Opinion
B322998
12-23-2024
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JASON ROBERT LAWRENCE, Defendant and Appellant.
Juliana Drous, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. PA097094 David W. Stuart, Judge. Affirmed.
Juliana Drous, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David E. Madeo, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ADAMS, J.
A jury convicted Jason Robert Lawrence of assault, injury to a spouse, and making criminal threats. On appeal, he argues the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his uncharged act of child abuse, denying him access to potentially exculpatory evidence, and unconstitutionally limiting his cross-examination of the victim. We find no error and affirm the judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The charges arose from incidents occurring on three days in August 2021. At trial, Lawrence's wife, Selena L., testified they had been in a relationship for seven years and married for four. They have three children. After the birth of their twins in September 2018, Lawrence began to exert more control over Selena's life. He required Selena to follow a rigorous daily routine that included precise instructions regarding her hygiene and grooming. If Selena did not follow the list of instructions, Lawrence would "discipline" her by destroying her clothes and jewelry, or by beating her.
Lawrence also controlled Selena's communications with other people. He kept her cell phone on his person and would not let her touch it. He blocked her friends on social media, deleted her family's phone numbers from her phone, and e-mailed friends to tell them not to contact her. The control extended to Selena's medical care, her weight, and how many calories she could eat each day. Lawrence denied Selena meals if she did not eat at designated times. He enforced this practice by beating her with utensils or locking her in the bathtub until she urinated on herself. Selena also testified that at the time of the August 2021 incidents, Lawrence forced her to "get intimate" with him three times a day and would assault her if she refused.
In July 2020, after the birth of their third child, Lawrence's violence toward Selena escalated. Lawrence yelled at Selena and subjected her to racial slurs. He regularly hit her with "the stick from the window" or kitchen utensils. Selena testified that these beatings and other physically violent conduct "started to happen almost every day . . . and it would happen several times during the day."
Selena is Black; Lawrence is White.
Selena testified that sometime in mid-August 2021, Lawrence began making threatening statements such as, "[I]f I killed you now, I would be doing you a favor." She also testified that when she tried to "run out the door" a few days before Lawrence's arrest, "he jumped on [her] back with his knife . . . and he said . . . you had your chance to leave.... [N]ow it's until death do us part. He said, if you do that shit again, I will kill you and your daughter in Chicago."
On August 22, Lawrence pointed his gun at Selena. The gun was fully loaded and did not have a safety. She stood up slowly and asked if he was going to shoot her in front of the children. She testified that "he got scared because [she] said it so loud" and told her to get the children ready to leave the apartment. Lawrence drove her and the children some distance to an unfamiliar desert-like area, told Selena to get out of the car, then locked the car door and drove away. He returned 10 minutes later. She realized when they got home that the box Lawrence used to store his gun was in the car during the trip. Selena was in fear for her life and for her children's lives from that day forward.
Whenever Selena told Lawrence she could not have sex with him because she was menstruating, Lawrence would check her maxi pads to confirm. On August 27, Lawrence cut Selena on her face, arm, and leg with his knife after not seeing blood on her maxi pads. Lawrence used the knife to cut her face "because he said he wanted to make [her] ugly." He also threatened to behead her, then sliced off both her pigtails with his knife and threw the hair in the garbage. Selena also testified to an incident involving Lawrence saying he was "suffocating" their son on the same day.
On the morning of August 28, Lawrence "punched" Selena in the back of her head and later "head-butted" her. He told the children, "[S]ay goodbye to your mother, she is not going to be alive by the end of the day." Selena was scared of Lawrence "doing something to the kids for the-retaliation. Like I said, he was suffocating my son the night before so I was like, okay, he's really losing his mind now. And I realized [that] he was really losing his mind at that point because he hadn't really hurt the kids before." After she put her sons in their strollers to take them for their walk, she ran out of the home by herself and "down the street to the campus police building ...."
California State University Northridge (CSUN) Police Officer Anthony Prera received a call around 10:30 a.m. on August 28 about ongoing domestic violence. He encountered Selena outside the police station. She "seemed to be sprinting" and appeared "panicked and frantic," "out of breath and worried," and "anxious." Selena told him that "there were threats made to decapitate Selena and shoot the children." She also said Lawrence was armed with a handgun. Prera did not see injuries on Selena's body or damage to her scalp or clothing.
Prera and his partner approached Lawrence, who was walking down the street with the children. Prera's partner retrieved a knife from Lawrence's pocket. Lawrence had a cell phone with him that he said belonged to Selena. When asked if he hit Selena, Lawrence told Prera he would not comment but admitted that things with Selena got physical in the past. He added that even if he did hit Selena, he would not incriminate himself by saying so.
When Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) Officer Joaquin Lopez arrived, Selena told him that Lawrence punched and headbutted her because "she didn't get the kids fed fast enough." She also said Lawrence "threatened to shoot her in the back of the head and have her 'brains splatter' on the door if she thought about leaving." In response to standard questions about domestic violence, Selena indicated that Lawrence had tried to strangle, smother, and suffocate her, used weapons against her, and threatened to kill her, and that she feared for her safety.
LAPD officers searched Lawrence and Selena's residence. They recovered a loaded gun in an unlocked case and over 200 rounds of ammunition. After Selena told officers Lawrence had cut off her hair, Lopez found "a chunk of hair, a bundle of hair" halfway down the trash can. He observed two lacerations to Selena's forearm, one to her cheek, and a bump to her head. Another officer took photos of injuries on Selena's legs.
