Ordered that the judgment is affirmed. The decision whether to grant a defendant permission to withdraw his guilty plea lies in the sound discretion of the County Court ( see People v Rodriguez, 270 AD2d 434; People v Leviyev, 256 AD2d 359). The defendant's contention that he did not understand the consequences of his plea because he suffered from a psychiatric condition and was medicated at the time of his plea is belied by the transcript of the plea proceedings, which demonstrates that the defendant appropriately answered the County Court's questions, allocuted to the crime, and expressly stated that he understood the proceedings ( see People v Brooks, 36 AD3d 929, 930; People v Martinez, 33 AD3d 631, 632; People v Rodriguez, 270 AD2d 434; see also People v Quinones, 63 AD3d 759).
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. Contrary to the defendant's contention, his factual allocution was sufficient (see, People v. Leviyev, 256 A.D.2d 359). The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed. The decision whether to grant a defendant permission to withdraw his guilty plea lies in the sound discretion of the court (see,People v. Leviyev, 256 A.D.2d 359; People v. DeLeon, 254 A.D.2d 430). Here, the record reveals that the defendant was lucid, rational, and unequivocal in assuring the court that he fully comprehended the meaning of the plea proceeding (see, People v. Torres, 215 A.D.2d 702; People v. Seger, 171 A.D.2d 892).
The defendant's claims in support of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea under Indictment No. 217/94, including his assertion that his counsel coerced him into pleading guilty by providing him with erroneous information, were unsubstantiated and contradicted by statements he made during the plea proceedings. Accordingly, the County Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in denying the motion without a hearing ( see, e.g., People v. Vega, 256 A.D.2d 367; People v. Leviyev, 256 A.D.2d 359). As to his conviction under Indictment No. 2506/94, the defendant contends that the prosecutor's failure to give the Grand Jury limiting instructions with respect to testimony regarding a prior crime committed by him rendered the indictment fatally defective.
However, before a defendant may be permitted to upset a judgment of conviction based upon a plea he must demonstrate that the plea was not voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently made. See People v. Leviyev, 256 A.D.2d 359, 681 N.Y.S.2d 766 (2d Dept. 1998); People v. Evans, 204 A.D.2d 346, 614 N.Y.S.2d 151 (2d Dept. 1994); People v. Stevens, 193 A.D.2d 635, 598 N.Y.S.2d 967 (2d Dept. 1993); see also People v. Martin, 227 A.D.2d 416, 642 N.Y.S.2d 548 (2d Dept. 1996). The trial judge, best able to determine a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, is given discretion to determine if a plea is entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.