Opinion
No. 1-19-0583
05-13-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CARL LESLEY, Defendant-Appellant.
NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1). Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 17 CR 13481 Honorable Patrick Coughlin, Judge, presiding. JUSTICE MARTIN delivered the judgment of the court.
Presiding Justice Gordon and Justice Reyes concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's conviction for armed habitual criminal where (1) the State sufficiently proved that he possessed the handgun; and (2) the trial court properly considered the factors in aggravation and mitigation in sentencing him. ¶ 2 Following a bench trial, defendant Carl Lesley was convicted of armed habitual criminal (AHC) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a) (West 2016)) and sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment. On appeal, Lesley argues his conviction should be reversed as the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had constructive possession of a handgun found under the front passenger seat of a vehicle in which he was a passenger. Lesley also argues his sentence is excessive considering the nature of the offense and his criminal background. We affirm.
In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order.
¶ 3 I. JURISDICTION
¶ 4 The trial court sentenced Lesley on October 9, 2018. Thereafter, on October 24, 2018, Lesley filed a timely motion to reconsider sentence, which was argued on February 19, 2019. On March 19, 2019, Lesley filed a notice of appeal. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction pursuant to article VI, section 6, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1980, art. VI, § 6) and Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb. 6, 2013) and Rule 606 (eff. July 1, 2017), governing appeals from a final judgment of conviction in a criminal case.
¶ 5 II. BACKGROUND
¶ 6 Lesley was charged with three counts of AHC, one count of unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon, and four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon, stemming from events which occurred on August 15, 2017 in Cook County, Illinois. Prior to trial, the State indicated it was only proceeding on one count of AHC. ¶ 7 At trial, Chicago police officer Paul Maletich testified that he worked with the Calumet City Police Department, and on August 15, 2017 was assigned to a tactical division with his partner, Officer Dimitroff. As part of his duties, Maletich was wearing plain clothes and driving an unmarked police vehicle with emergency lights and siren inside the vehicle. On that day, Maletich was in the 17th block of Sibley Boulevard in Calumet City, because he had received "an anonymous tip that a silver Mercedes had several people going in and out of it with handguns." Maletich noticed a silver Mercedes, facing southbound, parked next to an apartment building on the corner of Sibley. He observed the Mercedes for approximately 45 minutes and saw four people—William Lesley, Carl Lesley, Gabriel Budreau, and Lavender Matlock—enter the Mercedes. Subsequently, Maletich followed the vehicle until it came to an intersection where the vehicle failed to come to a complete stop at the stop sign. ¶ 8 After the Mercedes turned at the intersection, Maletich and Dimitroff activated their emergency lights, and the Mercedes pulled into a parking lot and stopped. Dimitroff approached the driver's side to speak with William, and Maletich approached the passenger side, where Budreau was seated. Maletich smelled the "[s]trong odor of cannabis coming from the vehicle," an odor he was familiar with because of his experience and training as a police officer. As Maletich approached, he saw Lesley, whom he identified in court, in the rear passenger seat of the vehicle, "hunched over" in his seat "pushing something underneath the front passenger seat." Maletich did not see what Lesley's hands were doing at the time but noticed "movement from his shoulders pushing something underneath the seat." Dimitroff spoke with William, and the Mercedes then reversed and drove toward the police vehicle. As it was reversing, Maletich was standing outside between the front and rear passenger seats, and "kept his eyes on" Lesley and Budreau. Matlock was seated next to Lesley in the rear passenger seat behind the driver. When the Mercedes reversed, both Dimitroff and Maletich drew their weapons and "yelled to the vehicle to stop moving." The vehicle stopped moving approximately eight feet from where it had initially stopped. ¶ 9 Maletich and Dimitroff then removed everyone from the vehicle and, upon inspection of the vehicle, found a black semiautomatic handgun under the front passenger seat. Maletich placed Lesley into custody because "[r]ight next to where he was sitting is where the weapon was located." The firearm was approximately eight to ten inches from where Lesley had been sitting, and no other items were under the seat. The handgun was "completely" loaded with seven live rounds in the magazine and one in the chamber. Maletich made the firearm safe by removing the magazine from the weapon, locking the slide back, and recovering one live round from the chamber. Maletich maintained care, custody, and control of the handgun until he returned to the police station where Dimitroff inventoried the weapon in Maletich's presence. Maletich identified the handgun in court. ¶ 10 On cross-examination, Maletich stated he spoke with the concerned citizen who gave the anonymous tip, and the person did not mention Lesley by name. Maletich further testified he did not see firearms in the occupants' possession at the time they entered the vehicle. Upon approaching the vehicle, Maletich observed all four windows were rolled down, but his view of the