Lopez spoke to Lawrence at the police station. Lawrence was "agitated." Lawrence told him Selena "was lazy or didn't do things fast enough."
Lawrence represented himself at trial and testified on his own behalf. Lawrence testified that he expected Selena to be subservient to him as his wife because they were both Christian "and that's part of Christian doctrine ...." He controlled who Selena could speak with. He did not feel Selena was capable of making medical decisions for herself, so he went with her to doctor's appointments. He found Selena "slow," and "corrected" her often during their marriage.
Lawrence also confirmed that he and Selena made "grooming lists" for her to follow. He testified that Selena had "a problem with maintaining her appearance and health" and would "make [ ] herself ugly" by "overeating," "improper hygiene, cutting herself, pulling her hair out, scratching herself." The lists were intended "to help her . . . maintain regular function." Lawrence regularly checked Selena's weight, sometimes daily if "she didn't make any progress ...."
Lawrence testified about checking Selena's maxi pad for blood. In the months before August 2021, he had been "buying more and more feminine products" and "[did]n't like going down that aisle." Around 10 days before his arrest, he "asked to see a bloody feminine product" from Selena. In response, Selena took a serrated knife and started cutting her hand, but he stopped her. He told her "that's not what [he] meant" and asked her to "show [him the] soaked pad" to check if she was "using these things." He "did not see one drop of blood" and thought Selena was "losing it."
On August 22, Selena dropped one of the twins while changing them and "knock[ed] [ ] over" their third son. When Lawrence asked her why, she responded," 'They should know better.'" After lunch, Lawrence was in another room when he heard Selena say" 'Don't shoot'" loudly. Lawrence saw no one else in the apartment and saw Selena staring. He asked what Selena was talking about and she "snapped out of it." They later went for a drive with the children. He pulled into a restaurant because they were hungry. Lawrence told Selena to check the children's diapers. When she got out of the car, Lawrence began thinking about Selena dropping one of the children and knocking the youngest child down. He felt he had a rare opportunity to leave with the children, so he drove away. He changed his mind within minutes and returned to pick her up before they returned home.
Lawrence testified that on August 24 and 26, Selena wanted to engage in sexual role-play and "asked [Lawrence] to spank her." Lawrence used the stick from the window to hit her on her thigh. He hit her several times at her request. After raised "red marks" appeared on her skin, he stopped.
On August 27, Lawrence and Selena got into an argument about "a trivial matter." He testified that she became "more and more aggressive and obstinate with" him. Lawrence criticized Selena's "horrible" behavior as a mother, daughter, and wife, and threatened to divorce her and take full custody of the children. He said they did not "say much to each other the rest of that evening," but "listened to music videos or watched comedy" together before Lawrence went to sleep.
On August 28, after they woke up and fed the children, Lawrence asked Selena if she wanted to go for a walk. After she put the children in their strollers, she turned around, said "I'm leaving," and then calmly walked out the door by herself. Lawrence took the three children out through the front gate of the apartment complex. An officer then approached Lawrence and began questioning him.
Lawrence denied ever hitting Selena, pointing a gun at her, threatening to kill her, cutting her hair, or destroying her clothes and jewelry. He testified that Selena was "using a lot of mindaltering substances" the week of his arrest and was paranoid and delusional. Any "bumps and bruises" Selena had were caused by their "foreplay."
Charges, trial, and verdict
The People charged Lawrence with assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1); count 2), injuring a spouse (Pen. Code, § 273.5, subd. (a); count 3), criminal threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); count 4), exhibiting a firearm (Pen. Code, § 417, subd. (a)(2)(B); count 5), and assault with a firearm (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(2); count 6). As discussed below, the People also initially charged Lawrence with child abuse (count 1). The count was dismissed for insufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing.
The jury convicted Lawrence of assault with a deadly weapon (a knife) (count 2); injuring a spouse (count 3); and criminal threats (count 4). The jury deadlocked on the charges for exhibiting a firearm (count 5) and assault with a firearm (count 6). On the People's motion, the trial court dismissed counts 5 and 6. The court sentenced Lawrence to an aggregate sentence of four years and eight months. The court also issued a 10-year criminal protective order prohibiting Lawrence from having contact with Selena. Lawrence timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion By Admitting Evidence of Uncharged Acts
Lawrence contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony of Lawrence's prior act of alleged child abuse. We find no abuse of discretion.
A. Relevant background
During direct examination, Selena testified that on August 27, Lawrence "suffocated" one of the twins. When asked to elaborate, she testified: "My son, he gets a panic attack whenever [Lawrence] would start yelling, and so he started throwing up. And [Lawrence] held him down on the floor . . . to keep him from throwing up on the rug. And so [Lawrence] told me to fix his playpen so he can put him in the playpen . . . to discipline him .... [¶] And so I'm over there fixing the playpen, and [Lawrence] is like hurry up, hurry up, I'm covering his mouth and his nose, he can't breathe, hurry up."
Outside the presence of the jury, the court asked the prosecutor to explain the purpose of eliciting this testimony. The prosecutor stated the testimony was relevant "to show one of the reasons why [Selena] was really afraid." She elaborated that Selena's fear for her safety and her children's safety was relevant to the criminal threats charge: "It goes to show [Lawrence's] control, that . . . one of the ways that he was exerting control over [Selena] was by telling her to do stuff for the children or not do stuff, or if she doesn't do something that he wants, something would happen to her or happen to the children." The prosecutor clarified that because Selena "didn't actually see him . . . holding his hand over the child's mouth," "the purpose of that testimony is to just show the controlling situation. I don't know whether or not he put his hand on the child's mouth or not, but he was just making that comment as if he were to further exert control." The court asked the prosecutor to propose a limiting instruction to prevent the jury from relying on the testimony "to say, well, he abused a child so he probably did the other crimes, like-we can't have that." Lawrence asked the court to inform the jury that "the charge [for child abuse] was dismissed for lack of probable cause" because jurors would otherwise question "why is he not being charged with such a heinous act."
