438; Mendoza, 49 Misc 3d 1007 [finding that police had violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights]; see also Correa, 55 AD3d 1380; Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769; Anderson, 146 AD2d 638 [declining to suppress evidence gathered by police who breached the threshold]). For the same reason, it has failed to safeguard the court system from constant appellate litigation (see, e.g., People v Kozlowski, 69 NY2d 761 [1987]; People v Spencer, 135 AD3d 608 [1st Dept 2016]; Garvin, 130 AD3d 644; People v Riffas, 120 AD3d 1438 [2d Dept 2014]; People v Pearson, 82 AD3d 475 [1st Dept 2011]; People v Correa, 55 AD3d 1380 [4th Dept 2008]; People v Rodriguez, 21 AD3d 1400 [4th Dept 2005]; Reynoso, 309 AD2d 769; People v Andino, 256 AD2d 153 [1st Dept 1998]; Mauceri v County of Suffolk, 234 AD2d 350 [2d Dept 1996]; People v Schiavo, 212 AD2d 816 [2d Dept 1995]; People v Francis, 209 AD2d 539 [2d Dept 1994]; People v Min Chul Shin, 200 AD2d 770 [2d Dept 1994]; People v Rosario, 179 AD2d 442 [1st Dept 1992]; People v Lewis, 172 AD2d 775 [2d Dept 1991]; People v Marzan, 161 AD2d 416 [1st Dept 1990]; People v Anderson, 146 AD2d 638 [2d Dept 1989]; People v Brown, 144 AD2d 975 [1st Dept 1988]; People v Nonni, 141 AD2d 862 [2d Dept 1988]). As this Court's first sustained consideration of the validity of threshold arrests, today's opinion may resolve some of that ambiguity by defining the threshold to mean only the narrow space between the doorjambs.
The defendant did not argue at the suppression hearing that he had an expectation of privacy in the hallway of the apartment building ( see, CPL 470.05; see, e.g., People v. Vasquez, 66 N.Y.2d 968, 969, cert denied 475 U.S. 1109; People v. Tutt, 38 N.Y.2d 1011, 1012-1013; People v. Cea, 237 A.D.2d 617, 618; People v. Alexander, 226 A.D.2d 548, 549). In any event, the defendant's arrest in the hallway of his apartment building did not violate Payton v. New York ( 445 U.S. 573) since the defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy there ( see, People v. Minley, 68 N.Y.2d 952, 953-954; People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524, 531; People v. Coppin, 202 A.D.2d 279, 289; People v. Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775; People v. Crutch, 161 A.D.2d 401; People v. Marzan, 161 A.D.2d 416; People v. Proctor, 151 A.D.2d 788; People v. Anderson, 146 A.D.2d 638, 639-640; People v. Brown, 144 A.D.2d 975, 976). The record supports the hearing court's determination that the defendant voluntarily exited his apartment and was not threatened or coerced to leave the apartment.
However, courts have recognized the distinction between homes and common areas such as halls and lobbies of multitenant buildings which are not within an individual tenant's zone of privacy ( United States v Holland, supra, at 255). In the instant case, the Supreme Court properly found that the warrantless arrest of Mauceri did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the arrest took place at the door to a common area and therefore was not part of his "home" for purposes of the Fourth Amendment ( see, People v Jacobo, 208 AD2d 432; People v Lewis, 172 AD2d 775; People v Marzan, 161 AD2d 416; People v Proctor, 151 AD2d 788, supra). Accordingly, since Mauceri had no reasonable expectation of privacy while standing in a common area, a valid warrantless arrest was effectuated ( see, People v Jacobo, supra; People v Lewis, supra; People v Marzan, supra; People v Proctor, supra).
