Opinion
A156314
03-25-2020
In re L.G., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. L.G., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Contra Costa County Super. Ct. No. J17-00839)
A supplemental petition was filed pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging that when appellant was a minor, he committed shooting into an inhabited dwelling and making criminal threats. Appellant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor making criminal threats and felony assault with intent to commit great bodily injury. At the contested dispositional hearing, he claims the juvenile court improperly considered hearsay police reports describing two unrelated incidents, and the court erred in committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. We disagree and affirm.
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Original Adjudication
We refer to the probation report in the instant matter on appeal to ascertain the facts underlying the original adjudication. According to the probation report, which in turn, relied on Richmond Police Department "report # 17-9921," "officers responded to a report of an assault with a firearm, as an officer advised a suspect had been seen running with a Glock handgun in his waistband." Appellant was later identified as the coparticipant and arrested, but the handgun was never found.
The Contra Costa District Attorney filed the original juvenile wardship petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602, subd. (a)), on July 18, 2017, charging him with possession of a firearm by a minor (Pen. Code, § 29610) and drawing or exhibiting a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(2)).
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, the prosecutor amended the wardship petition to add a third count, misdemeanor disturbing the peace in violation of Penal Code section 415, subdivision (1). Appellant pled no contest to disturbing the peace and the other two offenses were dismissed. On September 25, 2017, the juvenile court adjudged appellant a ward of the court, continued him on home supervision, and imposed various terms of probation. B. The Instant Offense
Because appellant pled no contest, we take the facts from the probation report. On August 24, 2018, J.N. was lying on his couch in his living room watching television when he heard approximately four to five rounds of gunfire. After the gunfire ceased, J.N. ran outside and saw a red pickup truck fleeing eastbound. He was not sure who shot into his home. Responding officers discovered multiple shell casings in the middle of the block and observed two impact rounds that struck J.N's pickup truck and two impact strikes in the front door and front window of the residence. One bullet went through the front door, the living room couch, and into the kitchen refrigerator.
J.R. told police she believed her current boyfriend, J.N.'s son, J.N., Jr., was the intended target, and her ex-boyfriend, appellant, was a potential suspect in the shooting. She felt appellant was the shooter because after she posted a picture of J.N., Jr., and herself on social media, appellant made several threats to harm her and J.N., Jr. Moreover, earlier that day appellant told her he was going to, " 'Spark up [J.N., Jr.]'s home and rape his mother.' " J.R. believed appellant was in a gang and showed one of the officers pictures of appellant holding a silver handgun and a bottle of Hennessy cognac.
Appellant admitted to the probation officer he arranged for his friends to " 'shoot up' " his ex-girlfriend's boyfriend's home because he was " 'jealous and angry' " he and his ex-girlfriend were no longer in a relationship. He stated he organized his friends to shoot at the current boyfriend's vehicle, but they fired shots at the home. He hoped " 'to intimidate' " the boyfriend and " 'to show him she was my girl.' " Appellant reported he had smoked marijuana with his friends on the day of the incident. He acknowledged his friends were part of the Norteño gang.
Although appellant stated his friends had not tried to have him join the gang, he nonetheless told probation intake staff at booking that he "claims the Norteno gang."
On August 31, 2018, the Contra Costa County District Attorney filed a supplemental petition, the subject of this appeal, charging appellant with shooting at an inhabited dwelling (Pen. Code, § 246) and two counts of making criminal threats (id., § 422).
At the contested jurisdictional hearing, appellant pleaded no contest to an amended misdemeanor criminal threats violation and an added felony assault with intent to commit great bodily injury charge (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(4)). C. Probation Violation
On August 20, 2018, the probation department alleged appellant violated the terms of his probation by testing positive for THC on two occasions and failing to abide by his curfew on three occasions. On August 29, 2018, appellant admitted the probation violation allegations. D. Dispositional Hearing
The probation department filed its report for the dispositional hearing stemming from the present offense and the probation violation. The report recommended appellant be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). The probation officer observed, "The calculated, callous and dangerous nature of the instant offense, coupled with the severity of the offense, and lack of parental control, and the minor's age, leads the undersigned to believe that future delinquent behavior will continue to escalate until the minor is either killed or kills someone, unless he is removed from the community for an extended period of time in a secure setting." The probation officer further suggested appellant was "inappropriate for local commitments due to the intensive rehabilitation he will need, at the age of 18, in a secure setting away from the local community, over an extended period of time to address his anti-social and violent behavior."
