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People v. Leonard

27 Citing cases

  1. Lacy v. People

    775 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1989)   Cited 35 times
    In Lacy, 775 P.2d at 6, we cited cases from this court identifying conspiracy to commit burglary, breaking and entering a motor vehicle with intent to commit the crime of larceny, conspiracy to commit escape, and assault to rob as crimes of greater definitional complexity.

    Due process of law requires that in order to provide the basis for a judgment of conviction, a guilty plea must be made voluntarily. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); People v. Chavez, 730 P.2d 321 (Colo. 1986); Wilson v. People, 708 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1985); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391 (Colo. 1985); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983); U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, sec. 25. A guilty plea may be involuntary in the constitutional sense for one of two reasons.

  2. People v. Trujillo

    731 P.2d 649 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 5 times

    The dismissal of habitual criminal counts after jeopardy attaches on the substantive charges prohibits a retrial of the defendant on the habitual criminal counts in this proceeding. See People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 38 n. 7 (Colo. 1983). Appellate review is limited to approval or disapproval of the judgment.

  3. Waits v. People

    724 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1986)   Cited 30 times
    Holding that district court was not required to define terms "intent," "specific intent," and "theft" for crime of burglary

    See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); People v. Cabral, 698 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1985); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391, 393 (Colo. 1985); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 39 (Colo. 1983); see also People v. Mozee, 723 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1986) (court adopts formulation that valid waiver of rights must be made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently; court also inquires whether waiver was intentional because court previously has used various combinations of the terms "knowingly," "voluntarily," "intelligently," and "intentionally" to determine the validity of waiver).

  4. Wilson v. People

    708 P.2d 792 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 12 times
    In Wilson v. People, 708 P.2d 792, 798-99 (Colo. 1985), we upheld a factual basis determination that rested upon the affidavits of two psychiatrists who examined the defendant.

    The provisions of Crim. P. 11 are designed to ensure compliance with these constitutional principles. See People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983). Compliance with Crim. P. 11 also creates a record to support a determination by both the trial court and a reviewing court of the defendant's understanding of the charge to which the plea is tendered.

  5. People v. Marquez

    692 P.2d 1089 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 40 times
    Finding that trial court must give instruction

    This court has previously held that a prior state conviction resulting from a constitutionally defective plea of guilty cannot be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding to enhance punishment under the habitual criminal statute. Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 1982) (trial court failed to explain elements of conspiracy and other crime which was the alleged object or purpose of the conspiracy). But see People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983) (trial court's dismissal of habitual criminal counts was disapproved on appeal where defendant's pleas were voluntarily and understandingly made). Federal convictions resulting from defective pleas of guilty should likewise not be used in subsequent criminal proceedings to enhance punishment. We begin by examining whether the federal district court which accepted the defendant's plea properly advised him of the nature of the charge of bail jumping.

  6. People v. Adrian

    701 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    In People v. Adrian, 701 P.2d 45 (Colo. 1985), we recently rejected a similar challenge to the validity of a guilty plea tendered under the sentencing provisions of the present version of the Act.

    Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969); Harshfield v. People, 697 P.2d 391, 393 (Colo. 1985); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 39 (Colo. 1983). A plea is knowingly made, and constitutionally valid, only if the district court ensures that the defendant is fully aware of the consequences of his plea.

  7. People v. Cabral

    698 P.2d 234 (Colo. 1985)   Cited 9 times

    Due process requires that a plea of guilty must be voluntarily and understandingly made. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976); Wright v. People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1984); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983). A plea of guilty cannot be either a voluntary or a knowing and intelligent admission of guilt unless the defendant receives notice of the true nature of the charge against him. Leonard, 673 P.2d at 39.

  8. Wright v. People

    690 P.2d 1257 (Colo. 1984)   Cited 17 times
    Holding that in the context of habitual criminality proceedings, collateral estoppel does not apply to trial court rulings excluding evidence of defendant's prior conviction on the basis that the plea hearing was constitutionally inadequate

    Ramirez v. People, 682 P.2d 1181 (Colo. 1984); People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37 (Colo. 1983); People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1983).

  9. Medina v. People

    535 P.3d 82 (Colo. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    ¶37 Crim. P. 11 is designed to facilitate the constitutionally required determination that a guilty plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. People v. Leonard , 673 P.2d 37, 39–40 (Colo. 1983). But that doesn't mean the factual-basis finding discussed in Crim. P. 11 is itself a constitutional requirement; instead, the finding is procedural in nature.

  10. Sanchez-Martinez v. People

    250 P.3d 1248 (Colo. 2011)   Cited 18 times
    Reversing denial of motion for postjudgment relief where illiterate defendant had been told to sign advisal of rights form even though it had not been read to him, he had difficulty hearing the interpreter, and he "had very little if any conception of what was happening"

    P.] 5(a)(2)." Crim. P. 1Kb); see People v. Leonard, 673 P.2d 37, 40 (Colo. 1983). Rule 5(a)(2) requires the court to ensure the defendant's understanding of the following: the right against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, the right of indigent defendants to court-appointed counsel, that his plea must be voluntary, the right to bail, the nature of the charges, the right to a jury trial, and the right to demand and receive a preliminary hearing within a reasonable time.