( People v. Jayne (1977), 52 Ill. App.3d 990, 1010. See also People v. Cunningham (1984), 130 Ill. App.3d 254, 266; People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 937.) Evidence that the victim lived alone was relevant to the State's case because the evidence showed that there were no signs of forced entry into the victim's home, and therefore it was important to rule out the possibility that someone who lived with the victim committed the murder.

The appellate court reversed Trosclair's convictions but affirmed those of his codefendants. ( 86 Ill. App.3d 922.) The State sought, and was granted, leave to appeal Trosclair's case under Rule 315 (73 Ill.2d R. 315).

But evidence that a victim had family does not warrant reversal where the victim's children are involved in the facts of the case. People v. Lee, 86 Ill. App. 3d 922, 937, 408 N.E.2d 335 (1980). Here, defendant's statement included a reference to a crying baby.

( People v. Scherzer (1989), 179 Ill. App.3d 624, 64445; People v. Jackson (1981), 100 Ill. App.3d 1064, 1068.) The defense is not available, however, if the compulsion arises from negligence or fault of the defendant or if the defendant had ample opportunities to withdraw from the criminal enterprise but failed to do so. ( Scherzer, 179 Ill. App.3d at 645-46; People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 932, rev'd on other grounds (1981), 87 Ill.2d 182; People v. Rodriquez (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 118, 120.) Moreover, a defense of compulsion is only a defense with respect to the conduct demanded by the compeller.

Defendants first argue that the prosecutor improperly referred to the victim's family when he stated, "I implore you to bring justice to Nabil and Suleiman, bring justice to the memory of their mother." While a closing argument dwelling upon the victim's family is generally improper ( People v. Bernette (1964), 30 Ill.2d 359, 197 N.E.2d 436), it does not warrant reversal here, where the family is necessarily involved in the facts of the case or where the individuals are witness to the incident (see People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 408 N.E.2d 335, rev'd on other grounds (1981), 87 Ill.2d 182, 429 N.E.2d 461), and the trial court sustained an objection to the comment and instructed the jury to disregard it. • 7 Defendants also argue that the prosecutor improperly insinuated in rebuttal closing argument that Hudson's testimony was not credible because he was intimidated by gangs.

It is the general rule that a trial court has the power to exclude cumulative or repetitious testimony ( People v. Godbout (1976), 42 Ill. App.3d 1001), and the extent to which cumulative evidence may be received rests within the discretion of the trial court. People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 937, rev'd on other grounds (1981), 87 Ill.2d 182; People v. Nahas (1973), 9 Ill. App.3d 570. The defendant raises the issue of prejudice due to cumulative testimony in three areas: the testimony of various medical personnel, doctors, and a lay witness concerning Tasha's injuries; testimony by Allan Friedman of the Department of Children and Family Services regarding his interview with the defendant; and the testimony of two police officers regarding the search of the defendant's apartment.

( People v. Barbaro.) The mere apprehension that defenses may prove antagonistic without a showing that such apprehensions are well founded is an insufficient ground for severance. ( People v. Moore (1978), 65 Ill. App.3d 712, 382 N.E.2d 810; People v. Davis (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 603, 357 N.E.2d 96.) Nevertheless, the court has a continuing duty at all stages of trial to grant severance if prejudice appears. ( People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 408 N.E.2d 335; People v. Clark.) Antagonistic defenses have been confined to those instances where one or more codefendants testify implicating the other. ( People v. Jones (1980), 81 Ill. App.3d 724, 401 N.E.2d 1325; People v. Precup (1977), 50 Ill. App.3d 23, 365 N.E.2d 1007.)

• 3 Generally, the failure to seek a continuance waives a claim of error based upon surprise. ( People v. Lee (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 922, 938.) While the evidence that defendant had read the book may have had a definite bearing on the jury's response to the insanity defense, the prejudice was not because of the discovery violation.