Opinion
B304591
03-07-2022
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. GREGORY LOGAN, Defendant and Appellant.
John P. Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. A638508-02 Patrick Connolly, Judge. Reversed and remanded with directions.
John P. Dwyer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra and Rob Bonta, Attorneys General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Scott A.
Taryle and Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorneys General, and Thomas C. Hsieh, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
PERLUSS, P. J.
Gregory Logan, convicted in 1990 of first degree murder and second degree robbery, appealed the superior court's order denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.95 after the court found he could still be convicted of murder notwithstanding the changes to the definition of the crime effected by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015) (Senate Bill 1437). We reversed the order and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing, agreeing with Logan that the court appeared to have applied an incorrect standard of proof and, in addition, failed to find he acted during the robbery with reckless indifference to human life within the meaning of People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks) and People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark), as now required to be convicted of felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3).
Statutory references are to this code.
After granting the Attorney General's petition for review, the Supreme Court transferred the case to us with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider Logan's appeal in light of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2) (Senate Bill 775), which, among other things, confirmed that the standard of proof at the hearing on an order to show cause under section 1170.95 is proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
In supplemental briefing following the Supreme Court's transfer order, Logan argues the case should be remanded for a new evidentiary hearing-Senate Bill 775 simply confirms what this court previously held. The Attorney General, however, although conceding the superior court did not articulate the proper standard of proof and failed to expressly find Logan acted with reckless indifference to human life, now argues we should affirm the order denying Logan's petition because the superior court's errors were harmless under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
The right to a postconviction proceeding for possible resentencing pursuant to section 1170.95 is purely a creation of state law. We evaluate nonstructural state law error under the harmlessness standard set forth in People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818. (People v. Gonzalez (2018) 5 Cal.5th 186, 195.) That standard requires us to evaluate whether the petitioner has demonstrated it is "'"reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error."'" (Ibid.)
The Attorney General's new assertion of harmless error recasts the argument advanced in his original brief that the superior court's detailed discussion of Logan's role as a major participant in the robbery indicated an implied finding of reckless indifference to life. We reject the revised version, as we did the original. The elements are distinct; both must be proved. And the evidence regarding Logan's mental state is far from clear.
Because the superior court not only applied an incorrect evidentiary standard but also failed to make an express finding on an essential element for liability under the amended felony-murder rule, it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to Logan would have been reached in the absence of those errors. Accordingly, we reverse the order denying Logan's petition and remand for a new evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d).
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. Logan's Trials, Conviction and Appeal
a. The charges
Logan was charged together with Randolph Hawkins in an amended information filed in March 1989 with first degree murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) with a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)), kidnapping (§ 207, subd. (a)), kidnapping for robbery (§ 209, subd. (a)) and second degree robbery (§ 211). It was specially alleged Logan and Hawkins had personally used a firearm while committing the offenses (§12022.5) and Logan had a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667, subd. (a)). The court severed the trial of the two defendants.
Hawkins had been charged with an unrelated murder, and the court believed it would be unduly prejudicial to try Logan together with Hawkins. Hawkins was convicted on all charges after a jury trial and sentenced to an indeterminate state prison term of life without parole.
At Logan's first trial the court granted Logan's motion for judgment of acquittal on the kidnapping and kidnapping for robbery charges. After closing argument a juror notified the court she had received an anonymous threatening telephone call in the middle of the night. The court declared a mistrial. The People and Logan thereafter agreed to a court trial based on the transcripts and evidence presented at Logan's first trial. The People agreed to dismiss the kidnapping-murder special-circumstance allegation and to amend the firearm enhancement to principal-armed (§ 12022, subd. (a)), rather than personal use.
b. The evidence at trial
According to the testimony of Willie Hearod, he, Hawkins and Logan walked to the Hoover Plaza Hotel at West 81st Street and South Hoover Street on the evening of September 24, 1986. Hearod stayed to play cards; Hawkins and Logan left. About 30 minutes later Hawkins and Logan returned with a 1984 Cadillac El Dorado that belonged to the murder victim, Raymond Curtis.
Hawkins asked Hearod to go with them to commit robberies in Santa Monica. Hearod declined. Hearod asked where Hawkins and Logan got the car. Logan explained that he and Hawkins were near 81st Street and Figueroa when they saw a man walking toward the car. Hawkins, who wanted to steal the car, pulled out a gun, told the man to freeze and then put him in the trunk of the Cadillac. Hawkins and Logan drove back to the Hoover Plaza Hotel to get Hearod.