We find unpersuasive the defendant's contention that the written and videotaped statements he made to the police and the bullets seized from his apartment should have been suppressed as the product of an unlawful arrest. The defendant was not arrested in his residence; thus, his claim of a violation of Payton v. New York ( 445 U.S. 573) is unpersuasive (see, People v. Rosario, 186 A.D.2d 598; People v. Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775). Moreover, the police were lawfully at the defendant's apartment to execute a valid search warrant and also had probable cause to arrest him. Since the requirements for a search warrant were satisfied, there was no constitutional infirmity in the failure of the police to also secure an arrest warrant (see, People v. Battista, 197 A.D.2d 486; Jones v. City County of Denver, 854 F.2d 1206; see also, People v. Tondryk, 176 A.D.2d 1194; People v. Keller, 148 A.D.2d 958). We further note that the defendant was not entitled to disclosure of the informant's identity or to a redacted transcript of the informant's testimony before the issuing Magistrate to controvert the search warrant or challenge the legality of his arrest (see, People v. Castillo, 80 N.Y.2d 578, cert denied ___ US ___, 113 S Ct 1854; People v. Battista, supra; People v. Carpenito, 171 A.D.2d 45, affd 80 N.Y.2d 65). The suppression court properly reviewed, in camera, the search warrant and accompanying papers as well as t
Moreover, upon the exercise of our factual review power, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence (see, CPL 470.15). We find that the hearing court correctly determined that the statements made by the defendant while in custody that were offered against him at trial were neither taken in violation of his rights under Miranda v Arizona ( 384 U.S. 436; see, People v Banks, 135 A.D.2d 643; People v Gomez, 127 A.D.2d 606), nor involuntary (see, People v Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35; People v McAvoy, 142 A.D.2d 605; People v Leonard, 59 A.D.2d 1). The hearing court also correctly found that the defendant's arrest was supported by probable cause (see, People v Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417; People v Javier, 175 A.D.2d 182; People v Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775; People v Mitchell, 170 A.D.2d 542; People v Nelson, 79 A.D.2d 171, cert denied 454 U.S. 869) and that there was no need to call the actual identifying witness concerning the alleged suggestivity of a pretrial identification from a photographic array (see, People v Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, cert denied 498 U.S. 833). We have considered the defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit.
There is no merit to the contention that, because defendant's warrantless arrest was unlawful under Payton v. New York ( 445 U.S. 573, 590; see, People v. Harris, 77 N.Y.2d 434), defendant's statements and certain physical evidence should have been suppressed. Defendant was not arrested in his own apartment but in the common hallway of a four-apartment building, where he had broken into an apartment, and thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy (see, People v. Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775, 776, lv denied 78 N.Y.2d 969; People v. Marzan, 161 A.D.2d 416, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 860). The fact that defendant entered the hallway at the suggestion of a police officer did not render the arrest unlawful (see, People v. Minley, 68 N.Y.2d 952). With respect to the hallway, defendant failed to satisfy his burden of establishing that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in that common area of the building (see, People v. Rodriguez, 69 N.Y.2d 159, 163; People v. Green, 134 A.D.2d 865, 866, lv denied 71 N.Y.2d 897). Although the police had probable cause to arrest defendant before taking him into custody, their failure to file a felony information and to obtain an arrest warrant before arresting him did not affect the admissibility of the seized evidence or of his statements.
Contrary to the defendant's claim, his statements to the police were not subject to suppression on the ground that they were involuntarily obtained. The record demonstrates that the defendant was advised of his Miranda rights which he waived (see, People v Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775). The totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's confession was made voluntarily (see, People v Jenkins, 167 A.D.2d 421). The defendant further claims that he was not criminally responsible for his conduct by reason of mental disease or defect (see, Penal Law ยง 40.15).
The police clearly had probable cause to arrest the defendant based upon information provided by a local cab driver, who implicated the defendant in the murder. It is well settled that information provided by an identified citizen accusing another identified individual of committing a specified crime provides the police with probable cause to arrest (see, People v Lewis, 172 A.D.2d 775). Moreover, prior to the defendant's arrest, the police verified this information through an independent investigation which revealed the existence of the defendant's bloodied fingerprint inside the hotel room (see, People v Johnson, 66 N.Y.2d 398). Additionally, we find without merit the defendant's contention that these statements should have been suppressed because the police identified him through the use of fingerprints that should have been sealed pursuant to CPL 160.50 because that provision was not designed to immunize a defendant from the operations of law enforcement official's investigatory use of fingerprints (see, People v Patterson, 78 N.Y.2d 711; People v Gilbert, 136 A.D.2d 562). Viewing the circumstantial evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, and giving it the benefit of every reasonable inference to be drawn therefrom, we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Additionally, although an arrest in the doorway would have been permissible, the credible evidence establishes that the defendant stepped outside his doorway. People v. Lewis, 172 AD2d 775 (2nd Dep't 1991). Accordingly, there was no Payton violation.