Opinion
B296189
08-25-2020
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. CASEY HARDING LINDER, Defendant and Appellant.
Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. LA087377) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Michael V. Jesic, Judge. Affirmed. Richard L. Fitzer, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David Voet, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
During a traffic stop, appellant Casey Linder failed to produce his vehicle registration information and proof of insurance. A police officer searched the center console of the car and found narcotics. After the trial court denied a motion to suppress the evidence seized from the car, appellant pled no contest to one count of sale/offer to sell/transportation of methamphetamine. On appeal, appellant contends the search of his car was an unconstitutional warrantless search based on the recent Supreme Court ruling in People v. Lopez (2019) 8 Cal.5th 353 (Lopez). The Attorney General argues that the search at issue was conducted prior to the decision in Lopez and "in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent" at the time, and thus is not subject to exclusion under the Fourth Amendment. (Davis v. United States (2011) 564 U.S. 229, 232 (Davis).) We agree that the "good faith" exception under Davis applies to the items seized during the officer's search of appellant's car, and therefore affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the preliminary hearing in this matter. Los Angeles Police Department officers Han and Denado were on patrol on December 14, 2016. At approximately 2:11 in the morning, they were driving in a marked patrol car in an area that Officer Han characterized as having a high amount of narcotics use and sales, as well as motor vehicle burglary and theft. The officers noticed a car parked illegally in a red zone. Officer Han also noticed that the front windows of the car were darkly tinted, in violation of the Vehicle Code. Officer Han activated his vehicle's overhead lights and initiated a traffic stop.
Officer Han testified at the preliminary hearing that the incident occurred on December 14, 2017 and both parties repeat that date in their appellate briefs. However, the information lists the date as December 14, 2016. Officer Han also testified that the vehicle registration was valid through May of 2017. Because neither party contends the registration was expired at the time of the search, we note that one of these dates must be incorrect.
As Officer Han approached the vehicle, the driver rolled down the window. Officer Han identified the driver as appellant during the preliminary hearing. Officer Han explained the reason for the stop and asked appellant for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. Appellant produced only his driver's license. He then opened the glove compartment in the car, looked through it for several seconds, and told Officer Han he did not have his registration in the car.
Officer Han testified that he asked appellant to step out of the car, and appellant complied. Officer Han then looked into the car's center console "where I believed people commonly put their registration." He found a plastic bag containing methamphetamine and a black sunglass case containing a "large amount of methamphetamine," a plastic bag of heroin, and another plastic bag with pills labeled "Xanex [sic]."
The officers arrested appellant. Subsequent to his arrest, Officer Denado searched appellant and found several "wads" of cash. They also recovered from the car a toothbrush case containing two more plastic baggies of methamphetamine, a baggie of heroin, and a glass pipe.
Officer Han testified that he routinely asks for a driver's license and registration to verify ownership of the vehicle and whether the registration is current. He admitted that prior to making contact with appellant, the officers provided the license plates of appellant's car over the radio, and received a response that the car was not stolen, the registration was valid through May of 2017, and there was insurance information on file. Appellant's license matched the information for the registered owner of the car. Han testified that he nevertheless searched for this information in the car for "several reasons: one, in my experience the D.M.V. is sometimes late to update their database; [and] two, I like to have a physical copy of the registration, so that . . . if I do write a citation I can do so outside of the car where it's more tactically favorable for me."
Appellant's counsel filed a motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5 prior to the preliminary hearing in May 2018. The court heard argument at the close of the preliminary hearing. Appellant's counsel argued that the officers had no need to search the vehicle for registration and insurance information and did not search the most likely place for such information to be found. The prosecutor argued that appellant was required to produce his license and registration upon demand and that the officers were not required to rely on the information received from the Department of Motor Vehicles' (DMV) database.
All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.
The court denied the motion, finding that the officer "had a right to go into the car to look for the registration" and was not limited by receiving the registration information over the radio. The court then held appellant to answer.
The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged appellant by information on June 6, 2018, with three counts of possession for sale of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, heroin, and Xanax (Health & Saf. Code, § 11378, counts 1, 3, and 5, respectively), and three counts of sale/offer to sell/transportation of methamphetamine, heroin, and Xanax (Health & Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a), counts 2, 4, and 6, respectively). The information further alleged that appellant served a prior prison term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)).