When Hearod said the police would be looking for the car, Hawkins responded that would not happen because the owner was in the trunk. Hawkins and Logan again left, but returned a short while later. Hearod asked about the man in the trunk. Hawkins said, "A dead man can't testify in court for kidnapping." Hawkins then told Hearod they had driven to 95th Street where Logan let Curtis out of the car to allow him to walk away. Hawkins thought Logan was being stupid, chased after Curtis and shot him multiple times. During the conversation Logan said he also shot at their victim, but Hawkins called him a liar and said he saw Logan "shoot in the air."
In a police interview following his arrest on September 25, 1986, the transcript of which was admitted into evidence, Logan generally corroborated Hearod's testimony. According to Logan, around 8:00 or 9:00 p.m. on September 24, 1986, while he and Hawkins were walking on 81st Street, they saw a car with blinking lights. Hawkins wanted to steal the car. Hawkins and Logan ran toward Curtis, who was walking near the car; Hawkins drew his gun; and Curtis dropped the keys, which Logan picked up. Logan then began looking inside the car. Hawkins wanted to leave and put Curtis in the trunk so he could not notify the police. After the men returned to the hotel, they moved Curtis to the back seat of the car. Logan understood they were going to drop Curtis off some place. When they let Curtis out of the car near the freeway, Logan told him to walk away. Curtis started to run; and Hawkins ran after him, shooting Curtis several times as he did. Hawkins and Logan then returned to the Hoover Plaza Hotel before driving to Santa Monica to attempt additional robberies.
Around 1:00 a.m. on September 25, 1986 a security officer at a hospital undergoing reconstruction at West 95th Street and South Broadway heard four gunshots. A short while later he saw a man staggering in pain. The security officer called the police emergency number. Los Angeles Police Officer Herbert Maples and his partner responded to the call. Maples found Curtis dead, leaning against a lamp post. A medical examiner from the Los Angeles County Coroner's Office determined Curtis had been shot four times in the back; two of the gunshot wounds were fatal.
c. The court's ruling, sentence and appeal
The trial court found Logan guilty of "first degree felony-murder as alleged in Count I as an aider and abettor." It stated, "The court finds that the robbery was still in progress while the victim was still being held by Defendant and Mr. Hawkins. The temporary stop at the Hoover Plaza Hotel was not sufficient to terminate the continuing robbery." The court further found "the enhancement for principal armed with a firearm to be true" and "Defendant guilty of robbery, second degree, as charged in Count IV."
The court sentenced Logan to an indeterminate state prison term of 26 years to life. We affirmed the judgment after Logan's appointed counsel filed an opening brief raising no issues pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. (People v. Logan (July 15, 1992, B051646) [nonpub. opn.].)
2. Logan's Petition for Resentencing
On January 7, 2019 Logan, representing himself, filed a petition for resentencing under section 1170.95, checking boxes on the form petition establishing his eligibility for resentencing relief, including the boxes stating he had been convicted under the felony-murder rule and could not now be convicted of first or second degree murder because of changes made to sections 188 and 189 by Senate Bill 1437.
The court appointed counsel to represent Logan. The People filed a response to the petition, arguing Logan was ineligible for resentencing because he was a major participant in the underlying robbery and kidnapping and had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The response included transcripts of witness testimony from Logan's trial and a transcript of Logan's police interview. Logan filed a reply.
Although the court did not formally issue an order to show cause, it scheduled an evidentiary hearing that, after several continuances, was held on January 29, 2020. Logan was present at the hearing with his appointed counsel.
3. The Evidentiary Hearing and the Court's Ruling
At the outset of the hearing the court stated it had reviewed all the transcripts from Logan's initial jury trial and other material from the record of conviction that had been submitted by the parties, including Logan's police interview.The prosecutor summarized the evidence in general and then in the context of the five factors identified in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 for determining whether a defendant, found guilty of the felony-murder special circumstance, had been a major participant in the underlying felony. Based on that review, she argued Logan not only was a major participant in the robbery of Curtis but also had acted with reckless indifference to human life during the course of the crime: "From the People's point of view, it's just not reasonable, Your Honor, that the victim of a robbery and a carjacking would be put in the trunk and left to tell the story later. As soon as he got in that car, his fate was sealed."
