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People v. Lemons

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 24, 2008
No. D050763 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2008)

Opinion


THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WARREN CLAUDIUS LEMONS, Defendant and Appellant. D050763 California Court of Appeal, Fourth District, First Division September 24, 2008

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Imperial County No. JCF15570, Matias R. Contreras, Judge.

McINTYRE, J.

Warren Claudius Lemons appeals a judgment convicting him of one count each of special circumstance felony murder, sexual penetration by a foreign object on a drugged victim, and sexual penetration by a foreign object on an unconscious victim. He contends that (1) the court erred in precluding his attorney from presenting an advanced consent defense to the sexual penetration counts; (2) the court erred in modifying the jury instructions defining special circumstance felony murder; (3) there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding of sexual penetration; and (4) the court erroneously believed that it lacked the discretion to strike the jury's special circumstance felony murder finding and, based on that mistaken belief, imposed a sentence that was cruel and unusual given the circumstances of the case. Finding no basis for reversal, we affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Lemons and MacArthur Townsend met in 2000, when Townsend, who was then a 19-year-old deaf mute in the care of his adult sister, went to the King/Drew Medical Center in Los Angeles (the Medical Center) for surgical treatment of a lesion tumor on his jawbone. Lemons was a physician at the Medical Center and participated in Townsend's treatment. Lemons and Townsend thereafter became friends, and ultimately lovers, and they maintained contact after Lemons moved to Brawley to work at a clinic there.

In April 2004, Townsend was arrested and Lemons drove to Los Angeles and posted bail for him. Lemons took Townsend to Calexico and they stayed together in Best Western's John Jay Inn. Several days after they arrived, paramedics responded to a 911 call from the John Jay Inn reporting a patron in medical distress. They were directed to the room the men were sharing and admitted into the room by Lemons, who was wearing only shorts and a stethoscope. Lemons told the paramedics that Townsend was in respiratory arrest.

Townsend was lying naked on top of a portable plastic table, with an intubation tube protruding from his mouth. Lemons explained that he had been practicing intubations on Townsend, with Townsend's consent; before paramedics could stop him, Lemons removed the intubation tube, which was bloody, from Townsend's throat. Lemons also told the paramedics that Townsend had multiple narcotics in his system and had been "down" for 20 minutes.

Police arrived at the scene as the paramedics attempted to resuscitate Townsend. Lemons indicated to one of the officers that he had decided to treat Townsend in a hotel room rather than in a hospital because "it would be interesting to see what would happen." He also admitted that he "messed up" and might have given Townsend "too much medicine."

Lemons consented to a search of the hotel room, which was in disarray, with medical supplies and medications "all over the place". While Lemons was talking to the officers, Townsend was pronounced dead at the hospital. Upon receiving this information, the police arrested Lemons. After being taken to the police station, Lemons asserted his right to counsel; however, when left alone in the interrogation room, Lemons asked himself "[w]hat have I done?" and repeatedly said "I'm sorry" to Townsend.

Police searched the hotel room and Lemons's rental car pursuant to a search warrant. They retrieved an intubation kit, Fentanyl patches, empty Fentanyl packaging, empty vials of injectable Midazolam, other drugs (including propofol), a syringe and gloves, as well as rectal suppositories, personal lubricant, catheter wrappers, cloth restraints, a penis pump and penis rings, from the room. They also confiscated a video camera and 136 video cassettes, many of which were of Lemons and Townsend; one of the cassettes was in the video camera and one was sitting alone on top of a table. In Lemons's rental car, the officers found various prescriptions Lemons had written for Townsend, including prescriptions for morphine sulfate, Adderall, Fentanyl, Tylenol No. 3, and rectal suppositories.

Blood and urine samples taken from Townsend's body showed that Townsend had low doses of methamphetamine, amphetamine, marijuana and Midazolam in his system, as well as a high level of Fentanyl. An autopsy showed that Townsend died as a result of the drugs.