inside was limited, and he could not see the floor of the vehicle. He testified Lesley was seated in the rear passenger seat and, although he could not see Lesley's hands, Lesley was pushing something under the seat. Maletich did not question Lesley at that time, and Matelich was standing approximately two feet from the vehicle when it reversed. Maletich further stated Lesley was not the owner of the vehicle and did not have exclusive control over it. At no time did Maletich see narcotics or a firearm in Lesley's possession. ¶ 11 The parties stipulated that Lesley was convicted of: (1) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver (PCS-I), a Class 2 felony, on August 12, 1997, and sentenced to six years' imprisonment, and (2) unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) on February 2, 1992 and sentenced to two years' imprisonment. ¶ 12 The court found Lesley guilty of AHC. In ruling, the court noted Maletich observed Lesley, from two feet away, bend over and make pushing motions as if he were putting something underneath the front passenger seat. The court pointed out that once Maletich searched under the seat, the only thing that was there was the handgun which was recovered. The court based its ruling on circumstantial evidence, including (1) the fact that nothing else was under the seat with the handgun, (2) that Lesley was bent over "as if to push something under the seat," and (3) that Lesley made this motion during a traffic stop as officers were approaching. ¶ 13 Prior to sentencing, Lesley filed two different motions "to reconsider," each of which the court denied after oral argument. When ruling on the first motion, the court noted that it was "particularly persuaded by the fact of the timing of the Lesley's movements as * * * the police were approaching the car," at which point he "reaches over and pushes an item underneath the seat." ¶ 14 At sentencing, Lesley's presentence investigation report (PSI) indicated that he was born in 1964 and had the following adult convictions: unlawful possession of cannabis (2011); driving on a suspended/revoked license (2011); retail theft (2007); other amount narcotics schedule (1997); possession of a controlled substance (1997 [2 cases]; 1992; 1990); unlawful use of a weapon by a felon (1992; 1990); robbery (1985). His sentences for these convictions ranged from 2 days in the Cook County Department of Corrections (unlawful possession of cannabis) to six years' imprisonment (other amount narcotics schedule & 1997 possession of a controlled substance cases to run consecutively). ¶ 15 The PSI also indicated that Lesley maintained a good relationship with his father and living siblings, and while his mother was "disappointed with his current situation," he had a "respectful relationship with her." Lesley reported having a "normal childhood" and denied suffering any childhood abuse or neglect. Before his arrest, he was employed at Pete's Market in Calumet City as a janitor. He has two children with his ex-wife, and another adult daughter from a previous relationship. He maintained a close relationship with the younger children, who lived with their mother in Blue Island. Lesley lived with his mother at the time of his arrest. ¶ 16 The State argued in aggravation that the factors applicable in Lesley's case were (1) the need to deter others from committing crimes and (2) his criminal background. The State noted that his last felony conviction was in 1996, so "he has a substantial period where he was not convicted of any major crimes." ¶ 17 In mitigation, defense counsel argued that, as the State noted, Lesley had not been convicted of any felony in over 20 years. Additionally, the predicate felonies for the armed habitual criminal charge were based on "Class I possession cases," with one unlawful use of a weapon by a felon conviction, which counsel classified as being "not inherently violent." Counsel also pointed out that Lesley had been taking care of his mother who was suffering from dementia. Counsel requested the minimum sentence of six years' imprisonment. ¶ 18 Lesley stated in allocution that he did not know the handgun was there and he was in the vehicle because he was going to the store. He informed the court that he "stayed out of jail 20 years not doing nothing," and had a job which he would still have if he had not been arrested. ¶ 19 While sentencing Lesley, the court stated that it had reviewed the evidence that was submitted at trial, as well as the factors in aggravation and mitigation, and the PSI. The court pointed out that the "most aggravating factor" was Lesley's criminal history. It then recited his entire felony criminal history, noting the felony offenses in the PSI, including his "1991" unlawful use of a weapon conviction and "1996" possession with intent to deliver conviction. The court noted that this last felony conviction was in 1996, although Lesley had several misdemeanor offenses since then. The court informed Lesley that while his lack of felony offenses since 1996 and reported employment since 2011 "definitely would seem to indicate that [he had] made some positive changes in [his] life," he had been ineligible to possess a gun since his first felony conviction in 1985. Nevertheless, Lesley had been twice convicted of possessing a firearm by a felon prior to this case and had a total of eight prior felony convictions. The court sentenced Lesley to 11 years' imprisonment. ¶ 20 Lesley filed a motion and supplemental motion to reconsider sentence. In relevant part, he argued his sentence was excessive because his background was nonviolent, and he was "being crucified for the actions of his younger self." He also argued the AHC sentencing guidelines were unconstitutional. After argument, the court denied Lesley's motions.