Judge Patrick Connolly heard Logan's petition for resentencing. Judge Madge S. Watai, who had presided at Logan's second trial and his sentencing hearing, left the Los Angeles Superior Court in the mid-1990's. (See § 1170.95, subd. (b)(1) [the petition should be heard by the judge who originally sentenced the petitioner, if available].)
In Banks the Supreme Court identified five factors courts should consider in determining whether a defendant was a major participant within the meaning of section 190.2, subdivision (d): "What role did the defendant have in planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths? What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did the defendant do after lethal force was used?" (Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
After completing her analysis of Logan's role as a major participant in the robbery, the prosecutor explained, "I think to show the reckless indifference to human life, I would be going over the same facts that I covered in whether he was a major participant." The court simply responded, "All right."
For his part, Logan's counsel mentioned in passing the terms "major participant" or "reckless indifference, " but did not address the factors identified in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788 and Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, instead emphasizing the general purpose of Senate Bill 1437: "According to Mr. Hearod's testimony, Mr. Hawkins thought Gregory Logan would let him go-let the victim go, I'm saying, because he's stupid and he could not abide by that. Randolph Hawkins made the decision to execute Mr. Curtis, and Randolph Hawkins shot the man. . . . Under the changes in our law, the hard man who acts as the real deal is the one who gets punished for murder. The patsy who goes along for the ride should be punished as an accessory. I believe that the evidence in this case overwhelmingly shows that Gregory Logan participated in the robbery, but not more than that. He is not guilty of murder."
Responding to the prosecutor's discussion of Logan's actions later in the morning after Curtis's murder, Logan's counsel argued the court should "narrowly focus on what his conduct was when the car was taken, when the victim was put in the trunk, and when the victim was murdered. And I do not believe that his actions right then and there amount to acting as a major participant in the robbery, acting with reckless indifference to human life. It is Randolph Hawkins who decide[d] to assassinate Mr. Curtis in cold blood."
After counsel completed their arguments, the court proceeded to go through its view of the evidence in light of the Banks factors. As to Logan's role in planning the crime, the court stated, "What I have before me is that they both were active participants . . . before the robbery and after it. Before the murder and then after the murder, they wanted to do more robberies. So to say that Mr. Logan was not integral to that planning would be false." With respect to supplying the lethal weapon, the court said, "I think that the evidence in this case does not make it clear as to who supplied the weapon, although I believe that the inference is pretty clear that it was Mr. Hawkins. . . . And it's clear to this court that Mr. Hawkins did this execution. . . . It is also clear to this court that at the time of the murder itself, that Mr. Logan fired a shot. He was armed. And I think that the belief there were two weapons is reasonable."
"As far as awareness posed of the dangerousness of the actions," the court continued, "Mr. Logan was present for this victim being placed in the trunk of a vehicle. . . . I don't believe for one second, regardless of whether or not Mr. Logan wanted to let him go, that he doesn't know what they are doing at that time. . . . Regardless of whether or not he's let out . . . Hawkins knows what's going on, but I think so does Mr. Logan. But Logan fires a shot. Whether it's up in the air, whether it's to scare this individual, whether it's at him, it's not clear. I tend to believe- and I'm making the record-that it would be up in the air."
As to the fourth Banks factor, which the court described as whether Logan was able to prevent or facilitate what occurred, the court stated, "I don't know if Mr. Logan could have prevented it. I think that Mr. Hawkins was a bad ass, and I don't think that Mr. Hawkins would have allowed anyone to intervene at that point. But I don't believe for one second that Mr. Logan tried to intervene nor was that his intent." Finally, as to Logan's actions after the murder, the court noted that Hawkins and Logan went back to the Hoover Plaza and still tried to recruit assistance for additional robberies in Santa Monica.
The court in its ruling concluded, "Based on everything I've stated, the transcripts that I've looked at and the arguments of the attorneys, the court does find that Mr. Logan was a major participant. The court is going to deny the motion to dismiss at this time. . . . [F]or the reasons that I've stated, him having the gun and going out there and firing first, his actions both before and after, as such, pursuant to Banks and the factors that they have given for guidance, I don't believe that there is any way to find Mr. Logan other than a major participant."