Lemons was charged with special circumstance felony murder, sexual penetration by a foreign object upon a drugged victim and sexual penetration by a foreign object on an unconscious victim. At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence of the foregoing, as well as evidence that Fentanyl is very potent (100 times more potent than morphine) and causes one's breathing to slow down and thus its use can lead to respiratory failure. A medical expert opined that it would be "very, very dangerous" to use Fentanyl patches to drug someone for the purpose of practicing intubation and that the effect of Fentanyl is amplified by the use of other drugs, including Midazolam.

The prosecution also played for the jury the two videotapes that were found separately from the others in the hotel room and were filmed in the hotel room. The first one showed Townsend lying nude on the fold-out table, while Lemons injected him with drugs and placed Fentanyl patches on him, bound him and rubbed his body with body oil. The second one showed Lemons continuing to apply large quantities of body oil to Townsend, particularly Townsend's torso, genital area and buttocks, and at one point stopping to put on gloves; Lemons became sexually aroused during this taped encounter, but did not appear to reach the point of ejaculation.

The defense did not present any evidence at trial, but argued that the prosecution's evidence was insufficient to establish sexual penetration, as necessary to establish the sexual penetration counts and the special circumstance felony murder allegations. The jury rejected the defense arguments, finding Lemons guilty of the charges and finding the special circumstance allegations to be true. The court thereafter sentenced Lemons to life in prison without the possibility of parole, plus a consecutive term of six years. Lemons appeals.

DISCUSSION

1. Preclusion of an Advanced Consent Defense

Penal code section 289 makes it a felony to commit an act of sexual penetration on a victim who "is at the time unconscious of the nature of the act and this is known to the person committing the act[.]" (Pen. Code, § 289, subd. (d); see also Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(4) [similarly defining rape of an unconscious victim].) (All further statutory references are to the Penal Code, except as otherwise noted.) The statute also makes it a felony to "commit[] an act of sexual penetration when the victim is prevented from resisting by any intoxicating[,] anesthetic . . . or any controlled substance, and this condition was known, or reasonably should have been known" by the perpetrator. (§ 289, subd. (e); see also § 261, subd. (a)(3) [rape of a drugged victim].) As statutorily defined, neither of these crimes includes the lack of the victim's consent as an element and such an offense may be committed even where the victim consents to the act prior to becoming unconscious or drugged. (See People v. Dancy (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 21, 35, 37 [interpreting the statutory definition of rape of an unconscious victim] (Dancy); compare § 261, subd. (a)(2) [defining rape as requiring sexual intercourse against the victim's will and by means of force or fear].)

Lemons contends that the trial court erred by preventing him from raising Townsend's consent to his acts before becoming unconscious and, in doing so, urges us to reject Dancy's conclusion that advanced consent is not a defense to the crimes of which he was convicted. Notably, however, he does not contest the analytical bases of the Dancy decision, to wit, that the statutes defining the offenses omit any lack of consent element and that advanced consent does not negate the intent element of those offenses. (See Dancy, supra, 102 Cal.App.4th at p. 37.) Rather, he argues that the statute interpreted in Dancy and the statutes in question here unconstitutionally infringe on personal liberty, and thus violate the federal Due Process Clause, in accordance with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003) 539 U.S. 558 (Lawrence).

In Lawrence, the Supreme Court held that a Texas statute making it unlawful for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct was unconstitutional as applied to two adult males who had engaged in a consensual act of sodomy in the privacy of their own home. (Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 578.) In reaching this conclusion, the court stated in part:

"The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government." (Ibid.)

The Supreme Court also concluded that the Texas statute barring sodomy between same-sex partners, but not opposite-sex partners, furthered "no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual." (Id. at p. 578.)

