The People presented evidence establishing that defendant shared his codefendants' intent to cause serious physical injury to the victim and intentionally aided the codefendants by fighting with the victim while the victim was being stabbed and by kicking the victim after he fell to the ground. Thus, the People presented legally sufficient evidence establishing that the stabbing was the "`culmination of a continuum of events in which [defendant] participated and continued to participate'" ( People v Little, 186 AD2d 1072, lv denied 81 NY2d 1075). Furthermore, viewing the evidence in light of the elements of the crime as charged to the jury ( see People v Danielson, 9 NY3d 342, 349), we conclude that the verdict is not against the weight of the evidence ( see generally Bleakley, 69 NY2d at 495). Contrary to the further contention of defendant, Supreme Court's Sandoval ruling does not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Mindful that "[m]ental culpability may be inferred from defendant's conduct and from the surrounding circumstances" (People v. McDonald, 257 A.D.2d 695, 696, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 876) and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the People (see, People v. Taylor, 94 N.Y.2d 910; People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621), we find that the evidence adduced at trial was legally sufficient to permit a rational trier of fact to conclude, based upon reasonable, permissible inferences drawn from defendant's actions and the surrounding circumstances, that he was an accomplice (see, Penal Law § 20.00; People v. Allah, 71 N.Y.2d 830, 832; People v.Gage, 259 A.D.2d 837, 838-839, lvs denied 93 N.Y.2d 924, 970; People v. McDonald, supra). The evidence further established all the elements of robbery in the first degree and robbery in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt (see, Penal Law § 160.15; § 160.10 [2] [a]; see generally, People v. Jacobs, 188 A.D.2d 897, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 887; People v. Little, 186 A.D.2d 1072,lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1075). We are similarly unpersuaded by defendant's assertion that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.
The testimony of the victims and other witnesses establishes that defendant assaulted one of the victims with larcenous intent. Additionally, the injury inflicted upon the second victim and the theft of the property from and damage to the victims' automobile were the "`culmination of a continuum of events in which [defendant] participated and continued to participate'" ( People v. Little, 186 A.D.2d 1072, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1075, quoting People v. Bosque, 78 A.D.2d 986, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 901, cert denied 451 U.S. 992). We agree with defendant that the People should have complied with People v. Ventimiglia ( 52 N.Y.2d 350, 361-362) and CPL 240.30 before offering testimony that defendant's initial words to the victims were "I just got out of jail. I'm on parole" and that defendant displayed a set of brass knuckles just before assaulting one of the victims.
Mental culpability may be inferred from defendant's conduct and from the surrounding circumstances ( see, People v. Dorsey, 112 A.D.2d 536, lv denied 66 N.Y.2d 769). Finally, both of defendant's accomplices, whose credibility was for the jury to determine, inculpated him to a substantially greater degree than did the victim. We therefore conclude that the crimes of which defendant was convicted represented the "culmination of a continuum of events" in which he continued to participate after the intentions of his codefendants became manifest, so as to justify the jury's conclusion that he shared their criminal intent and aided in commission of the crimes ( see, People v. Little, 186 A.D.2d 1072, lv denied 81 N.Y.2d 1075; People v. Bosque, 78 A.D.2d 986, lv denied 52 N.Y.2d 901, cert denied 451 U.S. 992). Crew III, Yesawich Jr., Carpinello and Graffeo, JJ., concur.