Appellant filed a renewed motion to suppress evidence pursuant to section 1538.5 in February 2019. At a hearing on the motion on February 14, 2019, the court noted that drivers were required to present their driver's license and registration upon demand by a police officer. The court continued, "And an officer doesn't have to rely on the computer printout because they're wrong sometimes. . . . I think he has a right to demand that registration and make sure that this is the lawful owner of the vehicle." Citing In re Arturo D. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 60 (Arturo D.), the court found that the officer could "search in cars where you would normally find registration," including "generally the center console and the glove compartment." The court accordingly denied the motion.
Following the denial of his motion to suppress, appellant entered a plea of no contest to count two. The trial court accepted appellant's plea and convicted him on count two. The remaining counts were dismissed. The court sentenced appellant to the mid-term of three years, with two years served in county jail and the third year on mandatory supervision. Appellant timely appealed from the denial of his motion to suppress. (§ 1538.5, subd. (m).)
DISCUSSION
Appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence discovered during the warrantless search of his car. The trial court relied on the principles set forth in Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, to find the search was reasonable. However, appellant contends that our Supreme Court's recent reconsideration of the issue in Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th 353 rendered the search unconstitutional and should result in the exclusion of the evidence. We disagree. A. Standard of Review
In reviewing the ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings, express or implied, when supported by substantial evidence. (Robey v. Superior Court (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1218, 1223 (Robey); People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.) The power to judge credibility, weigh evidence and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court. (People v. James(1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 107.) However, we exercise our independent judgment in determining whether, on the facts found, the search or seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Robey, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 1223.) A suppression motion ruling is judged exclusively by federal constitutional standards. (Ibid.) B. Fourth Amendment Framework
"The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures.' In general, a law enforcement officer is required to obtain a warrant before conducting a search." (People v. Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 359, citing Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton (1995) 515 U.S. 646, 653.) Subject to "well-delineated exceptions," warrantless searches are presumed to be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. (Katz v. United States (1967) 389 U.S. 347, 357; accord, Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 359.) "Whether a particular kind of search is exempt from the warrant requirement ordinarily depends on whether, under the relevant circumstances, law enforcement's need to search outweighs the invasion of individual privacy." (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 359, citing Riley v. California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 385.) The prosecution bears the burden of demonstrating a legal justification for a warrantless search. (People v. Evans (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 735, 742.)
In Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, the court considered the "existence and scope of an exception permitting officers to conduct a warrantless vehicle search when a driver pulled over for a traffic infraction is unable to produce the required documentation in response to an officer's request." (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 360.) Arturo D. involved two consolidated appeals challenging automobile searches on Fourth Amendment grounds. In one case, police stopped a minor for speeding. The minor gave his name, date of birth, and an address, but admitted that he lacked a valid driver's license and that the truck was not his. He failed to provide any documentary evidence as to his identity, proof of insurance, or vehicle registration. With the intent of issuing a citation, the officer searched for documents under the driver's seat, instead recovering a box containing narcotics. (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 65.) In the second case, the defendant was stopped for making unsafe lane changes. He did not produce identification or registration information. The police officer radioed for a records check, but while waiting, searched the glove compartment and under both front seats, finding a wallet that contained a baggie of methamphetamine. (Id. at pp. 66-67.)
The court upheld both searches. The opinion noted that Vehicle Code sections 4462 and 12951 require a driver to present a driver's license and evidence of registration upon the command of a peace officer. (Arturo, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 67.) The court continued: "The reason for these provisions is plain: An officer who has stopped a vehicle for a traffic infraction and who plans to issue a citation needs to ascertain the true identity of the driver and the owner of the vehicle, in order to include that information on the citation and the written promise to appear." (Ibid.) The court concluded that when a driver has been detained for a traffic infraction and fails to produce personal identification or vehicle registration documentation upon request, the Fourth Amendment "permits limited warrantless searches of areas within a vehicle where such documentation reasonably may be expected to be found." (Id. at p. 65.)