The court later proposed that it give "a [CALCRIM No.] 375 limiting instruction to the jury on the issue of motive. Because I do see how that would tend to prove [the People's] theory of the defendant's motive of trying to control his wife." The prosecutor stated that because Selena did not see Lawrence covering the child's mouth and nose, the People were seeking to use her testimony not to prove the incident actually occurred, but for the effect the statements had on Selena's state of mind.
When Selena returned to the stand, the prosecutor resumed the line of questioning regarding her son's panic attack. The following exchange took place:
"[Prosecutor:] Then the defendant made some sort of statement?
"[Selena:] Yes.
"The court: Something about holding his mouth, he is turning blue, something like that?
"[Selena:] He said I'm covering his mouth and his nose, hurry up.
"The court: Did you see him doing that or just heard him say that?
"[Selena:] He just said that to me.
"[Lawrence:] Objection, Your Honor. Prejudicial.
"The court: Okay, overruled.
"Ladies and Gentlemen, I just want to interject and give you a brief instruction now.
"The defendant is not charged with child abuse in this case. So you may consider this evidence only if the People have proved it by a preponderance of the evidence. That is a different standard than beyond a reasonable doubt. Everything in a criminal case has to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, except for this which is a preponderance, which is just more likely than not true.
"So if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence the defendant in fact committed the offense-proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof than proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.
"If you decide that the defendant did that act, you can only consider it as to whether that tends to show the defendant had a motive to commit the charged offense in this case. If the People have not met this burden of proving that that happened, you must disregard this evidence completely.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crimes.
"If you conclude the defendant committed the uncharged offense, that conclusion is only one factor to consider along with all the other evidence. It is not sufficient by itself to prove the defendant is guilty of the charged offenses."
The prosecutor again asked Selena if she saw Lawrence covering her son's mouth. She responded that she had not. Lawrence again objected "[f]or bias, the witness has motive," and requested "a continuing objection with this line of questioning." The court overruled the objection and asked Selena for the third time if she saw Lawrence covering her son's mouth. She again said no. The court reiterated to the jury that Lawrence "is not charged with that. So that's the point of that."
Before closing arguments, the court indicated to counsel that it planned to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 375 concerning evidence of an uncharged offense. The court said it assumed the People would argue the testimony about Lawrence's purported child abuse demonstrated Lawrence's "motive to control Selena, he would do anything . . . [¶] . . . [¶] including hurt the children in his effort to control her." The prosecutor confirmed that the evidence of his statements was intended to show that Lawrence "was saying he was doing something to control her."
The court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 375, which, as given, provided: "The People presented evidence that the defendant may or may not have committed an act which may have amounted to child abuse, which is not charged in this case. [¶] You may consider this evidence only if the People have proved by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant in fact committed the uncharged act." The instruction continued that if the jury found the People met this burden, the jury could consider the evidence "for the limited purpose of deciding whether: [¶] The defendant had a motive to commit the offenses charged. [¶] Do not consider this evidence for any other purpose. [¶] Do not conclude from this evidence that the defendant has a bad character or is disposed to commit crime." It further instructed that Lawrence's uncharged act was insufficient by itself to convict Lawrence of the charged crimes and was instead "one factor to consider along with all the other evidence."
During closing argument, the prosecutor argued Selena understood Lawrence's statement that their son could not breathe "to mean that he was covering her son's mouth and she was afraid. She was really afraid." She argued this incident was "the trigger for [Selena] running the next day to the police for help. Because at this point, she wasn't just concerned about . . . herself, but she was now starting to be more concerned about the children." The prosecutor pointed out that Selena had told the police she was "concerned about her children that are back at the house with the defendant."
Regarding the criminal threats count, the prosecutor argued Lawrence "willfully threatened to unlawfully kill or cause great bodily injury to Selena or her children." She focused on Lawrence's threat to Selena, immediately before she left to find the police, that the children should "say goodbye to your mom, you are not going to see her alive by the end of the day ...." The prosecutor said this specific threat "caused [Selena] to be in sustained fear for her safety or the safety of her children which she told you she was."
B. Discussion
As we understand his argument, Lawrence contends that although the trial court indicated it was admitting Selena's testimony regarding Lawrence holding his hand over their son's mouth and nose as relevant to the issue of motive, the prosecutor's argument reveals that the evidence was actually admitted to establish Lawrence's propensity for violence. However, Lawrence also "concedes that by operation of Evidence Code section 1109, Evidence Code section 1101 did not apply to bar the evidence concerning the alleged uncharged child abuse offenses." Lawrence thus argues the trial court erred in admitting the evidence because it was still inadmissible under section 352. Lawrence asserts the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect.
All further undesignated statutory references are to the Evidence Code.
The record does not indicate whether the trial court admitted the evidence under section 1109, in addition to section 1101. The record also does not support Lawrence's claim that the prosecutor referred to the testimony as evidence of Lawrence's character. She referred to Selena's challenged testimony to support the People's theory that Lawrence's motive to commit the charged offenses was to control Selena and to demonstrate Selena's "sustained fear" for her and her children's safety, an element of the criminal threats charge. (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).) However, since a section 352 analysis was necessary under either section 1101 or 1109, we turn our focus to that aspect of Lawrence's argument and find no error.