Following the contested dispositional hearing, the court committed appellant to the DJJ.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Admission of Police Reports
1. Background
During the disposition hearing, the prosecutor first requested the court review police report No. 2018-00010211 (report No. 0211). According to the report, the victim identified appellant as one of the suspects who participated in a robbery in which gold chain necklaces were pulled from the victim's neck. A witness identified appellant as the person who punched the victim and displayed a gun in his waistband. The parties agree appellant was never charged with a crime based on that incident.
Later in the hearing, the prosecutor asked the court to review a second police report, No. 2017-00009220/00009221 (report No. 9220), regarding the underlying original offense, disturbing the peace. Though the probation report summarized the event leading up to the filing of a wardship petition, the prosecutor did not believe the summation "really captured the similarities in that matter vis-a-vis" the matter before the court for disposition. Appellant objected on federal due process and hearsay grounds.
The court indicated it had reviewed the police reports.
2. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting the Police Reports
During the contested dispositional hearing, appellant asserts the juvenile court abused its discretion by admitting and then reviewing the two police reports containing inadmissible hearsay.
Appellant maintains the hearsay violations were particularly prejudicial to appellant because when the court announced its decision committing appellant to the DJJ, it referred to the out-of-court statements in the police reports as true and correct. Appellant is particularly concerned about the following four handwritten notes on report No. 9220's supplemental narrative: (1) "orig. offense (reduced to 415 misdo)—offered for similarity—"; (2) "S1?[defendant] chased vic & showed gun—bad blood yr. before re GF"; (3) "S2?went after other vic w/ crowbar"; and (4) "Issues [¶] (1) Bad blood over [female] [¶] (2) gets others to be violent." Appellant assumes the judge wrote these comments, and the Attorney General does not contest this assumption. Additionally, appellant asserts report No. 9220 "contained multiple hearsay statements and multiple level[s] of hearsay including triple hearsay."
Contrary to appellant's claim, the juvenile court did not refer to the police reports as true and correct.
We conclude the juvenile court properly reviewed and considered the police reports, and even assuming the court erred in reviewing both police reports, any error was harmless.
Unlike the jurisdictional phase, where the Evidence Code applies, "[n]o statute expressly subjects [the dispositional] phase to the Evidence Code." (In re Eddie M. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 480, 487; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 701.) Welfare and Institutions Code section 706 reads, in pertinent part: "After finding that a minor is a person described in Section 601 or 602, the court must hear evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor. The court shall receive in evidence the social study of the minor made by the probation officer and any other relevant material evidence that may be offered, including any written or oral statement offered by the victim, the parent or guardian of the victim if the victim is a minor, . . . as authorized by subdivision (b) of Section 656.2. . . . In any judgment and order of disposition, the court shall state that the social study made by the probation officer has been read and that the social study and any statement has been considered by the court."
Probation department reports prepared for the dispositional phase of a juvenile delinquency case are similar to reports prepared for adult sentencing proceedings. In the latter proceedings, "courts routinely rely [on] hearsay statements contained in probation reports to make factual findings concerning the details of the crime. These findings, in turn, guide the court's sentencing decision—a decision which has a great impact on the defendant's liberty interest." (People v. Otto (2001) 26 Cal.4th 200, 212-213 (Otto).)
