32, defendant again gave the name Richard Luna Gonzalez during a traffic stop. Marijuana was confiscated and defendant was arrested.

At the beginning of this trial, he was faced with choices of either having a jury hear about a past crime and prison term or admitting the truth of the conviction and prison term without having the jury find out about them. It is apparent from the interaction between the judge and defendant during the hearing, when defendant clarified a question the judge had, that defendant was actively involved in the proceeding. Our review of the record reveals defendant is intimately familiar with the criminal justice system. He was arrested numerous times and pled guilty several times. His familiarity precludes any finding except that he was aware of his constitutional rights when he admitted the truth of his prior conviction. From the totality of the circumstances in the record before us, we conclude defendant voluntarily and intelligently exercised the choice of admitting his past conviction and prison term.

III

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

OLEARY, ACTING P. J.

FYBEL, J.


Summaries of

People v. Longoria

Court of Appeal of California
Apr 23, 2009
G040258 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009)
Case details for

People v. Longoria

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. EDGAR LONGORIA, Defendant and…

Court:Court of Appeal of California

Date published: Apr 23, 2009

Citations

G040258 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 23, 2009)