People v. Lawson

Full title: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THELMA G…

Court: APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT

Date published: Feb 11, 2014

2014 Ill. App. 4th 120983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2014)

Opinion

NO. 4-12-0983

02-11-2014

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. THELMA G. LAWSON, Defendant-Appellant.

STEIGMANN

NOTICE

This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

Appeal from

Circuit Court of

Macon County

No. 12DT224

Honorable

Katherine M. McCarthy,

Judge Presiding

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Appleton and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The appellate court vacated the trial court's denial of the defendant's posttrial motion and remanded with directions that the trial court (1) comply with the supreme court's guidance in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984), and its progeny and (2) address defendant's one-act, one-crime-rule claim. ¶ 2 Following an August 2012 trial, a jury convicted defendant, Thelma G. Lawson, of (1) driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 or greater (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(1) (West 2012)) and (2) driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) (625 ILCS 5/11-501(a)(2) (West 2012)). ¶ 3 In September 2012, defendant pro se filed a "Motion to Dismiss Conviction[,] Motion to Appeal Conviction[,] and Ineffective Counselor." During a hearing conducted later that month, the trial court (1) acknowledged, but did not consider further, defendant's pro se inef-fective-assistance-of-counsel claims and (2) granted defendant's counsel leave to file a posttrial motion on defendant's behalf. In October 2012, the trial court denied defendant's posttrial motion, which did not incorporate defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. Thereafter, the court sentenced defendant to 18 months' probation. ¶ 4 Defendant appeals, arguing that (1) the trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing to consider her pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims as required by People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181, 464 N.E.2d 1045 (1984) (Krankel hearing) and (2) her convictions violated the one-act, one-crime rule. For the reasons that follow, we vacate the court's denial of defendant's posttrial motion and remand with directions that the court comply with Krankel and its progeny and address defendant's one-act, one-crime-rule claim.

¶ 5 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 6 A. The State's Charges, the Evidence Presented

at Trial, and the Jury's Verdict

¶ 7 In May 2012, the State charged defendant with (1) driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater and (2) DUI. The evidence presented at defendant's August 2012 jury trial showed the following. ¶ 8 On the evening of May 8, 2012, a police officer responded to a disorderly conduct call. Upon arriving at the residential neighborhood, the officer observed defendant (1) carrying a 40-ounce beer in her hand and (2) "yelling and staggering around." Defendant informed the officer that she "was on her second beer." The officer concluded that defendant was intoxicated. After defendant agreed to remain inside her home for the rest of the night, the officer left. ¶ 9 In the early morning hours of May 9, 2012, defendant called the police and reported that her car had been damaged as she drove home. The officer returned to the residence and spoke with defendant, who stated that someone had thrown an object at her car while she was driving home. The officer (1) observed that defendant was holding her car keys and (2) con- firmed that the engine of defendant's car was hot, indicating recent use. The officer opined that defendant was intoxicated. The officer did not see defendant operate her car. ¶ 10 Subsequent tests by another officer, who specialized in DUI testing procedures, confirmed that defendant's BAC was 0.236. A video recording of the different tasks defendant attempted to perform during a field sobriety test was shown to the jury. ¶ 11 Defendant testified that on May 8, 2012, at about 4 p.m., she drove her four children to see their grandmother. Defendant returned home with her children at about 6 p.m. She then consumed one beer. A later altercation with defendant's neighbors prompted police to respond. Unbeknownst to defendant, sometime thereafter, her children's father, Cedric Gomiller, drove her car. When Gomiller returned, he told defendant to call the police because someone had hit her car with a chair. Defendant called the police and reported the vandalism. After police arrived a second time, defendant began drinking another beer. Defendant could not recall whether she had car keys in her hand when police arrived. Defendant stated that she did not realize until after she was released from jail on May 9, 2012, that Gomiller had driven her car earlier that morning. Defendant admitted that she had previously allowed Gomiller to use her car. ¶ 12 Gomiller testified that on May 8, 2012, at about 11:15 p.m., he took defendant's car keys from her home without her knowledge and drove to the grocery store. During the return trip, someone threw a chair and hit defendant's car. When Gomiller arrived at defendant's home sometime after midnight, he suggested that defendant call the police and report the vandalism. Although Gomiller observed defendant's arrest for DUI, he was scared to report anything to the police because he had been driving without a license. ¶ 13 Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of (1) driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater and (2) DUI.