Although the Evidence Code applies in jurisdictional hearings, In re Vincent G. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 238, 243 (Vincent G.) held, "In juvenile dependency cases it is settled that hearsay evidence, which would be inadmissible at a jurisdiction hearing, may nevertheless be considered at a dispositional hearing." The court analogized dependency cases to delinquency cases, noting Welfare and Institutions Code section 701 requires adherence to the Evidence Code in jurisdictional hearings, but " '[t]here is no correlative statute making the Evidence Code generally applicable to a dispositional hearing,' " and indeed, Welfare and Institutions Code section 706 requires the court to admit into evidence the minor's social study report made by the probation officer and any " ' "other relevant and material evidence [that] may be offered." ' " (Vincent G., at p. 244, italics added by Vincent G.) And practically speaking, "[a] probation officer could not make an investigation and report . . . if restricted to the rules of evidence. Much of the prior record and history of a defendant, as well as the circumstances surrounding the crime, are hearsay and can be investigated and reported [on] only by the use of hearsay information." (People v. Valdivia (1960) 182 Cal.App.2d 145, 148.) By permitting the use of a probation department report at the juvenile dispositional hearing, we conclude "the Legislature necessarily endorsed the use of multiple-level-hearsay statements that do not otherwise fall within a hearsay exception." (Otto, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 208.)
In this case, we see no prejudicial error in the juvenile court's review and consideration of both police reports for the purposes of ascertaining the circumstances of the disturbing the peace offense (report No. 9220) and the later, but uncharged, robbery (report No. 0211). Because the court could review and consider the probation report summary of the disturbing the peace report, and the probation officer could have included in the report a summary of the uncharged robbery, we see no prejudice to appellant by the court's review and consideration of the actual police reports merely because they were directly presented to the court rather than as a probation report summary of the robbery and a more detailed summary of the disturbing the peace offense. In short, consistent with Welfare and Institutions Code section 706, these police reports are clearly relevant and material evidence offered on the question of appellant's proper disposition.
Even assuming the court erred in reviewing and considering the police reports, any error was harmless because it is not reasonably probable that if the reports were excluded appellant would have received a more favorable outcome. (People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [reviewing court will not disturb a judgment unless reasonably probable that if evidence was admitted, appellant would have received a more favorable outcome]; People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 439 ["Absent fundamental unfairness, state law error in admitting evidence is subject to the traditional Watson test"].)
First, as set forth previously, the probation report, to which appellant raised no objection, included a summary of the police report leading up to the disturbing the peace adjudication. Second, assuming the juvenile judge was precluded from reviewing either or both police reports in considering the appropriate disposition for appellant, she read and considered ample information contained in the probation report, including appellant's social history, family, education, drug and alcohol issues, and medical and psychological issues.
Importantly, the court had an opportunity to read the probation officer's "Analysis of Case Problems and Risks." In describing how appellant arranged for friends to carry out the shooting at the current boyfriend's car, the probation officer stated, "Chillingly, the minor stated the crime only became a bad idea, when the house was shot into." The probation officer further observed appellant had been a ward on formal probation for less than one year before committing the present offenses, he showed no remorse for the victim, and represented he was affiliated with the Norteño criminal street gang, but not a member, even though he identified himself as Norteño with custodial staff. The report also noted, "If he is to be believed, [appellant] planned and executed a crime by getting his 'friends' to shoot into a man's truck and his home, after threatening the man's son more than once, via social media, which could have resulted in the death of one or several people. The fact that [appellant] easily planned and had access to friends with firearms, who were willing and loyal enough to shoot into a stranger's truck and home, because their friend was suffering from relationship jealousy, is extremely concerning for public safety." Expressing concern, the probation officer stated that while appellant and his family had been involved with multidimensional family therapy for seven months when he committed the instant offense, rather than speaking with his therapist and family to assist him with coping skills to address his jealousy over his ex-girlfriend, he chose a "pre-meditated violent and vengeful response." The family seemed helpless "to see the type of life their son has chosen and to respond in a way he respects" and to address appellant's deteriorating "educational obligations."
Likewise, the juvenile court was equally focused on and underscored the serious nature of the present offense, stating this was an "extremely violent incident, and carried out in concert with [appellant] being the instigator and the shot caller based on a sense of ownership of an ex-girlfriend after making serious threats of not only violence, but sexual violence towards the victim's mother, and he involved other people in this shooting up the house. This could easily have been a murder. So in terms of the seriousness of the offense, it is way beyond in both its being an action in concert and the discharge of a firearm into an inhabited residence, that is way beyond the kind of crime that typically puts a youth in our county in YOPT [(Youth Offender Treatment Program)]."