The court's minute order, in addition to detailing the items that had been admitted into evidence, simply stated, "The court has made a determination that the defendant was a major participant and is not eligible for the relief sought. [¶] Resentencing is denied."
Logan filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
1. Senate Bill 1437 and the Narrowed Felony-murder Rule
Senate Bill 1437, in addition to eliminating the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842-843), significantly narrowed the felony-murder exception to the malice requirement for murder. (§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) At the time of Logan's trial in 1990, section 189 permitted a conviction for felony murder by imputing malice to a participant in an inherently dangerous felony, including robbery, that resulted in a homicide. (See People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1172, 1184.) As amended by Senate Bill 1437, section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing malice based solely on an individual's participation in a crime and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder except under the revised felony-murder rule as set forth in section 189, subdivision (e). That provision requires the People to prove specific facts relating to the defendant's individual culpability: The defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); although not the actual killer, the defendant, with the intent to kill, assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or the defendant was a major participant in an underlying felony listed in section 189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to human life, "as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2," the felony-murder special-circumstance provision (§ 189, subd. (e)(3)).
Section 1170.95, also added by Senate Bill 1437, authorizes an individual convicted of murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or the felony-murder rule to petition to vacate the conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if he or she is not guilty of murder under the current definition of the crime. If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief (§ 1170.95, subds. (b) & (c)), the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder conviction and resentence the defendant on any remaining counts (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(1)). As we held in our prior opinion, and as made clear by Senate Bill 775, at the evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate a felony-murder conviction, the prosecution has the burden of proving, "beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder . . . under California law as amended by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019." (§ 1170.95, subd. (d)(3).) At the hearing the court may consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial "that is admissible under current law," including testimony and stipulated evidence. (Ibid.) The petitioner and the prosecutor may also offer new or additional evidence. (Ibid.)
2. The Superior Court Applied an Incorrect Standard of Proof and Failed To Make Findings on All Required Elements of the New Felony-murder Rule
Because it was undisputed that Logan was not the actual killer and did not act with intent to kill, to now be convicted of felony murder the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Logan was a major participant in the underlying robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life, "as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2." (§ 189, subd. (e)(3).) However, at the evidentiary hearing on Logan's petition, neither party addressed the prosecutor's burden of proof, and the court never articulated the standard of proof it was applying. In its oral ruling the court simply stated, "[T]he court does find that Mr. Logan was a major participant. . . . I don't believe that there is any way to find Mr. Logan other than a major participant."
As we explained in our prior opinion, beyond a reasonable doubt was nowhere mentioned in the court's oral ruling or written minute order. Moreover, several of the court's intermediate findings concerning the Banks major-participant factors belied the Attorney General's suggestion the court was applying something akin to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard. For example, the court stated, "I think that the belief that there were two weapons is reasonable," and "Hawkins knows what's going on, but I think so does Mr. Logan."
In addition, the superior court made no finding Logan acted with reckless indifference to life during the robbery. Although the Attorney General argued the court's use of the term major participant, viewed in context, was intended as a shorthand reference to the overall requirement for felony murder-that Logan was a major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life-we declined to posit an implied finding, noting the parties and the court focused on Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and the factors identified in that case for evaluating a major participant finding, and neither the parties nor the court discussed Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522 and its identification of factors relevant to the reckless indifference element of a felony-murder special-circumstance finding.
Because the superior court failed to identify and apply the proper reasonable doubt standard of proof and failed to specifically find that Logan acted with reckless indifference to human life, we reversed the order denying the petition for resentencing and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing.
3. The Superior Court's Errors Were Not Harmless
The Supreme Court directed us to reconsider Logan's appeal in light of Senate Bill 775. That legislation, like our prior opinion, specifies the standard of proof at the evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1170.95, subdivision (d), is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Because Senate Bill 775 confirms this court's earlier holding, there would seem to be no reason not to once again remand for a new evidentiary hearing.
The Attorney General does not agree. Without identifying new authority at odds with our prior analysis, including any provision of Senate Bill 775 (cf. Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(b)(2) [supplemental briefs after transfer from the Supreme Court "must be limited to matters arising after the previous Court of Appeal decision in the cause, unless the presiding justice permits briefing on other matters"]), the Attorney General now contends it is not reasonably probable Logan would have obtained a different outcome had the superior court articulated and applied the proper standard of proof and made an express finding on reckless indifference. The record on appeal does not support the Attorney General's conclusion.