¶ 14 B. Defendant's Posttrial Motions and the Trial Court's Sentence

¶ 15 In September 2012, defendant pro se filed a document entitled, "Motion to Dismiss Conviction[,] Motion to Appeal Conviction[,] and Ineffective Counselor." In her motion, defendant first recounted the version of events that led her to notifying police about the vandalism to her car. Under a separate section entitled, "Motion to Dismiss—Ineffective Counselor," defendant alleged that her trial counsel had been ineffective because he failed to (1) stay awake during trial, (2) call witnesses she identified, (3) use her Department of Children and Family Services file at trial, (4) ask the police officer questions that she had drafted, (5) demand that the entire video recording of her sobriety tests be played for the jury, (6) prepare her or her witnesses for trial, (7) keep her informed, and (8) keep veniremembers she wanted as jurors. ¶ 16 During a hearing conducted later that month, the trial court stated the following:

"[The court] note[s] *** that there was a pro se motion filed by the defendant and that it *** appeared to be in the nature of a motion for a new trial, but it also included a motion for notice of appeal. It was filed pro se, which means that [the court] can't consider it at this point because [defendant] is represented by counsel. ***
However, [defendant] also claims ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, [which] allows [the court] to consider it on a pro se basis, that aspect of it. But the notice of appeal is premature *** because this court still has jurisdiction ***.
*** [T]he post-trial motion to dismiss the conviction [the court] can't consider that *** since [defendant] is represented by
counsel unless counsel adopts that motion."

Thereafter, the court granted defendant's counsel leave to file a posttrial motion on defendant's behalf. The court then scheduled an October 2012 hearing. The court did not address further defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. ¶ 17 In October 2012, defendant's counsel filed a posttrial motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or, in the alternative, a motion for a new trial. Defense counsel did not incorporate any of defendant's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. ¶ 18 At the scheduled hearing, the trial court first considered and denied defendant's posttrial motion. Thereafter, the court conducted a sentencing hearing and confirmed that the State was only proceeding with one of the convictions. The court then sentenced defendant to 18 months' probation on her DUI conviction. (The record does not show that the court vacated defendant's conviction for driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater.) ¶ 19 This appeal followed.

¶ 20 II. DEFENDANT'S KRANKEL CLAIM

¶ 21 Defendant argues that the trial court erred by failing to conduct a Krankel hearing to consider her pro se ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims. We agree. ¶ 22 In People v. McLaurin, 2012 IL App (1st) 102943, ¶¶ 39-40, 982 N.E.2d 832, the appellate court outlined the following process concerning a pro se litigant's posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel:

"Through *** Krankel *** and its progeny, the Illinois Supreme Court has provided the trial courts with a clear blueprint for the handling of posttrial pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citations.] A trial court is not automatically required to
appoint new counsel anytime a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] Instead, the trial court must first conduct an inquiry to examine the factual basis underlying a defendant's claim. [Citation.] The inquiry that the trial court conducts has evolved into what is now known as a 'Krankel inquiry'. [Citation.]
This court's review of a defendant's claim of error necessarily turns on the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry. [Citations.] If the trial court determines that the defendant's claim lacks merit or pertains only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny the pro se motion. [Citation.] A claim lacks merit if it is conclusory, misleading, or legally immaterial or does not bring to the trial court's attention a colorable claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] However, if a defendant's claims indicate that trial counsel neglected the defendant's case, the trial court must appoint new counsel. [Citation.] During a Krankel inquiry, some interchange between the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly ineffective representation is permissible and usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is warranted on a defendant's claim. [Citation.] A trial court may base its decision in a Krankel inquiry on: (1) the trial counsel's answers and explanations; (2) a brief discussion between the trial court and the de-
fendant; or (3) its knowledge of defense counsel's performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant's allegations on their face. [Citation.]" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (Emphasis in original.)

¶ 23 Defendant's claim that the trial court failed to conduct any inquiry into her pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel presents a legal question that this court reviews de novo. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 75, 797 N.E.2d 631, 636 (2003). ¶ 24 In this case, we note that at the September 2012 hearing, the trial court correctly noted that (1) defendant's pro se posttrial motion raised, in pertinent part, ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claims and (2) the trial court could consider those claims. However, the record is clear that despite the trial court's acknowledgement, it did not conduct the requisite Krankel hearing to ascertain the merits of defendant's allegations against her counsel. Instead, the trial court later considered and denied a posttrial motion defendant's trial counsel filed on defendant's behalf that did not incorporate defendant's pro se claims against trial counsel. Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's denial of defendant's posttrial motion and remand with directions that the court comply with the supreme court's guidance in Krankel and its progeny. ¶ 25 In so concluding, we note that defendant also argues that that her conviction for driving with a BAC of 0.08 or greater under section 11-501(a)(1) of the Illinois Vehicle Code should be vacated pursuant to the one-act, one-crime rule because the trial court sentenced her to 18 months' probation for her DUI conviction under section 11-501(a)(2) of the Code. The State concedes defendant's argument. Accordingly, on remand, we direct the trial court to address defendant's one-act, one-crime-rule claim.

¶ 26 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 27 For the reasons stated, we vacate the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. ¶ 28 Judgment vacated; cause remanded.