Furthermore, we do not agree with appellant's assertion that the court based a substantial portion of its decision on the two "wrongly admitted" police reports. As explained above, the report leading up to the disturbing the peace adjudication was summarized in the unobjected-to probation report. The court, as a result, was already aware, without reviewing the police report, that appellant had been identified as a coparticipant in an assault with a deadly firearm incident. And the court's reference on the record to the robbery incident occurring four days after the instant offense was brief. What concerned the court was the history of the use of guns and working in concert, issues easily discernable from the probation report without recourse to the police reports.
In sum, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by considering and reviewing both police reports because in dispositional proceedings, a court can consider hearsay evidence. And assuming the court erroneously admitted the reports, any error was harmless because the incident leading up to the disturbing the peace adjudication was already summarized in the probation report, a summary of the robbery incident could have been included in the probation report, the court's reference to the robbery was brief, and the entire probation report, absent direct review of the police reports, more than justified the court's focus on appellant's history of use of guns and working in concert.
3. Right of Confrontation
Citing Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68 (Crawford), appellant claims the juvenile court violated his right of confrontation by considering the police reports because he was not allowed to cross-examine the witnesses referenced therein. Accordingly, appellant argues his confrontation clause claim turns solely on the question of whether the interviews with victims and witnesses in those reports were testimonial.
We reject appellant's contention because there is no Sixth Amendment right of confrontation at a dispositional hearing such as the one held below. (See People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749, 754 [criminal defendants have no 6th Amend. right to confrontation in sentencing hearings].) While Welfare and Institutions Code section 702.5 expressly grants a minor a right of confrontation and cross-examination at a jurisdictional hearing, no such statutory right exists with regard to a dispositional hearing. A minor has no right to cross-examine the probation officer preparing the social study called for by Welfare and Institutions Code section 706. (In re Romeo C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1838, 1843, 1849.) Furthermore, as discussed above, the Evidence Code is not applicable to dispositional hearings. (In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 487.) Appellant's Sixth Amendment argument is without any merit.
In any event, even if Crawford applied, we would conclude any violation of appellant's right to confrontation by the admission of the two police reports was harmless beyond any reasonable doubt. (See People v. Pettie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 23, 64 ["A violation of the Sixth Amendment's confrontation right requires reversal of the judgment against a criminal defendant unless the prosecution can show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict obtained."].)
To reiterate, appellant objected only to the admission of the two police reports; he never objected to the admission or contents of the probation report, including the summary of the original offense leading to appellant's plea to disturbing the peace. Even if the police reports were not admissible, the probation report singularly contained ample information in support of the court's conclusion appellant was engaged in a dangerous pattern of conduct involving the use of guns and acting in concert. In the final analysis, the court's primary focus was on appellant's instant offense. And appellant waived his right to confront witnesses with respect to the present offense when he entered his plea of no contest to misdemeanor making criminal threats and to assault with intent to commit great bodily injury.
In sum, appellant cannot show his right of confrontation was implicated. B. Commitment to the DJJ
The Attorney General maintains appellant forfeited his confrontation right claim by failing to object on this ground in the juvenile court. Because appellant's right to confrontation is a question of law and it is undisputed the court reviewed the police reports, we decline to find appellant has forfeited this issue. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1313-1314 [an issue not raised in the trial court may be raised on appeal if it raises only a question of law and can be decided on undisputed facts].)
