¶ 8 Defendant's "Motion to Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence" acknowledged that one of the established "exceptions to the warrant requirement is the community caretaking or public safety exception, first recognized and discussed at length in Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) and discussed in the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois in People v. Lewis, 363 Ill.App.3d 516 (2006)." Defendant's motion alleged that the sole purpose of the officers' entry into the residence was "to attempt to convince the Defendant to come out."

Citing People v. Carter, 2016 IL App (3d) 140958, ¶ 33 (police who believe that they have probable cause to search cannot enter without a warrant on the rationale that they intended to obtain a warrant), defendant also contends that the inevitable-discovery rule does not apply, because the police could not justify their warrantless search by claiming that they planned to obtain a warrant. ¶ 39 In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, this court accepts the trial court's findings of fact so long as those findings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 523 (2006). However, we review de novo the trial court's ultimate ruling on the legality of the search or seizure.

The State contends that a trial court's determination whether evidence was in plain or open view is often a factual finding. See, e.g., People v. Lewis, 363 Ill.App.3d 516, 531 (2006) (trial court's finding that evidence was in plain view was a factual finding). In this case, however, the relevant facts are undisputed; the only question presented is the legal conclusion of whether Liebich's actions constituted a search.

Thus, unlike an inventory or administrative search, an emergency-assistance search does require a type of individualized suspicion, albeit not one of criminal activity." People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 526, 300 Ill. Dec. 618, 628, 845 N.E.2d 39, 49 (2006).

Thus, unlike an inventory or administrative search, an emergency-assistance search does require a type of individualized suspicion, albeit not one of criminal activity." People v. Lewis, 363 Ill.App.3d 516, 526, 300 Ill.Dec. 618, 628, 845 N.E.2d 39, 49 (2006).

"In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we accept the trial court's findings of fact as long as they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence, but we review de novo the court's ultimate ruling on the legality of the search or seizure." People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 523 (2006). Here, there was evidence that Mikrut objected to the officers entering his home and that they forced or pushed him into the home, where he was kept in the living room.

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we will accept the factual findings of the trial court so long as they are not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 523 (2006). The ultimate issue of whether police conduct comported with the strictures of the fourth amendment ( U.S. Const., amend. IV) is, however, subject to de novo review.

Several courts have also held that the emergency aid doctrine is a subcategory of the community caretaker exception, while the emergency doctrine is a subcategory of the exigent circumstances exception."). In the present case, the Court of Criminal Appeals cited People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 526, 845 N.E.2d 39, 49, 300 Ill. Dec. 618, 628 (2006), for the proposition that a search conducted while providing emergency assistance is an exercise of the police’s community-caretaking function and, thus, is an exception to the warrant requirement. The Illinois Court of Appeals in Lewis relied on Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).

A finding of fact is a trial court's conclusion about what happened in the past and involves weighing witness testimony, drawing inferences from evidence, and making credibility determinations. See, e.g., People v. Qurash, 2017 IL App (1st) 143412, ¶ 37 (determination about the language and tone an officer used is a finding of fact); People v. Roberts, 374 Ill.App.3d 490, 497-98 (2007) (determination about what occurred after a traffic stop would be a finding of fact); People v. Lewis, 363 Ill.App.3d 516, 530-31 (2006) (whether a responding officer examined the defendant's vital signs is a finding of fact). By contrast, a trial court's belief that defendant will flee prosecution in the future if she is not detained is not a determination about what actually happened in a given event that has already occurred.

It has been recognized that emergency-assistance searches are exercises of a police officer's community caretaking function. People v. Lewis, 363 Ill. App. 3d 516, 526, 845 N.E.2d 39, 49 (2006) (citing Cody, 413 U.S. at 441-43). In 2006, our supreme court clarified the use of the term "community caretaking," which had been imprecisely used in previous Illinois decisions to describe a type of police encounter.