People v. Leverette

19 Citing cases

  1. Hall v. Mackie

    Civil Action No. 18-CV-11074 (E.D. Mich. May. 8, 2019)

    As defendant correctly discusses, generally, prosecutors are prohibited from asking jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim. People v. Cooper, 236 Mich.App 643, 653; 601 NW2d 409 (1999); People v. Leverette, 112 Mich.App 142, 151; 315 NW2d 876 (1982), overruled on other grounds by People v. Wakeford, 418 Mich. 95, 110-113 (1983). Although this statement, on its face, is prohibited, when viewed in context the prosecutor's argument was proper.

  2. State v. Long

    119 N.J. 439 (N.J. 1990)   Cited 166 times
    Holding that 971 day delay did not violate petitioner's right to a speedy trial since the delay was attributable to the defendant, the pre-trial time was productively used, and it was necessary for defendant to prepare a list of mitigating factors.

    5 Am.Jur.2d, Appeal and Error § 953 p. 380 (1962); see, e.g., State v. Theriault, 182 Conn. 366, 374, 438 A.2d 432, 440 (1980) ("In a proper case where the error relates only to separable issues covered by the judgment, and the issues are not so interwoven that justice demands a new trial of the entire case, the case may be reversed as to those separable issues only."). See also People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982), which held that although a related count may not be tainted by error, retrial of a reversed count may require vacation of the valid count if the jury is given only a fractional version of the criminal episode. The Michigan court stated: "On the facts of this case, the jury is unlikely to want to acquit defendant entirely.

  3. People v. Wakeford

    418 Mich. 95 (Mich. 1983)   Cited 114 times
    Holding that a "single offense" of larceny can still give rise to multiple convictions under armed robbery statute if there are multiple victims

    Nor does this approach allow the prosecutor to multiply the number of armed robberies by charging a separate offense for each item of property taken from a single person. Cf. People v Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 148; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982). If the first victim's cash register in this case contained ten $100 bills, the appropriate charge is but one armed robbery arising out of that single assault.

  4. People v. Taylor

    No. 339721 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 5, 2019)   Cited 1 times

    "The fact that the prior confrontation occurred during the preliminary examination, as opposed to a pretrial lineup or showup, does not necessarily mean that it cannot be considered unduly suggestive." People v Leverette, 112 Mich App 142, 154; 315 NW2d 876 (1982); see also People v Colon, 233 Mich App 295, 304; 591 NW2d 692 (1998). If a witness is exposed to an impermissibly suggestive pretrial lineup or showup, his in-court identification of the defendant will not be allowed unless the prosecutor shows by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identification would be sufficiently independent to purge the taint of the illegal identification.

  5. People v. Hall

    No. 315691 (Mich. Ct. App. Jul. 24, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    As defendant correctly discusses, generally, prosecutors are prohibited from asking jurors to place themselves in the position of the victim. People v Cooper, 236 Mich App 643, 653; 601 NW2d 409 (1999); People v Leverette, 112 Mich App 142, 151; 315 NW2d 876 (1982), overruled on other grounds by People v Wakeford, 418 Mich 95, 110-113 (1983). Although this statement, on its face, is prohibited, when viewed in context the prosecutor's argument was proper.

  6. People v. Cooper

    236 Mich. App. 643 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 110 times
    Holding that the decision not to call an identification expert is not objectively unreasonable

    Prosecutors "should not resort to civic duty arguments that appeal to the fears and prejudices of jury members." People v. Bahoda, 448 Mich. 261, 282; 531 N.W.2d 659 (1995); see also People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 151; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982) (improper prosecutorial argument "injected into the case the broader issue of crime"). While this may not have been the prosecutor's intent, the statement at issue may have suggested to the jury that sending a message of disapproval of gun-related violence in Detroit was a factor favoring conviction.

  7. People v. Colon

    233 Mich. App. 295 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998)   Cited 73 times
    Holding that a less-than-two-week interval was a "relatively short span of time that does not reduce the reliability of the identification"

    The fact that the prior confrontation occurred during the preliminary examination, as opposed to a pretrial lineup or showup, does not necessarily mean that it cannot be considered unduly suggestive. People v. Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 154; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982). When examining the totality of the circumstances, relevant factors include: the opportunity for the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of a prior description, the witness' level of certainty at the pretrial identification procedure, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.

  8. People v. Hurst

    205 Mich. App. 634 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994)   Cited 47 times

    Defendant urges this Court to resolve the double jeopardy issue under a factual-identity test. Admittedly, under the facts of this case, a jury would have to find defendant guilty of the lesser offense of UDAA in order to convict him of the greater offense of armed robbery. Under the test advocated by defendant, see People v Jankowski, 408 Mich. 79; 289 N.W.2d 674 (1980); People v Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982), this would be enough for defendant to invoke the protection of the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, the factual double jeopardy test was rejected expressly by our Supreme Court in Wakeford, supra, and People v Robideaux, 419 Mich. 458; 355 N.W.2d 592 (1984).

  9. People v. Anderson

    166 Mich. App. 455 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)   Cited 40 times
    In People v Anderson, 166 Mich App 455, 466-467[;] 421 NW2d 200 (1988), the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals approved giving the statutory definition of MCL 768.21a, rather than CJI 7:8:02 (now M Crim JI 7.10).

    See People v Cowell, 44 Mich. App. 623, 627-628; 205 N.W.2d 600 (1973). [ People v Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142, 152; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982).] The harmless error standard applicable to this type of problem requires us to reverse if the error was so offensive to the maintenance of the judicial system that it can never be deemed harmless or if, in a trial free of the error, one juror might have voted to acquit.

  10. People v. Modelski

    164 Mich. App. 337 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that the criminal-agency prong of the corpus delicti rule had been met by showing that the victim disappeared suddenly and was never heard from, the defendant had a motive to kill her in light of his deteriorating marriage and his allegation of infidelity against his wife, and the defendant's actions that suggested he had murdered the victim

    It is an established rule that a prosecutor may not appeal to the jury to sympathize with the victim. People v Wise, supra; People v Leverette, 112 Mich. App. 142; 315 N.W.2d 876 (1982). Nor may he argue facts not in evidence.