The People argue that Lawrence forfeited his arguments regarding this testimony by failing to object to the admission of Selena's testimony during direct examination. However, before trial, Lawrence argued that testimony about child abuse risked unfairly prejudicing the jurors against him and requested that the court "strike all testimony alluding to child abuse, since it was dismissed for lack of probable cause ...." The court appeared to deny that request. Thus, Lawrence adequately preserved his challenge to the trial court's admission of testimony regarding Lawrence's uncharged act of child abuse.
1. Applicable legal principles
Evidence of a defendant's specific prior acts is generally inadmissible as "character evidence," which is "evidence of a propensity or disposition to engage in a type of conduct," when the evidence is used "to prove a person's conduct on a specified occasion." (People v. Villatoro (2012) 54 Cal.4th 1152, 1159, citing § 1101, subd. (a).)
Evidence of a defendant's specific prior acts "relevant to prove some fact" unrelated to a defendant's propensity, "such as motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake or accident," is not character evidence and therefore is not barred by section 1101, subdivision (a). (§ 1101, subd. (b).) The admissibility of evidence under section 1101, subdivision (b) depends on" '" '(1) the materiality of the fact to be proved or disproved, (2) the probative value of the other crime evidence to prove or disprove the fact, and (3) the existence of any rule or policy requiring exclusion even if the evidence is relevant.'"' [Citation.]" (People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 358.) "The main policy that may require exclusion of the evidence is the familiar one stated in Evidence Code section 352: Evidence may be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value. Because substantial prejudice is inherent in the case of uncharged offenses, such evidence is admissible only if it has substantial probative value. [Citation.] This determination lies within the discretion of the trial court." (People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 783 .) "In addition, the Legislature has carved out specific exceptions to the ban on propensity evidence for defendants charged with sex crimes (§ 1108, subd. (a)) and domestic violence (§ 1109, subd. (a)). Subject to conditions not relevant here, 'in a criminal action in which the defendant is accused of an offense involving domestic violence, evidence of the defendant's commission of other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section 1101[, subdivision (a)] if the evidence is not inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.' (§ 1109, subd. (a)(1).) The statute reflects the Legislature's determination that in domestic violence cases, similar prior offenses are uniquely probative of a defendant's guilt on a later occasion." (People v. Merchant (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 1179, 1192 (Merchant).)
Lawrence does not argue on appeal that prior acts of child abuse are not "other domestic violence" made admissible under section 1109 in an action for domestic abuse of a spouse. (See People v. Dallas (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 940, 952 [§ 1109 "does not explicitly provide for the admission of acts of domestic violence in a prosecution for an offense involving child abuse, nor vice versa"].) To the contrary, he concedes that Selena's testimony about his prior act of child abuse was not barred by section 1101, subdivision (a) "by operation of Evidence Code section 1109 ...."
2. The evidence was more probative than prejudicial (§ 352)
As with section 1109, evidence of prior specific instances of conduct otherwise relevant under section 1101, subdivision (b) "must be excluded under section 352 where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will consume too much time, cause undue prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. [Citations.] The prejudice that section 352 is designed to avoid is not the damage that naturally results from highly probative evidence, but rather the prospect of leading the jury to prejudge a person or focus on extraneous factors. [Citation.] We review the admission of other act evidence for abuse of discretion." (Merchant, supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 1192.)
The evidence of Lawrence's prior conduct with his son was probative for two independent reasons. First, it was relevant to the People's theory of motive. The People offered Selena's testimony about Lawrence telling her he was smothering their child as an example of the ways Lawrence maintained control over her, which the People argued motivated his charged crimes of domestic violence against her. Because Lawrence denied assaulting or threatening Selena in August 2021, evidence of his motive was probative of his commission of the crimes charged. "[W]hen the commission of a criminal act is a disputed issue, evidence of motive may become relevant to that issue." (People v. Gibson (1976) 56 Cal.App.3d 119, 129; People v. Clark (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 939, 960 (Clark) ["[M]otive may be probative of such ultimate issues as intent, identity or commission of the criminal act itself"].) For this reason, Lawrence's contention that motive was irrelevant because he "flatly denied he had assaulted Selena" is unavailing. Evidence of his motive was relevant precisely because he disputed whether he had committed the charged crimes at all. (Gibson, at p. 129; Clark, at p. 960.)
Lawrence contends the evidence had little probative value because "neither the trial court nor the prosecution ever articulated a logical nexus between [his] supposed abuse of his child and his motive to fight with Selena." Not so.
An uncharged act does not have to be similar to the charged crime to be probative on the issue of motive "so long as the offenses have a direct logical nexus." (People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 15.) Here, the prosecutor repeatedly argued the evidence showed Lawrence attempted to control Selena both directly, and indirectly, by abusing or threatening to abuse their children. An uncharged act is admissible for this purpose-as evidence of" 'the existence of a motive,'" even if" 'the act does not supply the motive....[T]he motive is the cause, and both the charged and uncharged acts are effects. Both crimes are explainable as a result of the same motive.' [Citation.]" (People v. Spector (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1335, 1381.) Lawrence does not argue otherwise.
