Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. CC934548.
Premo, Acting P.J.
In the court below, defendant Christopher Dominic Leyva, Jr. unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence. He thereafter entered a negotiated plea of no contest to driving with a suspended license. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by denying his suppression motion. He argues that the evidence implicating him was the product of an unlawful detention. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
SCOPE OF REVIEW
“ ‘ “An appellate court’s review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress is governed by well-settled principles. [Citations.] [¶] In ruling on such a motion, the trial court (1) finds the historical facts, (2) selects the applicable rule of law, and (3) applies the latter to the former to determine whether the rule of law as applied to the established facts is or is not violated. [Citations.] ‘The [trial] court’s resolution of each of these inquiries is, of course, subject to appellate review.’ [Citations.] [¶] The court’s resolution of the first inquiry, which involves questions of fact, is reviewed under the deferential substantial-evidence standard. [Citations.] Its decision on the second, which is a pure question of law, is scrutinized under the standard of independent review. [Citations.] Finally, its ruling on the third, which is a mixed fact-law question that is however predominantly one of law, ... is also subject to independent review.” ’ ” (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 255.)
BACKGROUND
The parties developed undisputed historical facts at the suppression hearing through the testimony of Milpitas Police Sergeant Huy Tran.
Sergeant Tran was on routine patrol alone in a marked police car on a January evening near 9:00 p.m. While canvassing a Milpitas residential area that had problems with auto burglaries and auto thefts, he observed and followed a car. The car quickly turned into the private driveway of a home located across from a park. As Sergeant Tran drove slowly past the driveway, he ran a check on the license plate by using his mobile computer. The check revealed that the car was registered to a woman who resided in San Jose. Sergeant Tran looked back at the car but did not see anyone exit. He then made a U-turn, drove back to the driveway area, and shined his spotlight on the car. He saw that the headrest of the driver’s seat was missing, which suggested to him that the seat was down without someone having exited the vehicle. He then saw defendant sit up, exit the vehicle, and walk toward the residence. He turned off the spotlight and made another U-turn. He watched defendant approach the house and stand by the door without knocking. He made another U-turn and parked his car on the street along the sidewalk. He exited the car and saw defendant walk back towards his own car. He walked up toward defendant and casually asked, “Hey, how’s it going tonight?” He then asked whether defendant lived at the residence. Defendant replied that he did not. Sergeant Tran then asked why defendant pulled into the driveway. Defendant replied that he was lost and looking for a friend who lived across the street from a church. Sergeant Tran then observed objective symptoms that defendant was under the influence of drugs or alcohol. He asked whether defendant had been drinking. Defendant replied that he had consumed three or four beers. Sergeant Tran asked whether defendant had identification, and defendant produced a California I.D. Sergeant Tran then used his portable radio to check whether defendant’s driver’s license was current and informed defendant that there were problems with car burglars and car thieves in the neighborhood. He learned after 20 or 30 seconds that defendant’s license was suspended. After defendant performed a field sobriety test, Sergeant Tran arrested defendant for driving under the influence and driving on a suspended license. He searched defendant and found $1,451. He performed an inventory search of defendant’s car before having it towed and found marijuana.
At the suppression hearing, the People argued that the encounter between Sergeant Tran and defendant was consensual and not a detention. They pointed out that no evidence supported that defendant knew Sergeant Tran was following him and, after briefly using the spotlight, Sergeant Tran casually walked toward defendant and engaged him in conversation without preventing him from leaving. Defendant countered that Sergeant Tran had detained him without reasonable suspicion. He urged that Sergeant Tran was following him and made three U-turns before exiting the patrol car and interrogating him. He argued: “So, although he’s not physically being held down and although the patrol car is not blocking the driveway, his movements are still restricted. No reasonable person under these circumstances would have felt free to leave.” He pointed out that his behavior was not suspicious because he could have been leaning forward in the car to pick something off the floorboard, knocked at the residence door without Sergeant Tran seeing him, and mistaken the park in the darkness for the church parking lot that was a block away. The People replied that Sergeant Tran did not have to discount all innocent explanations for defendant’s behavior before he could detain him.
The trial court explained: “Very well. In this matter, the Court is not persuaded that this was a consensual encounter. However, the Court is satisfied that there was reasonable suspicion to justify the temporary detention of the defendant.”