Lemons argues that, in accordance with Lawrence, a state cannot criminalize sexual encounters with someone who is unconscious or asleep if that person has previously consented to such encounters. However, the circumstances here differ in several important respects from those involved in Lawrence. In the latter, both perpetrators (neither or both of whom were also victims) were consenting adults who engaged in sexual activity in their own home while conscious and awake, circumstances that allowed each of them to withdraw his consent to the activities at any time. Here, Townsend was unconscious at the time of the charged offenses and thus could not specifically consent, or refuse to consent, to Lemons's conduct on an on-going basis. (Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at p. 563, 578; see also In re John Z. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 757 [recognizing that the crime of forcible rape is nonetheless committed where the victim initially consents to penetration but later withdraws that consent during an act of intercourse].) Further, unlike the statute challenged in Lawrence, the Penal Code provisions in question here apply equally to heterosexuals and homosexuals, a factor that was critical to the high court's decision. (Lawrence, supra, 539 U.S. at pp. 568-575, particularly p. 571 [noting that historically "powerful voices" have condemned homosexual conduct as immoral and that the issue presented in that case was "whether the majority may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society through operation of the criminal law"].)

For these reasons, we reject Lemons's argument that the analysis of Lawrence mandates the conclusion that section 289, subdivisions (d) and (e) are unconstitutional because they do not require lack of consent (or, more aptly put here, because they do not authorize the use of the victim's advanced consent as a defense to the charges).

2. Modification of Instructions Defining Special Circumstance Felony Murder

In accordance with section 190.2, where the jury finds that the defendant committed a homicide while engaged in the commission of certain enumerated felonies (including sexual penetration by a foreign object), the sentence to be imposed is life in prison without the possibility of parole. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).) Here, the felony complaint included a special circumstance felony murder allegation and the court instructed the jury regarding this prosecution theory by giving CALCRIM No. 540A, as follows:

"The defendant is charged in Count one with murder, under a theory of felony murder.

"To prove that the defendant is guilty of first degree murder under this theory, the People must prove that:

"1. The defendant committed or attempted to commit sexual penetration while the victim was drugged or unconscious of the nature of the act;

"2. The defendant intended to commit sexual penetration while the victim was drugged or unconscious of the . . . act; AND

"3. While committing or attempting to commit sexual penetration [*] while the victim [was] drugged or unconscious of the nature of the act the defendant did an act that caused the death of another person.

". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

"The defendant must have intended to commit the felonies of sexual penetration while the victim [was] drugged or unconscious before or at the time of the act causing the death[.]

"It is not required that the person die immediately [**], as long as the act causing the death and the felonies are part of one continuous transaction."

After deliberations began, the jury submitted the following statement to the court: "The defendant must have intended to commit the felonies of sexual penetration while the victim is drugged or unconscious before or at the time of the act causing the death." Upon inquiry by the court as to the nature of the jury's question, the jury provided written clarification that its concern related to the third statutory element and posed the question as follows: "Is the time the defendant is admini[stering] the drugs the time we consider the act of the cause of death?"

The court responded to the jury's question by re-reading the CALCRIM No. 540A instruction and telling the jury to consider the instruction in its entirety rather than focusing on one element separately. The next morning, however, the court modified the CALCRIM No. 540A instruction by adding "or while in the course of preparing to commit" to the third element, where the single asterisk appears in the text above. (The court also added "as a result of the act" where the double asterisk appears and moved that modified portion of the instruction up to immediately follow the third element. Lemons, however, does not raise any specific appellate argument challenging those modifications, so we do not address them further.)

Defense counsel objected to the court's modifications, contending that they amounted to a comment on the evidence, that without the opportunity for additional argument to the jury, the jury might interpret the modified instruction to include acts occurring well before the fatal incident and that Lemons would be disadvantaged thereby. The court rejected these objections, noting that the instruction related to an act that caused the death and that, as argued by the prosecution, the only such act in this case was the administration of the drugs. The court gave the modified instruction, as well as an instruction that the jury should not consider the modification as a comment on the evidence, and provided both instructions to the jury, which returned its verdicts the next trial day. Lemons contends that the court erred in giving the modified instruction, arguing that it broadened the statutory definition of murder and instructed the jury on this "new theory" after deliberations had begun in violation of his rights to a fair trial, due process, and effective assistance of counsel.

