Opinion
B333325
08-13-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ANISHA LOCKHART, Defendant and Appellant.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. NA121585. Chet L. Taylor, Judge.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Sophia A. Lecky, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
In a complaint filed by the Los Angeles County District Attorney's Office, defendant and appellant Anisha Lockhart was charged with one count of hit-and-run driving resulting in death or serious injury to another person, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (b)(2). She pled no contest to the charge.
On June 30, 2023, the trial court sentenced defendant to two years in state prison.
Following a contested restitution hearing, the trial court ordered defendant to pay $5,807.71 to the California Victim Compensation Board for the victim's burial and funeral expenses.
Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. She argues that the restitution order must be reversed pursuant to People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093 (Martinez). The People concede that the trial court erred.
We agree with the parties. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order of restitution.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
On March 4, 2023, defendant was drinking at a bar in San Pedro, where she consumed three alcoholic beverages with friends. She left the bar shortly after midnight to drive to another bar in Lawndale. While driving, she dropped her phone, and, while trying to retrieve it, she collided with Oscar Montoya (Montoya), who was riding his bicycle in the same lane.
Surveillance video captured defendant hitting Montoya with her car, pausing briefly, and then leaving the scene without providing identification or summoning help. Montoya suffered blunt force trauma to his head and body and was pronounced dead at the scene.
II. Relevant trial court proceedings
Prior to sentencing, the prosecution submitted a request for victim restitution to cover Montoya's funeral and burial expenses. Over defendant's objection, the trial court ordered her to pay restitution to the Victim Compensation Board for Montoya's burial expenses.
DISCUSSION
I. Relevant law and standard of review
"Under California law, '[c]onvicted criminals may be required to pay one or more of three types of restitution.'" (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1100.) "They may be required to pay a restitution fine into the state Restitution Fund, to pay restitution directly to the victim, or to pay restitution as a condition of probation. The statutory requirements vary depending on the type of restitution at issue." (Ibid.)
When a defendant is denied probation, Penal Code section 1202.4 governs restitution paid directly to the victim or deposited into the statewide victim compensation fund. (People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121, fn. 6.) That statute provides, in relevant part: "[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of the defendant's conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the court." (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
Courts have interpreted Penal Code section 1202.4 as limiting restitution awards "for those losses incurred as a result of the crime of which the defendant was convicted." (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1101.)
Ordinarily, the standard of review for a restitution order is abuse of discretion. (People v. Williams (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 142, 147.) But where, as here, an appellant's claim implicates a legal question, we review the restitution order de novo. (Ibid.)
II. The trial court erroneously awarded restitution for collision-related injuries
Applying these legal principles, we conclude that the trial court erred. As defendant correctly points out, the trial court could not award restitution for collision-related injuries when defendant was only charged with and convicted of hit-and-run and not sentenced to probation.
In Martinez, the defendant, who was unlicensed and on felony probation, was driving a pickup truck when he collided with a 12-year-old boy riding a scooter; fearing that he had violated his probation, he left the scene of the accident. (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1098.) He later pled guilty to fleeing the scene of an accident resulting in injury under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a); the trial court sentenced him to state prison and ordered direct restitution for losses resulting from the accident. (Martinez, supra, at pp. 1098-1099.) The Court of Appeal reversed the restitution order and the Supreme Court agreed. (Id. at p. 1097.)
In analyzing whether the restitution award was permissible, our Supreme Court specifically considered whether a trial court could order direct restitution to the victim of a hit-and-run for collision-related injuries. (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1098.) It noted that because the defendant had been sentenced to prison, and not probation, restitution under Penal Code section 1202.4 was limited to economic losses arising from the convicted crime. (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1101; see Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1).) Thus, the court concluded that in hit-and-run cases, victim restitution is limited to "losses incurred as a result of the defendant's unlawful flight from the scene of the accident . . . not losses incurred solely as a result [of] the accident itself" because the criminal conduct in a hit-and-run case is not the "'hitting,' but the 'running,'" without exchanging the requisite information. (Martinez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1102-1103.) As there was no criminal act related to the collision in Martinez, restitution for injuries from the collision were unauthorized. (Id. at p. 1107.)
The same is true here. Defendant was charged with and convicted of leaving the scene of an accident under Vehicle Code section 20001, for which she received a state prison sentence. Even if she was responsible for Montoya's death, the act of striking the victim with her car was not the criminal offense. Rather, her only actionable criminal conduct was leaving the scene of an injury accident without providing identification or aid. Consequently, her financial liability is limited to the economic losses caused by her flight, not to injuries she caused by striking and killing the victim. Because there was no evidence or suggestion that defendant's flight worsened Montoya's injuries or caused his death, the restitution order must be reversed.
DISPOSITION
The trial court's restitution order is reversed.
We concur: LUI, P. J., CHAVEZ, J.