People v. Bigelow (1984) 37 Cal.3d 731 (Bigelow), which Lawrence cites in support of his argument, does not compel a different conclusion. In Bigelow, the California Supreme Court rejected the argument that evidence of the defendant's prior robberies and thefts was admissible to prove the defendant's motive to steal a car. (Id. at p. 748.) The court found that it was not "seriously contested" that the person who shot the driver intended to steal his car, noting that "the motive for robbery is generally one of acquiring the victim's property ...." (Ibid.; see also Pen. Code, § 211 [robbery is the taking of personal property from another].) Thus, the fact that the defendant had previously robbed victims to acquire their property had little tendency to prove his motive in robbing the victim in the case at bar. (Bigelow, at p. 748.)
Unlike in Bigelow, whether Lawrence had a motive for assaulting and threatening Selena was seriously contested. The People argued Lawrence committed domestic abuse against Selena because his motive was to control her. Lawrence's defense was that Selena was not credible and she fabricated the allegations against him. Thus, whereas prior robberies "add[ed] little" to the prosecution's motive theory for robbery in Bigelow, here, the trial court could reasonably conclude that the evidence of Lawrence urging her to hurry because he was suffocating their child, and the effect of that statement on Selena, was highly probative of the People's theory that Lawrence assaulted and threatened Selena because he wanted to control her. Bigelow's reasoning is inapplicable.
Second, the evidence was relevant to an element of the criminal threats count. To establish a criminal threat, the People were required to prove, among other things, "that the threat actually caused the person threatened 'to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for his or her immediate family's safety,' and . . . that the threatened person's fear was 'reasonabl[e]' under the circumstances." (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 228.) "The victim's knowledge of defendant's prior conduct is relevant in establishing that the victim was in a state of sustained fear." (People v. Allen (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156; People v. Garrett (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 962, 967.) As noted above, the People relied on the challenged testimony to prove that Selena had a reasonable and sustained fear for herself and her children. Thus, in addition to the motive rationale, the trial court could reasonably conclude that evidence of Lawrence's prior conduct had probative value related to the criminal threats count.
Lawrence does not address this basis for admissibility in his briefing on appeal. He contends only that by relying on the evidence of his uncharged act to show Selena's subjective fear, the prosecutor used the evidence in her closing argument to establish Lawrence's propensity for violence. This argument fails to identify any error by the trial court in admitting the evidence as proof of motive under section 1101, subdivision (b).
Lawrence contends that any probative value of the evidence was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. He argues the jury was likely to have punished him for the uncharged act because the evidence "was far more inflammatory" than the crimes charged and the jury "was likely well aware" he had not been charged with child abuse.
We disagree. Under section 352, prejudice "is not synonymous with 'damaging': it refers to evidence that poses an intolerable risk to the fairness of the proceedings or reliability of the outcome." (People v. Booker (2011) 51 Cal.4th 141, 188.) Here, the challenged evidence was significantly limited. Selena only testified to one instance of conduct. The People and the trial court confirmed with Selena three times that she did not see Lawrence covering their son's mouth or nose. The trial court instructed the jury numerous times, including immediately after Selena's testimony, that Lawrence was not charged with child abuse, and later reminded the jury that the case was "not about how the children were raised, discipline, any alleged child abuse." Further, CALCRIM No. 375 expressly forbade the jury from relying solely on the uncharged act to convict Lawrence of the charged crimes. We presume the jury followed this instruction. (People v. Reyes (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 62, 78.)
Given this context, evidence of Lawrence's uncharged act of child abuse did not create an intolerable risk of unfairness. Any risk that the jury punished Lawrence for his uncharged act was "counterbalanced" by the court's instruction, and did not likely result in prejudice outweighing the probative value of the evidence. (People v. Frazier (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 30, 42.)
3. Any error in admitting the evidence was harmless
Even assuming the trial court erred by admitting the challenged testimony, any error was harmless.
" '[T]he erroneous admission of prior misconduct evidence does not compel reversal unless a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reasonably probable if such evidence were excluded.' [Citations.]" (People v. Walker (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 782, 808; Clark, supra, 62 Cal.App.5th at p. 968 [error in admitting uncharged act evidence is reviewed under the standard in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836].) "[T]he Watson test for harmless error 'focuses not on what a reasonable jury could do, but what such a jury is likely to have done in the absence of the error under consideration. In making that evaluation, an appellate court may consider, among other things, whether the evidence supporting the existing judgment is so relatively strong, and the evidence supporting a different outcome is so comparatively weak, that there is no reasonable probability the error of which the defendant complains affected the result.' [Citations.]" (People v. Beltran (2013) 56 Cal.4th 935, 956.)
Here, the evidence of Lawrence's guilt was strong. Selena testified consistently and at length about a pattern of escalating abuse that began after their first child was born and culminated in the events during the week of August 22. Other evidence corroborated Selena's testimony about Lawrence's acts of violence on August 27 and August 28. Officer Prera described Selena as "sprinting" up the street and appearing "panicked and frantic," consistent with Selena's testimony that she was very scared after Lawrence's threats and acts of violence on the morning of August 28. Officer Lopez testified that Selena told him Lawrence had assaulted her and cut off her hair, and he observed injuries consistent with these claims and found a "chunk" of hair in the trash at their residence. Prera's partner recovered a knife on Lawrence's person. Prera testified that Lawrence said his relationship with Selena had "gotten physical" in the past. Prera also testified Selena told them Lawrence became violent because she "was not feeding the children fast enough"; Lopez later testified that Lawrence volunteered that Selena "was lazy and didn't do things fast enough."