In accordance with section 1138, "[a]fter the [jurors] have retired for deliberation, . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, . . . the information required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after they have been called." This statute is deemed to "impose[] upon the court a duty to provide the jury with information the jury desires on points of law." (People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 985, fn. omitted.) "This does not mean the court must always elaborate on the standard instructions[];" however, "a court must do more than figuratively throw up its hands and tell the jury it cannot help. It must at least consider how it can best aid the jury [and] decide as to each jury question whether further explanation is desirable[.]" (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97, italics omitted.) On appeal, we review a trial court's decision to further instruct, or not to instruct, a deliberating jury for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-746.)

Here, the Attorney General contends that the trial court's modified instruction was proper, pointing out well established law to the effect that "a killing is committed in the perpetration of an enumerated felony if the killing and the felony 'are parts of one continuous transaction.'" (People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 888, quoting People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 631-632; see also People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1088 [noting that special circumstance felony murder is similar to felony murder principles in this regard], overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1.) Pursuant to the relevant authorities, a strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder is not required; rather, the felony murder special circumstance is established if the defendant intended to commit the felony at the time he killed the victim (or, in this case, committed the act that ultimately caused the victim's death) and that the commission of the fatal act and the felony were part of a continuous transaction. (People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 87.) The factors to be considered in determining whether the act causing the death and the felony were part of one continuous transaction include "[w]hether the fatal act was committed for the purpose of aiding the commission of the felony" and "[w]hether the fatal act occurred after the felony but while . . . the perpetrator[] continued to exercise control over the person who was the target of the felony[.]" (CALCRIM No. 549.)

Lemons does not directly challenge the notion that the commission of the fatal act (the administration of the illicit drugs) and the felony were part of a continuous transaction in this case. Rather, he contends that the court's modification of the third element (which required that the fatal act occur while he was committing or attempting to commit sexual penetration) to include his "preparing to commit" sexual penetration language was overly broad and allowed the jury to find him guilty if it concluded that the fatal act occurred during "virtually any act by [him] leading up to the sexual [penetration]."

We agree that, at best, the court's use of the words "preparing to commit" was unfortunate in light of well established authorities that acts of "mere preparation" are not sufficient to establish the commission or attempted commission of a felony. (See generally People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 452-455 [holding that an attempt to commit a crime requires more than "mere preparation," but instead actual commencement of the criminal deed by a "direct but ineffectual act done toward its commission"]; § 190.2, subd. (a)(17) [as relevant here, requiring that the fatal act occur while the defendant was engaged in the commission, or the attempted commission, of the sexual penetration by foreign object].) This point has not been addressed by the parties' briefs, however, and it suffices for us to simply assume, without deciding, that the court's choice of words rendered the modified instruction erroneous because we in any event conclude that the error was not prejudicial and thus does not support a reversal of the murder conviction. (People v. Beardslee, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 97.)

Contrary to Lemons's expressed concerns that the court's instruction might have led the jury to consider events far-removed from the conduct that occurred in the hotel room, the jury's notes to the court expressed confusion only as to how it was to consider the timing of the administration of the drugs relative to the acts of sexual penetration and Townsend's death. Further, the other instructions given by the court clearly informed the jury that the People were required to prove that the sexual penetration offenses and the act causing the death were part of "one continuous transaction" and the factors to be considered in determining whether the prosecution had met that burden, including whether the felony and the fatal act occurred at the same place and the time period, if any, between the felony and the fatal act. (CALCRIM No. 549; see People v. Cavitt (2004) 33 Cal.4th 187, 206-207, particularly fn. 7.)

Notably defense counsel's closing argument contended that the jury should reject the felony murder special circumstance allegations because there was no evidence the sexual assaults occurred before or at the same time as the administration of the drugs. This argument was inconsistent with the law (and frankly may have led to the jury's confusion), which instead merely requires that Lemon have intended to commit the sexual offenses at the time he administered the drugs and that the administration of the drugs and the sexual offenses have been part of a continuous transaction. (People v. Coffman and Marlow, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 87; People v. Cavitt, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 206-207, particularly fn. 7.)

