Opinion
326 KA 15–01284
03-16-2018
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (NATHANIEL V. RILEY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT. WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (NICOLE K. INTSCHERT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
FRANK H. HISCOCK LEGAL AID SOCIETY, SYRACUSE (NATHANIEL V. RILEY OF COUNSEL), FOR DEFENDANT–APPELLANT.
WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, SYRACUSE (NICOLE K. INTSCHERT OF COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
PRESENT: CENTRA, J.P., CARNI, NEMOYER, CURRAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Memorandum:
Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him upon his plea of guilty of rape in the first degree ( Penal Law § 130.35 [4 ] ). We reject defendant's contention that his waiver of the right to appeal was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent (see generally People v. Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d 248, 256, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 [2006] ). County Court "did not conflate that right with those automatically forfeited by a guilty plea" ( People v. McCrea, 140 A.D.3d 1655, 1655, 32 N.Y.S.3d 778 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 933, 40 N.Y.S.3d 361, 63 N.E.3d 81 [2016] [internal quotation marks omitted] ), and we conclude that "the court engaged defendant in an adequate colloquy to ensure that the waiver of the right to appeal was a knowing and voluntary choice" ( People v. Massey, 149 A.D.3d 1524, 1525, 53 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks omitted] ). The valid waiver of the right to appeal forecloses defendant's challenge to the severity of his sentence (see generally Lopez, 6 N.Y.3d at 255, 811 N.Y.S.2d 623, 844 N.E.2d 1145 ).
Defendant further contends that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered and that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his plea on that ground. Although that contention survives defendant's waiver of the right to appeal (see Massey, 149 A.D.3d at 1525, 53 N.Y.S.3d 766 ), defendant's claim that he "did not fully understand what he was doing" is belied by the record. Defendant articulated to the court that he fully understood the rights he was giving up as part of the plea bargain and that he had consulted with his attorney. He further admitted his guilt, recited all of the elements and facts of the crime with which he was charged, and stated that his decision to plead guilty was voluntary. Thus, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion to vacate the plea (see generally People v. Schluter, 136 A.D.3d 1363, 1364, 24 N.Y.S.3d 478 [4th Dept. 2016], lv denied 27 N.Y.3d 1138, 39 N.Y.S.3d 121, 61 N.E.3d 520 [2016] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is unanimously affirmed.