1. The Contested Dispositional Hearing
Prior to the dispositional hearing, the probation department filed a report recommending appellant be committed to the DJJ for an extended period to address appellant's antisocial and violent behavior. There, according to probation, appellant will receive the "intensive rehabilitation he will need, at the age of 18, in a secure setting." The report included an evaluation of alternative placements to the DJJ but rejected them as inappropriate for appellant. Specifically, appellant was screened for commitment to the Orin Allen Youth Rehabilitation Facility (OAYRF) program; however, he was found unsuitable by the probation manager because he was "not an acceptable, 'safe' candidate for the OAYRF open setting given the dangerous gun behavior during the commission of [the instant] crime and the potential dangerous threat to the surrounding community of OAYRF." Appellant was also screened for a commitment to the Youth Offender Treatment Program (YOTP). Again, he was found "unsuitable." Probation Supervisor Kira Faulkner determined, " 'It is clear by [appellant's] actions in this offense, premeditated violence on another, and his affliction [sic] for using firearms in the commission of his crimes, [that] he poses a serious danger to his community and to society as a whole. In reviewing the circumstances of each of his offenses, past and present, he is demonstrating a lack of empathy for others and appears to believe problems are solved with violence.' "
During the contested dispositional hearing, the court probation officer reaffirmed the DJJ provided the best option for treatment of appellant.
The court also evaluated whether an alternative placement to the DJJ would be more appropriate and beneficial to appellant. Initially, the court considered the YOTP, expressing concern that to the extent there are other gang members housed in this treatment program, the chances are more likely appellant will affiliate with "local people . . . as opposed to if he were to go to DJJ" where he would not be as likely to affiliate with the gang members there, presumably because those members would be from different locales. Next, having committed many minors to the YOTP, the court could not think of another minor there who had "actually discharged a firearm, much less into a home . . . . , let alone order[ed] and organiz[ed] other minors to do it with him" out of jealousy and "controlling rage over a young woman." Because of these distinctive factors, the court had "grave concerns" about trying to use the rehabilitative programs at the YOTP "for a minor who is that far outside of the mainstream of offenses that the other minors here are involved in."
Placement in the YOTP, or "the Ranch," in the court's view, was "completely inappropriate" for appellant because he had an issue with guns, and notwithstanding family therapy, appellant became jealous, made threats to someone romantically involved with his ex-girlfriend, and recruited others to shoot up a car and an occupied house.
Though, the juvenile judge felt "YOTP is a good program," she questioned whether it had as wide-ranging programs as the DJJ. The judge had visited the DJJ and believed it had more extensive therapeutic programming than the YOTP. Notwithstanding the judge's exposure to the DJJ, since there was a dispute whether the DJJ or YOTP was the appropriate placement for appellant, she decided to hold an evidentiary hearing.
At the evidentiary hearing, two witnesses testified: Lorraine Custino, a parole agent and a court and community liaison with the DJJ, and Kira Faulkner, a probation supervisor for the juvenile field division of the Contra Costa County Probation Department.
Custino explained she screened cases for acceptance into the DJJ. Once a youth arrives at the DJJ, he or she is assigned to the intake reception center for approximately 45 days to receive assessments through the psychologist, a medical physical, educational testing, and an assessment to determine his or her risks and needs. A case plan is then developed. Custino also described gang diversion related programs, including the "Counterpoint program." That program involves addressing skills building, moral reasoning, and negative peer influences. Instead of "glorifying" gangs, the program has its participants examine the underlying issues that brought them to the gang. The DJJ was beginning a new program, entitled "New Freedom 100 Gang Intervention," recognized by the Department of Justice. During her testimony, Custino described two other programs offered at the DJJ. The first, "Aggression Interruption Training," is again a skill building group in which the participants learn how "to slow down their thought process, figure out the things that trigger [them], and find better ways to deal with those situations." The second program, "Advanced Practice," is another intervention program youths can enroll in after they have completed Counterpoint and Aggression Interruption Training to continue practicing the skills they learned in the other programs.
Faulkner testified she was familiar with the YOTP program, and after screening appellant for this program, she concluded "he was not appropriate for YOTP." In reaching this conclusion, Faulkner relied on the circumstances of the current offense, as well as appellant's prior offense in which he was adjudged a ward, his social history, and information found in the disposition report and police reports. The "planning and the actual outcome of the circumstances of this particular offense" demonstrated to Faulkner that appellant's "criminal sophistication" was "far greater" than those currently housed at the YOTP. In her opinion, the DJJ was better equipped to rehabilitate appellant because appellant's minimum confinement at the DJJ would be 18 months, whereas at the YOTP he would likely be out within 9 to 10 months. Considering appellant's thought process "during the commission of this instant offense," Faulkner believed the DJJ had "more programming, more lengthy cognitive behavioral treatment programming" and "allows for more time for it to set in to sort of take hold on [appellant]" than the YOTP, which would not be of sufficient duration to address appellant's specific needs.