To avoid confusion, William Lesley will hereinafter be referred to as William. Carl Lesley will continue to be referred to as Lesley.
At trial, the parties stipulated that defendant was convicted of the two predicate offenses in 1992 and 1997. During the court's recital of his convictions, it noted these convictions took place in 1991 and 1996. The court's review of the record indicates these are the same offenses which served as predicates for the AHC conviction at issue. --------
¶ 21 III. ANALYSIS
¶ 22 On appeal, Lesley first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, arguing the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he constructively possessed the handgun, where the evidence showed another man was sitting in the seat under which it had been 8 discovered, and Lesley did not know the handgun was in the car. Lesley requests this court reverse his conviction. ¶ 23 The standard of review for challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction is "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, 'any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' " People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67 (quoting People v. Collins, 106 Ill. 2d 237, 261 (1985)). The trier of fact, here the trial judge, is responsible for resolving conflicts in the testimony, weighing the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences from the facts. People v. Brown, 2013 IL 114196, ¶ 48. The reviewing court must allow all reasonable inferences from the evidence to be drawn in favor of the State. People v. Martin, 2011 IL 109102, ¶ 15. " 'In weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.' " People v. Hardman, 2017 IL 121453, ¶ 37 (quoting People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009)). A reviewing court will not reverse a criminal conviction unless the evidence is "unreasonable, improbable, or so unsatisfactory as to justify a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d at 281. For the following reasons, we find the evidence sufficient to support Lesley's conviction. ¶ 24 To sustain Lesley's conviction for AHC as charged in this case, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm after having been convicted two or more times of certain qualifying offenses. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)(2), (3) (West 2016). Lesley does not dispute that he has the necessary qualifying convictions, but rather that the State failed to prove that he had possession of the handgun at issue. 9 ¶ 25 To establish the element of possession, the State may introduce evidence that a defendant had either actual or constructive possession of a firearm. People v. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817, ¶ 21. Actual possession is proved where the evidence shows the defendant "exercised some form of dominion" over the item, "such as trying to conceal it or throwing it away." People v. Scott, 152 Ill App. 3d 868, 871 (1987). Where there is no actual possession, constructive possession, may be proven where the defendant (1) had knowledge of the presence of the firearm and (2) exercised immediate and exclusive control over the area where it was found. McCurine, 2019 IL App (1st) 160817. ¶ 22. "Because possession is often difficult to prove directly, proving possession frequently rests upon circumstantial evidence." People v. Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d 784, 788 (2010). ¶ 26 Here, we do not find the evidence was "so improbable or unsatisfactory that it creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt." Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 334. Although Officer Maletich did not observe Lesley holding the handgun, his possession of it can be inferred from the circumstances. See Love, 404 Ill. App. 3d at 788. When the officers approached the Mercedes, Maletich saw Lesley, who was seated in the back passenger seat, "bent over pushing something underneath the front passenger seat." Maletich explained that he did not see what Lesley's hands were doing at the time, but Lesley was "hunched over" making a "movement from his shoulders pushing something underneath the seat." During the search of the vehicle, the officer discovered a loaded handgun approximately eight to ten inches from where Lesley had been sitting, with no other items under the seat. Viewing this circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we find it was sufficient to enable a rational trier of fact to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Lesley had been in possession of the handgun. 10 ¶ 27 Lesley nevertheless argues the State did not present sufficient evidence that he knew the handgun was in the vehicle. He argues that the placement of the firearm suggests it was not easily visible and the officer could not see it until he looked under the seat himself. Further, he argues his movements were not "conclusive proof of possession," citing to cases where this court has ruled that "furtive movements" alone do not support probable cause for a search. See People v. Ocampo, 377 Ill. App. 3d 150 (2007); People v. Creagh, 214 Ill. App. 3d 744 (1991). Lesley also challenges the State's evidence showing he had immediate and exclusive control over the area where the handgun was found. To this point, he argues that he was one passenger inside a vehicle he did not own, and the handgun was not in immediate proximity to his feet. Further, Lesley points out that another individual was sitting in the passenger seat under which the police officer discovered the handgun. ¶ 28 First, the issue in this case is not about probable cause to search a vehicle, but whether evidence of Lesley's movements, taken alongside all the other evidence, was sufficient to prove Lesley's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Here, the court found it persuasive that Lesley made the movements in question as the police officers were