Further, the evidence unequivocally established that, at the time of the administration of the drugs, Lemons had done more than merely prepare to sexually penetrate Townsend, but had in fact taken affirmative steps in the commission of that act. (See People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 387 [holding that attempted rape does not require physical assault or other sexually "unambiguous" contact and that the defendant's conduct in pointing a gun at the victim and threatening to rape her was sufficient to establish an attempt], superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Verdin v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1096, 1106-1108.) The videos, which were filmed in the hotel room where the police arrested Lemons, showed that Lemons had removed his shirt, had gloves and many bottles of body oil at hand and placed Fentanyl patches on Townsend before injecting Townsend with Midazolam. Further, Lemons had an array of sexual paraphernalia in the hotel room at that time.

This evidence, which was uncontroverted, established that Lemons engaged in direct acts toward the commission of the offenses. Accordingly, it is beyond a reasonable doubt that any error by the trial court in giving the modified felony murder special circumstance instruction did not contribute to the jury's finding that the special circumstance allegation was true. (People v. Flood (1998) 18 Cal.4th 470, 502-503.)

3. Insufficiency of the Evidence to Establish the Sexual Penetration Convictions

Lemons also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his sexual penetration convictions, arguing, as he urged to the jury at trial, that the evidence failed to establish that penetration actually occurred. However, sexual penetration is broadly defined as "the act of causing the penetration, however slight, of the genital or anal opening of any person . . . for the purpose of sexual arousal . . . by any foreign object." (§ 289, subd. (k)(1), italics added.) Further, direct evidence is not required to establish such penetration.

"The consummation of such an act may be shown by the circumstances and surroundings, and may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evidence. The right to draw proper inferences from the evidence is a function of the jury[] and as long as [the jury's] conclusions do not do violence to reason, an appellate court is not permitted to substitute its findings of the ultimate fact for that reached by the jury[.]" (People v. Strickland (1955) 134 Cal.App.2d 815, 818, quoting People v. Vicencio (1945) 71 Cal.App.2d 361, 365, internal citations omitted.)

In determining the merits of Lemons's challenge, the test is not whether the evidence proves guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to this court, but whether substantial evidence, of credible and solid value, supports the jury's conclusions. (People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 432.) Unless it is clearly shown that "on no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to support the verdict," we will not reverse the conviction. (People v. Hicks (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 423, 429; also People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1125.)

No such showing has been made in this case. The videotape shows Lemons repeatedly rubbing Townsend's genitals and buttocks with body oil as Townsend lay supine on the portable table; it also shows that at one point he stopped to put on gloves and thereafter placed his arm flat on the table so that his hand was palm-side up and moved it toward Townsend's anus. (Notably, the only other time Lemons put on his gloves during the taped encounters was to give injections to Townsend, suggesting that Lemons's conduct in putting on the gloves the second time was purposeful.) Although this evidence was not of the nature of a "smoking gun," it was sufficient to support the jury's finding that sexual penetration occurred.

4. Sentencing

The Penal Code mandates a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole in a non-capital case where, as here, the jury makes a true finding on a special circumstance allegation under section 190.2, subdivision (a)(17)(K) that the homicide occurred during the commission of sexual penetration by foreign object. (§ 1385.1; People v. Johnwell (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1267, 1283.) Based on this finding, the trial court had no discretion to strike the special circumstance finding to reduce the punishment. (Ibid.) The court, however, did retain the authority to reduce sentence under the compulsion of the federal and/or state constitutions. (People v. Mora (1995) 39 Cal.App.4th 607, 615; see People v. Johnwell, supra, 121 Cal.App.4th at p. 1285.)