As explained in Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at page 615, the "major participant" element is the actus reus of the felony-murder special-circumstance requirement; and the "reckless indifference" element is the mens rea requirement. Although the two requirements often overlap, they are separate; and both must be proved. (Ibid.; see Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 810, fn. 9 [a major participant in an armed robbery that results in a death does not necessarily exhibit reckless indifference to human life].)
Reckless indifference, the Supreme Court said in Clark, "encompasses both subjective and objective elements. The subjective element is the defendant's conscious disregard of risks known to him or her. . . . [R]ecklessness is also determined by an objective standard, namely what 'a law-abiding person would observe in the actor's situation.'" (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) The Clark Court set out a series of factors, reiterated more recently in In re Scoggins (2020) 9 Cal.5th 667 (Scoggins), similar in some respects, but nonetheless distinct from the Banks major participant factors, to assess whether a participant in an underlying felony acted with reckless indifference to human life: "Did the defendant use or know that a gun would be used during the felony? How many weapons were ultimately used? Was the defendant physically present at the crime? Did he or she have the opportunity to restrain the crime or aid the victim? What was the duration of the interaction between the perpetrators of the felony and the victims? What was the defendant's knowledge of his or her confederate's propensity for violence or likelihood of using lethal force? What efforts did the defendant make to minimize the risks of violence during the felony?" (Scoggins, at p. 677; accord, Clark, at pp. 618-622.) "'"[N]o one of these considerations is necessary, nor is any one of them necessarily sufficient."'" (Scoggins, at p. 677; accord, Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 803.) Specifically with respect to the facts before it, the Clark Court emphasized, "[W]hile the fact that a robbery involves a gun is a factor beyond the bare statutory requirements for first degree robbery felony murder, this mere fact, on its own and with nothing more presented, is not sufficient to support a finding of reckless indifference to human life for the felony-murder aider and abettor special circumstance." (Clark, at p. 617.)
Measuring the evidence against these factors, using the proper standard of proof, it is reasonably probable the superior court will not find that Logan acted with reckless indifference to life during the robbery of Curtis-that is, that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt Logan's "'willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the outcome of his actions.'" (Scoggins, supra, 9 Cal.5th at pp. 676- 677, quoting Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 617.) Although both Hawkins and Logan were armed, no shots were fired when the men first encountered Curtis, stole his car and placed Curtis in the car's trunk to prevent him from calling the police. Indeed, there was no evidence Logan even displayed his gun during this phase of the crime.
Later, Logan attempted to allow Curtis to walk away from his assailants without injury. No evidence concerning Logan's knowledge of Hawkins's criminal past suggested Logan should have anticipated that Hawkins would interfere with that effort by running behind Curtis and shooting him. From Logan's perspective, Hawkins's decision to kill Curtis appears to have been entirely unexpected. As such, Logan had no opportunity to take steps to prevent the killing. (The superior court observed that Logan had not tried to intervene but also noted it did not know if Logan could have prevented the murder.) Furthermore, although Logan also fired his gun as Curtis fled, the superior court found credible the testimony that he fired in the air, not at Curtis.
Other evidence would certainly support a reckless indifference finding, including that Logan was armed and knew Hawkins was, as well, and that Logan was present with Hawkins and Curtis throughout the entire episode that ended with Curtis's death. Placing Curtis in the car trunk, not simply holding him at gunpoint, arguably suggested a shared intent to prevent Curtis from surviving the crime, as the Attorney General contends, although that is inconsistent with Logan's statement he attempted to allow Curtis to go free. Finally, Logan left the scene after the shooting without attempting to aid Curtis.
How all these factors should be balanced is properly determined in the first instance by the superior court, acting as independent factfinder, applying the proper standard of proof and making all the required findings before concluding Logan's felony-murder conviction should or should not be vacated.
DISPOSITION
The order denying Logan's section 1170.95 petition is reversed, and the cause remanded for a new evidentiary hearing at which the superior court is to apply the beyond a reasonable doubt standard of proof; adhere to the evidentiary requirements of section 1170.95, subdivision (d)(3); and make express findings as to the required elements for a felony-murder conviction pursuant to section 189, subdivision (e)(3).
We concur: SEGAL, J., FEUER, J.