In addition, much of Lawrence's testimony confirmed the People's theory and corroborated Selena's testimony. Lawrence testified that he expected Selena to be "subservient" to him. He confirmed that he gave Selena "grooming lists" with his preferences for her appearance and testified that she was incapable of taking care of herself. He also testified that he monitored her weight, inspected her feminine products, controlled who she could speak with, made her medical decisions, and corrected her often because she was "slow." He admitted hitting Selena, but asserted it was part of consensual sexual activity. This testimony did not explain the injuries to Selena's face and head on the day Lawrence was arrested.
On this record, there was no reasonable probability Lawrence would have obtained a more favorable result had Selena's challenged testimony been excluded. Any error by the trial court in admitting the evidence was harmless.
II. The Trial Court Did Not Deny Lawrence Access to the Bodycam Footage From August 28
Lawrence contends that the trial court erred by failing to provide him with police officer body-worn camera footage from August 28, which he requested during discovery. We disagree.
A. Relevant background
Over a month before trial, after the trial court granted Lawrence's request to represent himself, the court instructed the People to provide him with a redacted copy of the discovery. The prosecutor stated that some items of discovery could not be disclosed directly to Lawrence, such as "things on evidence.com, which is a link that would be to body-worn video .... That would, I guess, have to go to an investigator. So the defendant will have to request a defense investigator ...." The court agreed that Lawrence "can't have a CD or thumb drive" while in custody. The prosecutor asked for a hearing date the following week so that she could redact the discovery and provide it to Lawrence. The court set a hearing for June 2. The court advised Lawrence that at that hearing, "you can talk about the videos, how to do that. We can maybe set up the screen here and we can just turn it on and he can watch the videos." The prosecutor agreed, noting she would check to see how long they were. Lawrence asked for a continuance to prepare for trial, which the court granted. Lawrence waived his right to a speedy trial, with trial to be within 30 days of the next court date.
The record does not include transcripts of the June 2 hearing or the next two pretrial dates, June 8 and June 22. The minute orders in the clerk's transcript indicate only that the People turned over paper discovery to Lawrence on June 2. Lawrence has not requested that this court augment the record with the transcripts from these proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320; Ct. App., Second Dist., Local Rules, rule 1(a)(5) [transcripts related to criminal proceedings where no motions are at issue are not automatically included in the record on appeal].)
The day before the trial was scheduled to begin, the People and Lawrence announced ready for trial. The court then said: "I just want to put a couple things on the record." The court and Lawrence had the following exchange:
"The court: Last time we spoke about the investigator, Mr. Rotello, and you gave me the phone number. I spoke to Mr. Rotello. He assured me he was on the approved list for pro per investigators. And I told him that I would approve 10-15 hours of work for you, and he said that he was going to come to San Fernando on that day, the last time we were in court. And then later we got a call from Mr. Rotello that he wasn't going to be doing any work for you.
"[Lawrence:] Your Honor, he didn't want to accept that work. He said it was in the form of evidence, Your Honor.
"The court: Okay. So you're not going to use the services of an investigator.
"[Lawrence:] No, Your Honor.
"The court: So you are announcing ready for trial?
"[Lawrence:] I-we have several 402 motions to present today.
"The court: Yes, yes. But first, I need to know if you are announcing ready for trial, which is sort of a-it has a legal meaning. It means there is no turning back now.
"[Lawrence:] Yes, sir."
Later that day, the prosecutor informed the court that Lawrence intended to tell jurors during voir dire that "he wasn't given all of the discovery because he couldn't watch the body camera footage" from August 28. She reported Lawrence also planned to reveal "conversations that he had with an investigator where he . . . wasn't allowed to get the investigator because of financial disagreements between the two, and things of that nature." The People argued these details were not relevant and "that the People made a full effort to give the defendant all of the discovery in whatever format we could." The court informed Lawrence that this information was not relevant to the jury. The court and Lawrence engaged in further discussion:
"[Lawrence:] I believe it's in defense counsel's best interest to, at least, receive a transcript of the two videos from the body-cam footage that were used. Could-the prosecution making reference to her demeanor differs from the body-cam footage from the police report and the police report her demeanor is described as calm.
"The court: That's a different issue. If you are talking about what's-are you planning on showing the body-cam video during the trial?
"[Lawrence:] If it's available and we can all look at it together.
"The court: It has been available. The only way for you to access it without an attorney is to get an investigator.
"[Lawrence:] Or what-introduce it as evidence. It is directly relevant.
"[Prosecutor:] I cannot introduce it because I did not have a transcript. If I had a transcript, I would have provided it. Also it's mostly hearsay. I think the-the discrepancy that the defendant was making essentially is that there are two police reports. One is from Los Angeles Police Department who handled the investigation; prior to [LAPD] being called out to the scene, Selena spoke with CSUN Police Department. So in the report by CSUN Police Department it states Selena was visibly in distress, frantically running on the street. Something along those lines.
[¶] . . . [¶]
"[Prosecutor:] Well, I need a ruling on-or the People are asking to exclude the defendant from being able to mention to the jurors that he wasn't given evidence because it's not as if the People were excluding evidence from him. He had a certain path to be able to get some things, and if he is not able to access that
"The court: What is it that you didn't think you could get?
"[Lawrence:] I just ask for the same standard we have had for the last hundred years.
"The court: And you've gotten it. What specifically are you saying?
"[Lawrence:] Either have the videos or the transcript of the videos.