DISCUSSION
The parties reiterate their arguments here. The focus is on the events beginning when Sergeant Tran followed defendant’s car and ending when Sergeant Tran observed defendant’s objective symptoms of being under the influence. Defendant concedes that Sergeant Tran had reasonable suspicion to detain him once he observed the symptoms.
Whether “there was a detention” is a pure question of law subject to independent review. (See, e.g., People v. Nickleberry (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 63, 68.) “[When, as here, ] the evidence is uncontradicted, we must independently determine whether the facts support the court’s conclusion. [Citation.] Under Proposition 8 we apply federal constitutional law, but utilize state law where it does not conflict with federal law.” (People v. Verin (1990) 220 Cal.App.3d 551, 555.)
We respectfully disagree with the trial court’s characterization of the undisputed facts as a detention. Rather we agree with the People that the encounter was consensual. We therefore affirm the judgment without examining whether reasonable suspicion justified a detention. (People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 993, fn. 19 [it is a “ ‘settled principle of appellate review that a correct decision of the trial court must be affirmed on appeal even if it is based on erroneous reasoning’ ”].)
“For purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, there are basically three different categories or levels of police ‘contacts’ or ‘interactions’ with individuals, ranging from the least to the most intrusive. First, there are what Justice White termed ‘consensual encounters’ [citation], which are those police-individual interactions which result in no restraint of an individual’s liberty whatsoever--i.e., no ‘seizure, ’ however minimal--and which may properly be initiated by police officers even if they lack any ‘objective justification.’ [Citation.] Second, there are what are commonly termed ‘detentions, ’ seizures of an individual which are strictly limited in duration, scope and purpose, and which may be undertaken by the police ‘if there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a crime.’ [Citation.] Third, and finally, there are those seizures of an individual which exceed the permissible limits of a detention, seizures which include formal arrests and restraints on an individual’s liberty which are comparable to an arrest, and which are constitutionally permissible only if the police have probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime.” (Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784.)
Thus, not every encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen constitutes a detention for Fourth Amendment purposes. “[S]eizure does not occur simply because a police officer approaches an individual and asks a few questions.” (Florida v. Bostick (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 434.) Rather, “a person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” (United States v. Mendenhall (1980) 446 U.S. 544, 553.) “[T]o determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter to determine whether the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that the person was not free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise terminate the encounter.” (Florida v. Bostick, supra, at p. 439; accord, People v. Valenzuela (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 817, 823.) “The test is necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of that conduct in isolation. Moreover, what constitutes a restraint on liberty prompting a person to conclude that he is not free to ‘leave’ will vary, not only with the particular police conduct at issue, but also with the setting in which the conduct occurs.” (Michigan v. Chesternut (1988) 486 U.S. 567, 573.)
“Circumstances establishing a seizure might include any of the following: the presence of several officers, an officer’s display of a weapon, some physical touching of the person, or the use of language or of a tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be compelled.” (In re Manuel G. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 805, 821; see also In re Christopher B. (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.) All of the circumstances involved in the encounter must be evaluated to decide whether a reasonable person would have concluded from the police conduct that he or she was not free to leave or decline the requests of the police. (Florida v. Bostick, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 439.) And “[t]he officer’s uncommunicated state of mind and the individual citizen’s subjective belief are irrelevant in assessing whether a seizure triggering Fourth Amendment scrutiny has occurred.” (In re Manuel G., supra, at p. 821.)
Here, there is no suggestion in the record that Sergeant Tran coerced defendant to submit to questioning “by means of physical force or a show of authority.” (United States v. Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553.) Sergeant Tran approached defendant from a public street after defendant had exited his car and remained in the vicinity. He asked defendant questions. The defendant provided answers. This scenario shows a consensual encounter that does not implicate Fourth Amendment principles.
