We note that the State concedes any statements or utterances made by defendant subsequent to his arrest and any fingerprints taken from defendant following his arrest are suppressed, and therefore we need not address that issue. • 2 It has been held that when an improper arrest occurs, the power of the court to try the defendant is not impaired. (See People v. Finch (1970), 47 Ill.2d 425, 266 N.E.2d 97, cert. denied (1971), 404 U.S. 836, 30 L.Ed.2d 68, 92 S.Ct. 122; People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 658-59, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1217.) The proper remedy is not to exclude all evidence following the arrest ( People v. Hornal (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 308, 316, 330 N.E.2d 225, 231) but to exclude all evidence that directly flowed from the improper arrest.
e four Chambers factors as a conjunctive test for admissibility. People v. Powell (1985), 139 Ill. App.3d 701, 709, 487 N.E.2d 719, 725; People v. Newell (1985), 135 Ill. App.3d 417, 427, 481 N.E.2d 1238, 1246; People v. Nally (1985), 134 Ill. App.3d 865, 871, 480 N.E.2d 1373, 1378; People v. Williams (1985), 131 Ill. App.3d 597, 606, 475 N.E.2d 1082, 1088; People v. Bowel (1985), 129 Ill. App.3d 940, 944, 473 N.E.2d 962, 965, rev'd (1986), 111 Ill.2d 58, 488 N.E.2d 995; People v. Cunningham (1984), 130 Ill. App.3d 254, 264-65, 473 N.E.2d 506, 514; People v. Martinez (1984), 129 Ill. App.3d 145, 164-65, 472 N.E.2d 464, 477; People v. Bonilla (1983), 117 Ill. App.3d 1041, 1043, 453 N.E.2d 1322, 1324; People v. Petrovic (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 282, 290, 430 N.E.2d 6, 12; People v. Bell (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 857, 867, 421 N.E. 1351, 1359-60; People v. Bracey (1981), 93 Ill. App.3d 864, 872-73, 417 N.E.2d 1029, 1036; People v. Garza (1981), 92 Ill. App.3d 723, 736, 415 N.E.2d 1328, 1339; People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 660, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1218-19; People v. Black (1980), 80 Ill. App.3d 116, 120-21, 399 N.E.2d 647, 650; People v. Foster (1978), 66 Ill. App.3d 292, 294-95, 383 N.E.2d 788, 790; People v. Woodruff (1978), 62 Ill. App.3d 949, 952-53, 379 N.E.2d 907, 910; People v. Pietrzyk (1977), 54 Ill. App.3d 738, 747, 369 N.E.2d 1299, 1305; People v. Bolden (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 848, 851, 368 N.E.2d 1319, 1325; but see People v. Ireland (1976), 38 Ill. App.3d 616, 621-22, 348 N.E.2d 277, 281 (where court raised question whether the declarant's unavailability for cross-examination was sufficient to exclude her statements from evidence). See generally Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 1164 (1979) (admissibility, as against interest, in criminal case of declaration of commission of criminal act).
Where the identification of the accused is in question, the State's burden may be met by offering a positive identification by a single witness who had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender even if the circumstances of the observation are less than perfect. ( People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 656, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1215.) It is the jury's province to determine whether the State has met this burden ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 456, 343 N.E.2d 489, 493), and resolution of factual disputes and the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses are for the jurors.
He bases his argument on the alleged inadequacy of the witnesses' opportunity to observe and contradictions in the details of the offender's description. The State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that a crime occurred and that the accused is the person who committed it ( People v. Bridges (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 868, 390 N.E.2d 407), but the latter burden may be met by offering a positive identification by a single witness who had an adequate opportunity to observe the offender ( People v. Smith (1982), 111 Ill. App.3d 895, 444 N.E.2d 801) even if the circumstances of the observation are less than perfect ( People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212). It is the jury's province to determine whether the State has met this burden ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 343 N.E.2d 489); therefore, the "[r]esolution of factual disputes and the assessment of the credibility of the witnesses" is for the jurors ( People v. Williams (1983), 93 Ill.2d 309, 315, 444 N.E.2d 136, 138), and we will not substitute our judgment for theirs unless the evidence itself is so improbable as to raise a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt ( People v. Carlson (1980), 79 Ill.2d 564, 404 N.E.2d 233).
The trial court denied the motion and held that the in-court identification was independent of the pretrial viewing and that it was based on Burks' observations of the defendant at the time of the robbery. We agree with that conclusion (see People v. Williams; People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212) and hold that the discovery error, if any, does not require reversal of the defendant's conviction. The final issue raised by the defendant is whether the defendant was denied a fair trial due to prosecutorial misconduct during rebuttal argument.
• 11, 12 Defendant also argues that the in-court identification of defendant by John Hartgerink should have been suppressed as it did not have an origin independent of suggestive police procedures. We have determined that no suggestive procedures were employed but, in any event, the in-trial identification would be permissible if an independent origin for it could be shown. ( People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 657, 411 N.E.2d 1212, 1216; People v. Richard (1980), 88 Ill. App.3d 247, 252, 410 N.E.2d 459, 464.) Factors to be considered to determine an independent origin are: the length and quality of the witnesses' opportunity to observe (here four to six minutes in a well-lit area); the degree of attention displayed by the witness (high, as Hartgerink was confined with the robbers in a small area with a weapon pointed at his head); any discrepancies with the prior description given by the witness and defendant's actual description (Hartgerink described the robber as about 25 pounds heavier and 2 inches taller but otherwise similar); circumstances of the witness' prior identification (Hartgerink identified defendant spontaneously and with certainty); and length of the time lapse between the crime and the identification (Hartgerink initially identified defendant approximately 40 hours after the crime and at trial approximately 6 months later).
• 4 An in-court identification is admissible regardless of the suggestiveness of pretrial identification procedures when from the totality of the circumstances it is shown by clear and convincing evidence that the identification was based on observations of the defendant other than during the arguably improper pretrial identification. ( People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212.) Where the person identified is known to a witness prior to the crime, the identification by that witness is not influenced by any pretrial confrontation. ( People v. Mueller (1973), 54 Ill.2d 189, 295 N.E.2d 705, cert. denied (1973), 414 U.S. 1044, 38 L.Ed.2d 335, 94 S.Ct. 549; People v. Kane (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 641, 401 N.E.2d 1310.) It is evident from the facts of this case that the victim's identification of defendant at trial was not influenced by their confrontation at the police station since the two had known each other for several years prior to the crime.
The defendant concludes that these three factors raise a reasonable doubt of his guilt as a matter of law. It is well established that the positive and credible testimony of one identification witness is sufficient to support a conviction if the witness had the opportunity to observe the accused for a sufficient length of time. ( People v. Jones (1975), 60 Ill.2d 300, 325 N.E.2d 601; People v. Lomax (1980), 89 Ill. App.3d 651, 411 N.E.2d 1212; People v. Barber (1979), 70 Ill. App.3d 540, 388 N.E.2d 833.) In the instant case the complainant had ample opportunity to observe the defendant during the two-hour period the assailant kept her in the back seat of the automobile.