"The court: The videos have been made available, and, as we have explained, we can't give you a thumb drive in custody. So the only way for you to watch the videos is to hire an investigator, which the court would pay for, and you can sit and watch the 30-plus hours of video footage if you wanted to. However, that interferes with your right to a speedy trial. So you had to make the strategic choice here about whether you wanted to watch the videos or have the speedy trial.
"[Lawrence:] The tactical choice is, Your Honor, if she is going to make reference to things that are in reference to the police report that are in the bodycam footage that haven't been shared, would she be refraining herself from describing the body-cam footage?
"The court: Are you planning on offering any body-cam video in your case-in-chief?
"[Prosecutor:] No. The People were planning on calling an officer who initially encountered Selena from CSUN Police Department who is going to talk about her demeanor.
"The court: Okay.
"[Prosecutor:] And my understanding is that her demeanor is-and I have seen the body camera footage, so I know what her demeanor was. I'm obviously not the witness, but the testimony would come via the witness who is going to say she seemed frantic, she seemed like she was in distress, she was crying, she was emotional, things of that nature.
"The court: All right. Well, you have the CSUN police report.
"[Lawrence:] Yes, Your Honor.
"The court: So if there is anything in there that's inconsistent, you can point that out to that officer.
"[Lawrence:] Yes, Your Honor."
At trial, Prera testified on direct examination that Selena seemed "panicked and frantic" and "out of breath and worried" when he initially encountered her outside the police station. In response to Lawrence's questions on cross-examination about Selena's demeanor, Prera again testified that "she appeared to be panicking, she was out of breath, she seemed worried" and "she seemed anxious" and "frantic." During his cross-examination of Officer Lopez, Lawrence asked how Selena seemed "at that point after I had been arrested?" Lopez responded, "When I interacted with her, she was fairly calm."
B. Discussion
Relying on Penal Code section 1054.1 and caselaw regarding the purpose of criminal discovery, Lawrence asserts that "[g]iven the potential exculpatory value of the videos, the court's denial of discovery due to logistical difficulties was unacceptable." However, Lawrence's contention that the trial court "completely den[ied]" him access to the body-worn camera footage is directly contradicted by the record. The court appointed an investigator to aid Lawrence in discovery. That arrangement did not work out. When the court asked, Lawrence expressly indicated he was not going to use the services of an investigator, even after the court had advised Lawrence that the investigator was necessary to facilitate his review of the video footage. Lawrence provides no support for his contention that his decision not to work with an investigator required the trial court to explore "other options" for Lawrence to conduct his review of the evidence. The court provided Lawrence with the means to review the evidence, and Lawrence fails to explain how his decision not to avail himself of those means constitutes a denial of discovery by the trial court. We find no error.
We additionally note the record does not indicate that Lawrence asked for a continuance to review the footage, nor does Lawrence argue on appeal that the trial court erred by denying him a continuance.
III. The Trial Court Did Not Unconstitutionally Limit Lawrence's Cross-Examination of Selena
Finally, Lawrence contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses by limiting the scope of his cross-examination of Selena to the three days on which Lawrence was alleged to have committed the charged crimes. We find no abuse of discretion.
A. Relevant background
Before the start of trial, Lawrence informed the court that he sought to elicit testimony about Selena's use of legal substances. He explained that he personally knew Selena used tobacco and marijuana daily and drank alcohol "at least once a month." The court explained Selena's substance use was relevant only if there was evidence Selena consumed these substances on the days of the alleged crimes, and only to the extent her use "affect[ed] her ability to remember or describe what happened that day." Lawrence further claimed that Selena was intoxicated on all the days when Lawrence purportedly committed previous acts of domestic violence. The court stated they would "take it question by question" during cross-examination.
Lawrence also sought to introduce evidence that Selena had "maxed out" his credit cards and defaulted on payments since his arrest, which had ruined his credit. He argued the evidence was relevant to Selena's "honesty and credibility as a witness" and to his motive theory. He contended that after he "brought up the issue of full custody" of the children, Selena fabricated the allegations of abuse "to try and have [him] killed" to avoid paying child support. The court allowed Lawrence to "ask [Selena] about whether the allegations are true and whether she made the whole thing up just to get rid of you and take your money." But the court prohibited Lawrence from cross-examining Selena on specifics related to their credit card accounts to avoid "a minitrial" on finances.
Lawrence began cross-examining Selena sometime during the morning session on July 6, 2022. His initial line of questioning included subjects that predated the alleged criminal conduct by several years. For example, Lawrence asked Selena how they met and the details of their early financial situation. During a recess shortly after Lawrence began the crossexamination, the court urged Lawrence to keep his questions "focused on everything after [the third child] was born. At least." The court further stated that if Lawrence could keep his cross-examination focused on August 22nd, 27th, and 28th-the three days on which alleged crimes occurred-"that would be even better."
After trial resumed in the afternoon, Lawrence questioned Selena about their joint finances. At one point, Lawrence asked Selena about the balance on their checking account at the time of his arrest. The court sustained a relevance objection, but after clarifying that it was a joint account, allowed Selena to answer.
Lawrence then extensively questioned Selena about her testimony regarding his "controlling routines"-including many questions about her health, appearance, and hygiene-and asked about her employment. He specifically asked her if she "lost out on one better paying position because [she] smoke[d] marijuana," which she confirmed.
During a break in the proceedings, Lawrence indicated to the court that he had "[a] lot" of cross-examination remaining. The court told Lawrence to "cut to the chase, what you really want to ask about, which is what happened on those three days," and "the events of the nights that are charged, the nights and the day after." The court noted there had been 90 minutes of cross-examination without mention of the events underlying the charges. Lawrence explained that his lines of questioning were relevant because Selena "was in a very poor state of health when [he] met her ...."