Defendant disagrees. He points out that the trial court implicitly found that a detention occurred before Sergeant Tran had reason to believe that he had been driving under the influence. He asserts that the detention happened when he “either sat in his car while the officer made U-turns out in the street, or when he approached the front door of the house, at which time he responded to the officer’s presence by walking toward him.” He argues that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave because the encounter involved consecutive police actions (three U-turns, spotlight, officer was visibly armed, officer failed to announce that he could refuse to answer questions or was free to leave, officer interrogated him about his presence on the property). He adds that the trial court observed Sergeant Tran’s demeanor and implicitly concluded that Sergeant Tran’s “manner would be intimidating to a reasonable person.” He relies on cases such as People v. Jones (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 519 (Jones) in support of his position. Defendant’s analysis is erroneous.
In Jones, the officer made contact with the defendant at approximately 9:00 p.m. on an Oakland street after observing the defendant--who was with two other men--receive money from one of them. Because the area was known to the officer as a high drug trafficking region, the officer notified the dispatcher that he was going to make a “ ‘walking stop’; he then pulled his patrol car to the wrong side of the road and parked diagonally against the traffic about 10 feet behind the group.” (Jones, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 522.) After the defendant began to walk away, the officer said something to the effect of “ ‘ “Stop. Would you please stop.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The defendant stopped, and then “ ‘immediately’ reached towards his left-rear pants pocket with his left hand.” (Ibid.) Fearing that the defendant might have a concealed weapon, the officer grabbed his left arm; the defendant’s fingers were in his left rear pocket and the officer withdrew the defendant’s hand and observed that he was holding a clear plastic bag containing cocaine. In response to the officer’s query, the defendant said that he thought the bag contained methamphetamine. The officer then arrested the defendant for possession of cocaine for sale.
In reviewing the People’s appeal from an order granting the defendant’s motion to suppress, the Jones court concluded that the combination of the officer’s quick arrival to the scene and his direction that the defendant stop constituted a detention. It reasoned, “We believe the coercive effect of [the officer’s] conduct was clear. A reasonable man does not believe he is free to leave when directed to stop by a police officer who has arrived suddenly and parked his car in such a way as to obstruct traffic.” (Jones, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 523.)
Here, the record does not support that Sergeant Tran “arrived suddenly” or “parked his car in such a way as to obstruct the driveway.” (Jones, supra, 228 Cal.App.3d at p. 523.) And Sergeant Tran did not direct defendant to stop. Instead, in a casual or conversational tone of voice, he said, “Hey, how’s it going tonight?” These words, viewed in the context in which they were spoken, were reasonably those of a peace officer making a request that a citizen voluntarily cooperate in speaking with the officer for a moment. Moreover, any supposed belief of defendant that he felt compelled to cooperate with Sergeant Tran is of no consequence. Again, a subjective belief as a citizen encountering a peace officer as to whether he or she is compelled to cooperate is irrelevant in testing whether a reasonable person would have thought under the circumstances that he or she was free to go about his or her business. (In re Manuel G., supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 821.) Additionally, “[w]hile most citizens will respond to a police request, the fact that people do so, and do so without being told they are free not to respond, hardly eliminates the consensual nature of the response.” (INS v. Delgado (1984) 466 U.S. 210, 216.) And we will not presume from a silent record that the trial court inferred from Sergeant Tran’s courtroom demeanor that Sergeant Tran’s demeanor on the night in question was intimidating. This follows because such an inference is inconsistent with the objective, undisputed facts. (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1251 [under the substantial evidence scope of review, the appellate court presumes what the fact finder could reasonably deduce from the evidence].) We add that the facts defendant relies on demonstrate less a show of authority than those in People v. Perez (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1492, a case in which we rejected a claim that a detention occurred when a police patrol car shined its high beams and spotlights at the defendant’s vehicle. “While the use of high beams and spotlights might cause a reasonable person to feel himself the object of official scrutiny, such directed scrutiny does not amount to a detention.” (Id. at p. 1496.)
In short, the evidence in this case is undisputed that Sergeant Tran’s demeanor at the time of the encounter was casual or conversational rather than threatening. His questions were just that, rather than demands. He did not physically or orally restrain defendant. And nothing he said or did indicated that he wanted to do anything more than talk to defendant.
Thus, the evidence does not demonstrate a show of authority other than what is implicit when a uniformed police officer exits a patrol car to engage a citizen. It therefore fails to support that Sergeant Tran coerced defendant to submit to questioning by means of physical force or a show of authority such that a reasonable person in defendant’s situation would not have felt free to leave.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Elia, J., McAdams, J.