Lemons contends for the first time on appeal that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the special circumstance term on the ground that the resulting life-without-parole term constituted cruel and unusual punishment and that his sentence must be vacated because it runs afoul of the California Constitution. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.) By failing to raise the issue below, Lemons arguably waived it for purposes of appeal. (People v. Norman (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 221, 229; People v. DeJesus (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1, 27.) Even if he had not waived the issue, however, we would find it without merit.

The California Constitution's prohibition against "cruel or unusual punishment" (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17) precludes the imposition of punishment that "is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 424, fn. omitted.) Based on separation of powers considerations, a defendant who challenges his sentence as cruel and unusual under state law bears a "considerable burden" (People v. Wingo (1975) 14 Cal.3d 169, 174) and successes in such an attempt are an "exquisite rarity." (People v. Weddle (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 1190, 1196.) The validity of the Legislature's decisions about how to define crimes and what punishments are appropriate therefore are generally not subject to question unless the unconstitutionality of such legislative pronouncements "clearly, positively, and unmistakably appears." (People v. Estrada (1997) 57 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1282, quoting In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 414-415.)

The power to define crimes and prescribe punishments is a legislative function. The court may not subvert the legislative determination unless the statute prescribes a penalty that is so severe in relation to the crime as to violate the constitutional prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. The essential question is whether the punishment "'is so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity.'" (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 478.) To answer this question, the court must consider the nature of the offense and the nature of the offender. (Id. at p. 479.) Specifically, it must look at the offense in the abstract and the facts of the crime in the particular case, such as "its motive, the way it was committed, the extent of the defendant's involvement, and the consequences of his acts." (Ibid.) In addition, the court must consider whether the punishment is grossly disproportionate to the defendant's individual culpability given his age, prior criminality, personal characteristics, and state of mind. (Ibid.)

Under state law, proportionality is determined by examining "the nature of the offense and/or the offender, with particular regard to the degree of danger both present to society" and comparing it against the challenged penalty with punishments prescribed in the same jurisdiction for more serious offenses and against penalties for the same crime in other jurisdictions. (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at pp. 425-427.) Here, Lemons focuses on the first of these factors, which requires a consideration of the offense in the abstract, as well as "the totality of the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense." (People v. Dillon, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 479.)

Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the statutorily mandated life-without-parole sentence is not so disproportionate to the offense as to shock the conscience and offend fundamental notions of human dignity. Felony murder, in the abstract, is a serious offense and Lemons's administration of multiple potent drugs to Townsend presented a high degree of danger, regardless of the fact that he did not use them with the intent of killing Townsend. Clearly the consequence of Lemons's acts, even if unintended, was quite serious.

Townsend may have been a willing participant in the events that led to his death; however, it remains that, as a result of Lemons's professional education and training, Lemons had a far better understanding of the risks created by the use of illicit drugs than did Townsend, who never completed high school. In addition, Lemons was significantly older and more sophisticated than Townsend and the videotapes show that he played the dominant role in providing the means to accomplish this aspect of their relationship. Townsend undoubtedly relied on Lemons and trusted that Lemons would not expose him to a situation that created a reasonable risk of his death. (Notably, Lemons had Townsend's medical records in his car at the time of the incident in question.) Although Lemons did not have a prior criminal record, that is not determinative of whether his punishment is cruel and unusual. (People v. Martinez (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 489, 497.)

As recognized by the trial court, what happened here may appropriately be characterized as a tragedy for Lemons as well as for Townsend; however, this does not mean that the imposition of the legislatively-mandated sentence was unconstitutionally harsh. Given that Lemons's conduct resulted in Townsend's death, we cannot conclude that the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence was "so disproportionate to the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends fundamental notions of human dignity." (In re Lynch, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 424, fn. omitted.)

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed.

WE CONCUR: BENKE, Acting P.J., AARON, J.


Summaries of

People v. Lemons

California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division
Sep 24, 2008
No. D050763 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2008)
Case details for

People v. Lemons

Case Details

Full title:THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WARREN CLAUDIUS LEMONS, Defendant…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fourth District, First Division

Date published: Sep 24, 2008

Citations

No. D050763 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 24, 2008)