approaching the vehicle. "[G]estures or movements made by defendant that would suggest an effort to retrieve or conceal the weapon," support an inference of knowledge. People v. Nesbit, 398 Ill. App. 3d 200, 209 (2010) (finding the defendant's gestures toward the floorboard to be circumstantial evidence of the defendant's knowledge of the presence of the loaded weapon discovered in that area). Further, the handgun was the only item discovered under the seat, and the gun was eight to ten inches from Lesley, who was the only occupant of the vehicle making the movements that suggested an effort to conceal it. See People v. Grant, 339 Ill. App. 3d 792, 799 (2003) ("Because of the location of the gun at the 11 time it was recovered, we can certainly infer that defendant had knowledge of the gun and that the gun was within his immediate and exclusive control"). ¶ 29 Additionally, the presence of other individuals in the vehicle does not undermine the inference that Lesley controlled the location of the handgun. See People v. Rangel, 163 Ill. App. 3d 730, 739 (1987) ("[A]lthough mere presence in the vicinity of the contraband is insufficient to establish constructive possession, control over its location gives rise to such an inference which is not undermined by the presence of others in the vicinity."). Moreover, despite Lesley's contentions that the gun could have been placed under the seat by someone else, "[a] trier of fact is not required to disregard the inferences that normally flow from the evidence or to seek out all possible explanations consistent with a defendant's innocence and elevate them to reasonable doubt." People v. Murphy, 2017 IL App (1st) 142092, ¶ 11. Accordingly, the State presented enough evidence for the trier of fact to make a reasonable inference that Lesley possessed the handgun. See Spencer, 2012 IL App (1st) 102094, ¶ 17. ¶ 30 Lesley next argues that this court should reduce his sentence to "a more appropriate term" of six years' imprisonment because his 11-year sentence was disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. He maintains that, in imposing sentence, the court improperly weighed his criminal history and inaccurately assessed his rehabilitative potential. Lesley also argues the court impermissibly considered the predicate offenses for his AHC conviction during sentencing, where the predicate offenses were already factored into his mandatory Class-X sentencing. We find the court committed no such sentencing errors. ¶ 31 A trial court's sentencing decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010). A trial court will be found to have abused its 12 discretion where the sentence is " 'greatly at variance with the spirit and purpose of the law, or manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the offense.' " Id. (quoting People v. Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d 203, 210 (2000)). The trial court has broad discretion in imposing a sentence, and its sentencing decisions are afforded great deference, because the trial judge "observed the defendant and the proceedings," and is in a better position to weigh factors such as Lesley's credibility, demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and age. Id. at 212-13. The reviewing court " 'must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed these factors differently.' " Id. at 213 (quoting Stacey, 193 Ill. 2d at 209). ¶ 32 A sentence that falls within the statutory range is presumed to be proper. People v. Knox, 2014 IL App (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. Here, Lesley was convicted of one count of AHC (720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(a)(2), (3) (West 2016)), a Class X felony with a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years' imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/24-1.7(b) (West 2016); 730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-25(a) (West 2016). Lesley's 11-year sentence falls within these statutory guidelines and is, therefore, presumed to be proper. Knox, 2014 IL App. (1st) 120349, ¶ 46. ¶ 33 Although Lesley's sentence falls within the statutory range, he argues the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing him, because the sentence was disproportionate in length to the "victimless nature" of the crime and to his background. Lesley notes that he was 53 years' old at the time of sentencing, had not had a felony conviction since he was 32 years' old, and his subsequent misdemeanor convictions had been nonviolent. He also points out that he was the caretaker for his mother, had stable employment at the time of his arrest, and had two minor children. 13 ¶ 34 A sentence should reflect both the seriousness of the offense and the objective of restoring the offender to useful citizenship. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I § 11; People v. Neasom, 2017 IL App (1st) 143875, ¶ 48. Pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615(b)(4), a reviewing court may reduce the sentence a trial court imposes on a defendant. "That power, however, should be exercised 'cautiously and sparingly.' " People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212 (2010) (quoting People v. O'Neal, 125 Ill. 2d 291, 300 (1988). The trial court is presumed to consider "all relevant factors and any mitigation evidence presented" (People v. Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123258, ¶ 48), but has no obligation to recite and assign a value to each factor (People v. Perkins, 408 Ill. App. 3d 752, 763 (2011)). Where, as here, a defendant argues that the court failed to properly consider certain factors, the defendant "must make an affirmative showing that the sentencing court did not consider relevant factors." People v. Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 38. Lesley has made no such showing. ¶ 35 While the trial court cannot exclude mitigating evidence from consideration, the court " 'may determine the weight to be given' " to that mitigating evidence. People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 252-53 (2000) (quoting People v. Davis, 185 Ill. 2d 317, 344 (1998)). Here, the PSI outlined Lesley's criminal history, including the dates of his previous convictions. Defense counsel argued in mitigation that Lesley had not been convicted of a felony in over 20 years, and he was taking care of his mother who had dementia. We presume that the court considered this mitigating evidence. Jackson, 2014 IL App (1st) 123258, ¶ 53. ¶ 36 The record shows that in pronouncing sentence, the court indicated it reviewed the PSI as well as the factors in aggravation and mitigation and the evidence presented at trial. It noted that the "most aggravating factor" was Lesley's lengthy criminal history, and although he had made 14 good changes in his life, he had been ineligible to possess a gun since his first felony conviction in 1985. See People v. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 13 (criminal history alone may warrant a sentence substantially above the minimum). Given this record, we find Lesley's request that we determine the trial court abused its discretion is merely a request for this court to reweigh the evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. This we will not do. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d at 213 (where the sentencing court adequately considered the appropriate factors, "the reviewing court must not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court merely because it would have weighed those factors differently"). Lesley has failed to meet his burden in affirmatively showing that the sentencing court did not consider the relevant factors during sentencing. See Burton, 2015 IL App (1st) 131600, ¶ 38. ¶ 37 Lastly, Lesley argues the trial court impermissibly considered the predicate offenses for his AHC conviction during sentencing, where the predicate offenses were already factored into his Class X sentencing. ¶ 38 The State argues that Lesley has forfeited this sentencing argument because he did not raise it in his written motion to reconsider sentence. While Lesley did not raise the question of plain error review in his appellate brief, he did raise the issue in his reply brief. This is sufficient for us to review the issue for plain error. See People v. Ramsey, 239 Ill. 2d 342, 412 (2010). ¶ 39 Sentencing issues raised for the first time on appeal may be reviewed under the plain-error doctrine. Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan. 1, 1967); People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 11. In the sentencing context, a reviewing court may address a forfeited claim if a clear and obvious error occurred and either (1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was closely balanced, or (2) the error was so serious that it deprived the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. People v. 15 Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545 (2010). "When a defendant fails to establish plain error, the result is that the 'procedural default must be honored.' " People v. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d 584, 593 (2008) (quoting People v. Keene, 169 Ill. 2d 1, 17 (1995)). The initial consideration in this analysis is whether a clear and obvious error occurred at all. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d at 545. Here we find no error. ¶ 40 In sentencing Lesley, the trial court recited his extensive criminal history, including the two convictions—1997 PCS-I and 1992 UUWF—which were the predicate offenses for his AHC charge. Lesley argues that because these prior convictions were already taken into account due to the Class-X sentencing of the AHC offense, the court erred in considering these convictions in aggravation for imposing a harsher sentence. See People v. Gonzalez, 151 Ill. 2d 79, 83-84 (1991) ("There is a general prohibition against the use of a single factor both as an element of a defendant's crime and as an aggravating factor justifying the imposition of a harsher sentence than might otherwise have been imposed") (emphasis in original). ¶ 41 In determining whether the court considered improper factors, we necessarily focus on the entire record as opposed to a few words or statements made by the sentencing court. People v. Valadovinos, 2014 IL App (1st) 130076, ¶ 47. Even if the sentencing court mentions the improper factor, the defendant must show that the court relied on the improper factor when imposing sentence. Id. ¶ 42 In this case, the court recited Lesley's entire felony record in imposing sentence, which necessarily included the two offenses—1997 PCS-I and 1992 UUWF—which were used to support the AHC charge. It also commented that although Lesley had been prohibited from possessing a firearm since 1985, he had been twice convicted of possessing a firearm by a felon prior to this case and had a total of eight prior felony convictions. "A trial court is not required to 16 refrain from any mention of sentencing factors that constitute elements of the offense." People v. Sauseda, 2016 IL App (1st) 140134, ¶ 15. In context, the court mentioned the predicate offenses as part of the larger picture of Lesley's entire criminal record and rehabilitative potential. As noted above, a lengthy criminal history may warrant a sentence substantially above the minimum. Wilson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141063, ¶ 13. Lesley has not shown that the court relied on the two convictions when imposing his 11-year sentence (Valadovinos, 2014 IL App (1st) 130076, ¶ 47), a term on the lower end of the Class-X sentencing range. Accordingly, we find no error. Having found no error, there can be no plain error. Naylor, 229 Ill. 2d at 593. ¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. ¶ 44 Affirmed.