2. The Juvenile Court's Ruling
After hearing the evidence, the court found appellant would receive substantial benefit from the DJJ programing and the "mental and physical condition and qualifications of [appellant] are such" that it was probable that he would benefit from "the reformatory, educational, discipline, or other treatment provided by the [DJJ]." The court, in addition, determined the protection and safety of the public, including other youth in the YOTP, made "the less-restrictive[,] less-extensive[,] less-searching and less-individualized programing" at YOTP "inappropriate." In reaching this conclusion, the court focused on the extremely violent present incident, noting appellant was the instigator of a violent criminal act carried out in concert. Not only was the court concerned that appellant was the "shot caller based on a sense of ownership of an ex-girlfriend," he threatened sexual violence against the victim's mother. Referring to the original offenses disposed of as a disturbing the peace, the court indicated while no gun was ever found, the facts suggested appellant was chasing an individual down the street with a gun.
In rejecting YOTP placement, the court explained, "YOTP does not have the extensive intake that is done to individualize the program. There's a 45-day intake Ms. Custino testified at DJJ that does not exist [at] YOTP. YOTP is kind of a one-size-fits-all program. And DJJ is not."
To summarize the court's other findings, it commented the DJJ is targeted at psychiatric, psychological, educational, and risk assessments tailored "exactly" to appellant's needs. In rejecting the YOTP, the court found the YOTP's program is not designed to address appellant's gang activity, shot calling, violence or possessiveness. The DJJ, in contrast, the court found, has programming to address appellant's family, education, medical, and mental health needs, plus peer influences and substance abuse. The court noted the Counterpoint, Freedom 100 Gang Intervention, and Advanced Practice programs are better suited to deal with appellant's moral reasoning and negative peer influences associated with gang activity. Concerned appellant was already 18 and would be one of the older youths in the YOTP, who by his activities had shown his ability to influence other youth, the court decided the YOTP would not be beneficial to appellant or other youth in the YOTP.
3. Applicable Principles
Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 725.5, the juvenile court must consider the circumstances and gravity of the offense committed by the minor. In determining how best to rehabilitate a minor and to afford him or her adequate care, the court must consider the broadest range of information. (In re Robert H. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1317, 1329.) A juvenile court's order may be reversed on appeal only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Appellate courts must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them. (Id. at pp. 1329-1330.)
The record must be viewed in light of the purposes of juvenile law. As described in Welfare and Institutions Code section 202, those purposes include rehabilitation, treatment, guidance, punishment as a rehabilitative tool, and protection of the public. (In re Teofilio A. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 571, 576.) To that end, the juvenile court considers the probation officer's report and any other relevant material evidence that may be offered (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 706), as well as the age of the minor, the circumstances and gravity of the offense, and the minor's previous delinquent history (id., § 725.5). The court may also consider the need to hold the minor accountable for his or her actions (id., § 202, subd. (b)) and the community's interest in being protected from crime during rehabilitative efforts (id., subd. (a); In re Lorenza M. (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 49, 57-58). Courts do not necessarily abuse their discretion in ordering a juvenile to the most restrictive placement before other options have been tried. (In re Eddie M., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 507.) It is error, however, for the juvenile court to fail to consider less restrictive alternatives to a DJJ commitment. (Teofilio A., at p. 577.)
4. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Committing Appellant to the DJJ
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion by committing him to the DJJ rather than placing him in a less restrictive setting because the evidence was insufficient to establish a probable benefit to appellant from a DJJ commitment. We are not persuaded.