Lawrence continued his cross-examination for the rest of the afternoon. Among other things, he asked Selena about her purported acts of violence against him; attempted to elicit testimony that she had harmed herself and caused her own injuries; and questioned Selena as to why she did not leave at night while he was sleeping to escape his alleged abuse.
The following morning, before trial resumed, the court told Lawrence he must complete his cross-examination by 12:00 noon. The court noted that Lawrence's four hours of cross-examination was "more than five times the time that was needed for direct examination," which was less than an hour.
Lawrence's continued cross-examination was wide-ranging. He questioned Selena about his firearm, their financial situation, and his interactions with neighbors and property management at their apartment complex. He also attempted to elicit testimony that Selena cut her own hair and injured herself with the knife. Lawrence asked Selena for her opinions of him, such as whether she considered Lawrence a peaceful person who "[took] care of everybody's health." Lawrence elicited testimony from Selena that he had helped her with her health, religious faith, and education.
During the afternoon recess, the court asked Lawrence if he had further cross-examination "that has real probative value in this case?" The court noted Lawrence had started to repeat himself and cover areas about which Selena had already testified. The court then asked Lawrence to specify what ground he wanted to cover with respect to August 22, 27, and 28. The court allowed Lawrence additional time to ask Selena about those days' events. Lawrence proceeded to ask Selena about the incident on August 22 and on the day of his arrest. He asked further questions about the August 2021 events on re-cross.
B. Discussion
Lawrence contends the trial court erred by allowing Selena to testify about Lawrence's prior abuse while denying his request to cross-examine Selena about her prior acts, specifically her "misuse of their credit cards" and her "continuous drug usage." He contends this limitation prevented him from eliciting testimony relevant to Selena's credibility and therefore denied him his constitutional right to confront a key witness.
"While a defendant's confrontation right includes the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses regarding bias or prejudice, the right is not absolute. [Citation.] As the trial court did here, a court may restrict cross-examination based upon the factors articulated in Evidence Code section 352. [Citation.] A trial court has the discretion to exclude otherwise admissible 'evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.' (Evid. Code, § 352.) We review a trial court's ruling under Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion." (People v. Gutierrez (2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 807-808.)
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by restricting Lawrence's cross-examination. The issue in the case was whether, in August 2021, Lawrence assaulted Selena with a firearm and knife, committed felony acts of domestic violence toward her, and threatened to kill her. Unlike Lawrence's prior acts of domestic violence against Selena, which the trial court concluded were highly probative in establishing a pattern of abuse (People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th 513, 535), evidence of Selena's past misuse of credit cards or marijuana consumption had no direct relationship to whether the incidents in August 2021 actually occurred. (People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 152 [a matter is collateral, and therefore not relevant under § 210, where it has "no logical bearing on any material, disputed issue"].) Instead, the evidence could only be relevant as potential impeachment. Yet, Lawrence does not specifically explain how evidence regarding Selena's misuse of credit cards and daily marijuana use related to her character for truthfulness or the veracity of her testimony. Moreover, despite the trial court's indication that it would consider questions regarding Selena's marijuana use "question by question," Lawrence did not ask Selena about substance use on the dates of the charged crimes.
Given the minimal probative value of the evidence, even as impeachment, the trial court could appropriately consider that delving further into the couple's finances or Selena's general marijuana use would necessitate an undue consumption of time and create a risk of confusing the issues. (People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296-297 [trial could "may and should consider with particular care" whether evidence of non-felonious conduct would consume undue time or cause confusion]; People v. Rivera (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 1374, 1380 [admissibility of "[i]mmoral conduct" "remains subject to the trial court's discretion under Evidence Code section 352 . . . 'to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues,'" quoting Wheeler, at p. 296.)
Further, the trial court's limitation on Lawrence's cross-examination would violate his confrontation rights only if "a reasonable jury might have received a significantly different impression of [Selena's] credibility had the excluded cross-examination been permitted." (People v. Quartermain (1997) 16 Cal.4th 600, 624.) That was not the case here. The potential evidence would not have directly contradicted Selena's testimony. It did not appear to specifically relate to the dates of the charged crimes. And other evidence on the general topics-Selena's marijuana consumption, the couple's finances, and Lawrence's beliefs that Selena had lied to take his money or that she had no financial aptitude-was admitted. (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 208.)
As stated above, the trial court allowed Lawrence to ask Selena about her substance use on the three days in August 2021 when the crimes were said to have occurred. Lawrence did not do so. During his direct examination, Lawrence testified about Selena's general marijuana use and testified that she had been under the influence of marijuana on August 22, 27, and 28.
Lawrence also appears to argue that his additional cross-examination was material to show Selena was "in a poor state of health" at the time they met, which supported his defense that his routines were intended to help Selena improve her life and were not abusive or controlling. Yet, Lawrence was able to ask questions to this effect during his cross-examination. He questioned Selena at length about the effect of his routines on her weight and blood pressure and elicited testimony that he "helped" her with her health and hygiene. Lawrence also asked Selena about his involvement in her financial well-being. The trial court thus allowed Lawrence to explore evidence relevant to the theory of his defense and did not abuse its discretion by prohibiting" 'an unlimited inquiry into collateral matters'" that were only of marginal probative value. (People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 282.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: EDMON, P. J. BERSHON, J. [*]
[*] Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.