The court in Arturo D. acknowledged Knowles v. Iowa (1998) 525 U.S. 113 (Knowles), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment does not permit law enforcement to search the vehicle of a person who has been cited, but not arrested, for a traffic violation. In Knowles, an officer stopped the defendant for speeding, issued a citation, and then conducted a "full-scale warrantless search of the vehicle for contraband." (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 74, discussing Knowles, supra, 525 U.S. at p. 114.) The Knowles court rejected the argument that a full search that would be permissible incident to a custodial arrest also should be permissible "incident to citation" in order to discover and preserve evidence. Rather, the court found: "Once [the driver] was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained." (Id. at p. 118.)
Arturo D. concluded that Knowles was distinguishable, however, as it "addressed itself only to the question of allowing a full-scale warrantless search for contraband following the issuance of a traffic citation." (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at pp. 75-76.) Conversely, Knowles did not address, or foreclose, a "warrantless search of a vehicle for required regulatory documentation, prior to issuing a traffic citation," and limited to the areas in which such documentation might reasonably be found. (Ibid.)
The Supreme Court recently reexamined this framework in Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th 353. There, responding to an anonymous report of erratic driving, a police officer approached Lopez after she parked and exited her car. (Id. at pp. 357-358.) The officer did not observe any traffic violations or signs of intoxication, but asked Lopez if she had a driver's license. She said that she did not. The officer then detained Lopez, without asking for her name or other identifying information. After Lopez stated that "there might be" identification in her car, an officer retrieved and searched a purse from the passenger seat, and discovered narcotics inside. (Id. at p. 358.)
The trial court held the search was invalid under Arizona v. Gant (2009) 556 U.S. 332 (Gant), "which narrowed the scope of permissible warrantless vehicle searches incident to a driver's arrest." (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 357.) The Court of Appeal reversed, finding Gant inapplicable because Lopez was not under arrest at the time of the search, and concluding that the search was authorized under Arturo D. (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 359.) The Supreme Court "granted review to consider the application and continuing validity of the Arturo D. rule in light of subsequent legal developments," noting that California was the only state to have "recognized an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement for suspicionless traffic-stop vehicle searches" for a driver's identification. (Id. at p. 357.)
The court agreed that Gant was "not directly applicable," as it dealt with the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest, and therefore a different exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal. 5th at p. 364.) However, the court found that the "reasoning of Gant offers additional, highly relevant guidance not available at the time of Arturo D.," warranting "a reappraisal of the proper balance of interests to ensure consistency with the larger body of Fourth Amendment law" (id. at p. 367). In particular, the Lopez court considered the driver's privacy interests at stake, which it found Arturo D. had undervalued, and which were "important and deserving of constitutional protection." (Id. at p. 368, citing Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 345.) Thus, having considered the issue "in light of more recent decisions from both the United States Supreme Court and our sister states," the court concluded that "the Fourth Amendment does not contain an exception to the warrant requirement for searches to locate a driver's identification following a traffic stop. To the extent it created such an exception, In re Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, . . . is overruled and should no longer be followed." (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at pp. 357, 381.) C. Analysis
Appellant contends that the search of his vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment under Lopez and therefore the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence seized during that search. We find no error.
As an initial matter, we note that the Lopez court expressly overruled only Arturo D.'s holding with respect to a vehicle search for a driver's license or other identification documents. The court expressly declined to reach the issue of searches for registration or insurance information. (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 360, fn. 2 ["The portion of Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th 60, upholding a search for registration documents is not at issue in this case."]; see also Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 377 [noting that New Jersey, "like California, has recognized an exception for warrantless vehicle searches to locate registration and proof of insurance documentation"]; Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 88 (conc. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J.) [explaining that searches for a driver's license and for vehicle registration "are two different matters subject to different analyses and rules"].) Here, neither party addresses this distinction as relevant to the search for appellant's registration information.
We need not decide the scope of Lopez here. Assuming the search of appellant's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment under Lopez, we agree with respondent that the trial court should nevertheless have denied the motion to suppress the fruits of the search because the officer acted in good faith based on the existing state of the law.
The exclusionary rule operates as "a deterrent sanction that bars the prosecution from introducing evidence obtained by way of a Fourth Amendment violation." (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at pp. 231-232.) The Supreme Court "has recognized that the deterrent purpose of the rule is not served by excluding evidence when an officer reasonably acts in objective good faith." (People v. Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1220, citing United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 906.)
In Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 235, a police officer conducted a traffic stop, arrested and handcuffed the two occupants of the vehicle, and then conducted a search of the passenger compartment of the vehicle, recovering a gun. The search followed then-binding Eleventh Circuit precedent "to the letter," but would have been unconstitutional under Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332, which was decided while Davis was pending on appeal. (Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 239.). The court concluded that excluding the evidence under these circumstances would not serve the purpose of the exclusionary rule, reasoning that "[p]olice practices trigger the harsh sanction of exclusion only when they are deliberate enough to yield 'meaningfu [l]' deterrence, and culpable enough to be 'worth the price paid by the justice system.'" (Id. at p. 240, quoting Herring v. United States (2009) 555 U.S. 135, 144.) Accordingly, the court held that "searches conducted in objectively reasonable reliance on binding appellate precedent are not subject to the exclusionary rule,"
The search at issue here was conducted in 2017. At that time, controlling precedent dictated that an officer could detain a motorist for a traffic infraction and, upon his or her failure to produce vehicle registration information, search the vehicle in places where one might reasonably find that information. (Arturo D., supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 71; see also People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 431.) Officer Han discovered narcotics in appellant's car while searching the center console for the car's registration. Appellant does not challenge the trial court's finding that this location was a place one might reasonably find those documents. Applying Davis, we conclude that Officer Han acted in good faith based on binding state appellate precedent, and the trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to suppress the fruits of the search. (See Davis, supra, 564 U.S. at p. 232; People v. Macabeo, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 1221; People v. Jimenez (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1365.)
We are not persuaded by appellant's arguments that the good faith exception is inapplicable. Appellant first contends that at the time of the search in 2017, "Arturo D. had already been implicitly overruled by" Gant, supra, 556 U.S. 332. Appellant has forfeited this argument by raising it for the first time in his reply brief. (See Hernandez v. Vitamin Shoppe Industries, Inc. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1461, fn. 10.) Moreover, as our Supreme Court noted in Lopez, Gant is not controlling where, as here, appellant was not under arrest at the time of the search. (Lopez, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 364 ["The Court of Appeal correctly held that Gant is not directly applicable here because it concerned a different exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement."]; see also Gant, supra, 556 U.S. at p. 335.) While the Lopez court relied on the rationale in Gant in analyzing the competing interests at stake in allowing vehicle searches for a driver's identification documents, there is nothing to suggest that an officer could not properly rely on the holding in Arturo D. in 2017 to conduct a limited, pre-citation search of a vehicle where the driver had not been arrested and had failed to produce a driver's license or proof of registration.
Appellant also argues that officer Han's search was impermissible even under Arturo D. because appellant was not a traffic offender and the officers had already received confirmation of registration and insurance over the radio. On the first point, appellant contends that, unlike the defendants in Arturo D., his alleged Vehicle Code violations were not criminal infractions but subject to a civil penalty under Vehicle Code section 40200. Our sister court rejected this distinction in People v. Bennett (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 907, 916, concluding that "police may stop a motorist who has violated the Vehicle Code, regardless of the type of violation." Here, Officer Han testified that he conducted a traffic stop of appellant's vehicle because it was parked in a red zone and had illegally tinted front windows, in violation of the Vehicle Code. Based on this information, Officer Han was entitled to stop appellant to issue a citation. (See People v. Bennett, supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 913 ["when an officer suspects a person has [violated] or is violating the Vehicle Code, the officer may stop that person for the purpose of issuing a citation"]; People v. Hart (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 479, 488 ["An officer may detain and cite a person for violating the Vehicle Code."]; People v. Brown (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 493, 496-497.)
We are similarly unpersuaded by appellant's attempt to distinguish Arturo D. based on the information Officer Han retrieved from the DMV database. Appellant contends the search of his vehicle was unnecessary because "police had already confirmed that Linder was legally operating a properly registered and insured vehicle." But the trial court credited Officer Han's testimony that the search for vehicle registration information was not a pretext to search for contraband and the information he received over the radio was not always up to date. Appellant fails to point to any evidence in the record to suggest otherwise. Accordingly, the trial court found the officer could reasonably elect to search for the physical registration document to confirm ownership of the vehicle. The officer's search for the registration was confined to the vehicle's center console, following appellant's failure to produce the documentation, and was therefore permissible at the time under Arturo D.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
COLLINS, J. We concur: MANELLA, P. J. CURREY, J.