" 'The appellate court reviews a commitment decision for abuse of discretion, indulging all reasonable inferences to support the juvenile court's decision.' " (In re A.R. (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 1076, 1080.) A DJJ commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the record demonstrates "both a probable benefit to the minor . . . and the inappropriateness or ineffectiveness of less restrictive alternatives." (In re Angela M. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1396.) Such is the case here. Before deciding to commit appellant to the DJJ, the court considered less restrictive placements and expressed sound reasons for rejecting them. First, the court reviewed the probation report. The report considered and rejected OAYRF and the YOTP citing appellant's need for intensive rehabilitation in a secure setting as opposed to an open setting, his dangerous gun behavior during the instant crime, the premeditated violence committed against another, and his potential threat to the surrounding community. Second, in evaluating whether alternative placement to the DJJ would be appropriate, the court examined the YOTP, expressing concern appellant would associate with other gang members housed in this treatment program. The court was familiar with the YOTP and could not think of another minor there who had discharged a firearm, much less into a home, and had ordered and organized other minors to commit the shooting. In short, appellant's behavior was outside of the realm of offenses committed by minors at the YOTP.
Nonetheless, the court held an evidentiary hearing in which Parole Agent Custino and Faulkner, the DJJ's court and community liaison, testified. To summarize, Custino testified about the extensive assessment appellant would receive upon his arrival at the DJJ, in addition to the gang diversion related programs addressing skills building, moral reasoning, and negative peer influences. After screening appellant for the YOTP, Faulkner testified that appellant was not an appropriate candidate because of his current offense, his prior offense, his social history, and information from the disposition report and police reports.
We conclude the court's order committing appellant to the DJJ was supported by substantial evidence in the record, including the seriousness of the premeditated offense, appellant's role as the instigator, his penchant for guns, his prior behavioral history, and his lack of empathy for others. And as the court concluded, appellant would receive substantial benefit from the extensive programing provided by the DJJ, comprising reformatory, educational, discipline, and other described treatment. Given the need to protect public safety, as well as minors in the YOTP, and appellant's role as an instigator of a violent criminal act in concert, the court appropriately confirmed it was rejecting the less restrictive setting and less extensive programming of an alternative placement.
Appellant raises several points in arguing the DJJ commitment was not appropriate based on his prior misdemeanor for disturbing the peace at age 16, his "excellent adjustment to juvenile hall," his "ability to refocus and calm down when emotional," his defense counsel's report, his remorse, and his letters of reference. As to alternative placement, appellant argues the court abused its discretion by not placing him in the YOTP. Appellant speculates the court must have had some concern about placing appellant at the DJJ because it asked about the "option of 90-day observation and diagnosis under Welfare and Institutions Code Section 704[, subdivision] (a) and [California Rules of Court, rule] 5.782(c)," but failed to have Custino check whether the county had a contract "with us for diagnostics." Appellant finds this significant because he has a learning disability, substance abuse issues, anxiety issues for which he takes Prozac, and is receiving multidimensional family therapy.
Next appellant asserts Custino was not asked to specify which DJJ programs would benefit him. Appellant further criticizes Faulkner's testimony that none of the youth presently at the YOTP were there for an offense involving discharge of a firearm, contrary to cross-examination in which she acknowledged that other wards who had been in possession of a firearm had gone through the YOTP. Appellant also compares Faulkner's testimony in this matter with her testimony in a different unrelated juvenile case. According to appellant, both cases involved a DJJ commitment, and Faulkner testified in each case that the minor was not appropriate for the YOTP "by testifying to almost the same thing in both cases."
In our view, appellant is asking us to independently evaluate the dispositional hearing evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the juvenile court. However, as explained in In re Michael D. (1987) 188 Cal.App.3d 1392, 1395, "[a]n appellate court will not lightly substitute its decision for that rendered by the juvenile court. We must indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them." We have examined the record and indulged in all reasonable inferences, and as set forth above, there was substantial evidence at the dispositional hearing to support the commitment to the DJJ.
In sum, the record does not indicate any abuse of discretion on the part of the juvenile court. To the contrary, it demonstrates a thorough assessment and reasoned disposition by the court. The record demonstrates there are probable benefits associated with a DJJ commitment and the court considered and appropriately rejected alternative, less restrictive placements.
III. DISPOSITION
Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.
/s/_________
Margulies, Acting P. J. We concur: /s/_________
Banke, J. /s/_________
Sanchez, J.