Opinion
No. 2010SU009261.
2012-11-14
The PEOPLE of the State of New York, v. Dwight W. LAWSON, Defendant.
Rachit Anand, Suffolk County Legal Aid Society, for the defendant. ADA Maggie A. Bopp, for Thomas Spota, Suffolk County District Attorney, for the People.
Rachit Anand, Suffolk County Legal Aid Society, for the defendant. ADA Maggie A. Bopp, for Thomas Spota, Suffolk County District Attorney, for the People.
WILLIAM G. FORD, J.
The defendant herein is charged with one count of sexual abuse in the second degree, § 130.60(2) of the Penal Law, and one count of endangering the welfare of a child, § 260.10(1) of the Penal Law. A Huntley hearing was held on October 18, 2012 wherein the defendant sought suppression of his statement to police.
The People presented one witness, Detective Guido Cirenza.
FACTS
Detective Cirenza testified that on February 28, 2010 he was assigned to the 1st precinct, and at approximately 8 pm, uniform officers interviewed a mother and daughter alleging sexual abuse. The uniformed officers report was provided to the detective who spoke with the mother, Cherain Moody, and the child.
The defendant had been at the precinct about an hour and a half earlier, inquiring whether detectives were looking for him.
On March 3, 2010 Detective Cirenza did more interviews with the child's biological father and grandmother. Later that evening Detective Cirenza went to the defendant's home. Detective Cirenza did not recall who answered the door but at some point defendant Dwight Lawson came to the door, and after being identified as Dwight Lawson, he was informed by the detective that he was being arrested. Mr. Lawson surrendered to the detectives and was transported to the 1st precinct. There was no discussion or request by the defendant for a lawyer during the approximate 5 minute trip to the precinct.
At approximately 11:40 pm Detective Cirenza began taking pedigree information from Mr. Lawson. He then read Mr. Lawson the “advice of rights”, which contained the Miranda warnings. Detective Cirenza also read Mr. Lawson his rights from a Miranda card. Mr. Lawson indicated in writing that he understood all of his rights as to both documents. He initialed and signed each of them in the appropriate areas and indicated in writing that, after being advised of his rights, he wished to talk to the detective and give a statement. At no time did the defendant appear to be tired, hungry or sleepy. The interview and statement was not video-taped or recorded.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
At a Huntley hearing, the People have the burden of proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a statement was voluntarily made. People v. Huntley, 15 N.Y.2d 72, 78, 255 N.Y.S.2d 838, 204 N.E.2d 179 (1965). If the statement was made during a custodial interrogation, the presentment agency has the burden of showing that the respondent knowingly and intelligently waived those constitutional rights outlined under Miranda. The purpose of the Miranda rule is to counteract the coercive pressure of the custodial setting; therefore those rights apply to custodial interrogations. People v. Deary, 212 A.D.2d 960, 623 N.Y.S.2d 467 (4th Dept.1995), lv. denied85 N.Y. 971, 629 N.Y.S.2d 731, 653 N.E.2d 627 (1995); Matter of Darryl T., 210 A.D.2d 120, 620 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1st Dept.1994), lv. denied85 N.Y.2d 954, 628 N.Y.S.2d 46, 651 N.E.2d 914 (1995).
Absent such a showing, the exclusionary rule, a judicially created tool to deter illegal conduct and practices of law enforcement officials, requires suppression of the evidence. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961). In New York, the voluntariness of a statement is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); People v. Anderson, 42 N.Y.2d 35, 396 N.Y.S.2d 625, 364 N.E.2d 1318 (1977).
Here, there is no dispute that defendant provided a statement in a custodial setting, the issue is whether his waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. This Court finds after hearing the credible testimony of the officer together with all the facts and the totality of circumstances presented, that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. The advice of rights and Miranda card bear no less than eight sets of defendant's initials and both documents bear his signature. The testimony on cross-examination is that defendant never indicated he was hungry, tired or sleepy. Though not in any way dispositive of his waiver, there was testimony that this defendant had gone to the police precinct to inquire if the detectives were looking for him. All these facts taken together indicate that this defendant's waiver was knowing and voluntarily made.
Accordingly the motion to suppress is denied.