Opinion
2014-10-1
The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Kevin LINDSEY, appellant.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se. Thomas P. Zugibe, District Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Itamar J. Yeger of counsel), for respondent.
Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant, and appellant pro se. Thomas P. Zugibe, District Attorney, New City, N.Y. (Itamar J. Yeger of counsel), for respondent.
PETER B. SKELOS, J.P., CHERYL E. CHAMBERS, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, and HECTOR D. LaSALLE, JJ.
Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Rockland County (Nelson, J.), rendered October 5, 2010, convicting him of robbery in the first degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress identification testimony.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.
Contrary to the defendant's contention, the record demonstrates that the court's “searching inquiry” accomplished “the goals of adequately warning [the] defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising [him] of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication” (People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 482, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632; People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154). Thus, the defendant's “clear and unequivocal waiver of his right to counsel was knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made,” and the County Court did not err in allowing him to represent himself during the trial and sentencing (People v. Allison, 69 A.D.3d 740, 741, 892 N.Y.S.2d 516; see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255; People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632; People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154; People v. Rahman, 85 A.D.3d 1062, 925 N.Y.S.2d 852).
Likewise, there is no merit to the defendant's contention that the court erred in its Sandoval ruling ( see People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413). “The extent to which the prosecution should be allowed to ... impeach the credibility of a defendant ... is a matter that is generally left to the discretion of the trial court” (People v. Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 237, 451 N.Y.S.2d 690, 436 N.E.2d 1292; see People v. Murad, 55 A.D.3d 754, 756, 865 N.Y.S.2d 331; People v. Carrasquillo, 204 A.D.2d 735, 612 N.Y.S.2d 424). Here, the court's Sandoval compromise precluding the prosecutor from eliciting the underlying facts of the defendant's seven convictions, or even the nature of the crimes of which the defendant was convicted, avoided any undue prejudice that could have resulted from the similarity between the prior convictions and the instant charge of robbery in the first degree ( see People v. Murad, 55 A.D.3d at 756, 865 N.Y.S.2d 331; People v. Jamison, 303 A.D.2d 603, 756 N.Y.S.2d 495; People v. Carrasquillo, 204 A.D.2d at 735, 612 N.Y.S.2d 424).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( seeCPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053; People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).
The sentence imposed was not excessive ( see People v. Suitte, 90 A.D.2d 80, 455 N.Y.S.2d 675).
The defendant's contention, raised in his pro se supplemental brief, that he was unlawfully arrested without a warrant is unpreserved for appellate review, and, in any event, without merit ( see Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639).
The defendant's remaining contentions, including those raised in his pro se supplemental brief, are without merit.