Summary
noting that "[a]ssociations of human beings, such as corporations and municipal entities, may be considered legal persons, because they too bear legal duties in exchange for their legal rights"
Summary of this case from Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v. R.W. Commerford & Sons, Inc.Opinion
2014-12-4
The PEOPLE of The State of New York ex rel. The NONHUMAN RIGHTS PROJECT, INC., on Behalf of Tommy, Appellant, v. Patrick C. LAVERY, Individually and as an Officer of Circle L Trailer Sales, Inc., et al., Respondents.
Case law has always recognized the correlative rights and duties that attach to legal personhood ( see e.g. Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200, 203–204 [Ark.2013], citing Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2010 Ark. 432, *4 [2010] [defining a “person” as “a human being or an entity that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a human being”]; Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., 704 So.2d 778, 780 [La.1997] [finding that the classification of a being or entity as a “person” is made “solely for the purpose of facilitating determinations about the attachment of legal rights and duties”]; Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 225, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098 [1985, Zappala, J., concurring] [noting that “ ‘[p]ersonhood’ as a legal concept arises not from the humanity of the subject but from the ascription of rights and duties to the subject”] ). 3 Associations of human beings, such as corporations and municipal entities, may be considered legal persons, because they too bear legal duties in exchange for their legal rights ( see e.g. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189, 8 S.Ct. 737, 31 L.Ed. 650 [1888]; Western Sur. Co. v. ADCO Credit, Inc., 251 P.3d 714, 716 [Nev.2011]; State v. A.M.R., 147 Wash.2d 91, 94, 51 P.3d 790, 791 [2002]; State v. Zain, 207 W.Va. 54, 61–65, 528 S.E.2d 748, 755–759 [1999], cert. denied 529 U.S. 1042, 120 S.Ct. 1541, 146 L.Ed.2d 354 [2000] ).
Elizabeth Stein, New Hyde Park, and Steven M. Wise, admitted pro hac vice, Coral Springs, Florida, for appellant.
Before: PETERS, P.J., LAHTINEN, GARRY, ROSE and LYNCH, JJ.
PETERS, P.J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (J. Sise, J.), entered December 18, 2013 in Fulton County, which denied petitioner's application for an order to show cause to commence a CPLR article 70 proceeding.
The subject of this litigation is a chimpanzee, known as Tommy, that is presently being kept by respondents on their property in the City of Gloversville, Fulton County. On behalf of Tommy, petitioner sought an order to show cause to commence a habeas corpus proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 70 on the ground that Tommy was being unlawfully detained by respondents. In support, petitioner submitted the affidavits of several experts in an effort to establish that, in general, chimpanzees have attributes sufficient to consider them “persons” for the purposes of their interest in personal autonomy and freedom from unlawful detention. Collectively, these submissions maintain that chimpanzees exhibit highly complex cognitive functions—such as autonomy, self-awareness and self-determination, among others—similar to those possessed by human beings. Following an ex parte hearing, Supreme Court found that the term “person” under CPLR article 70 did not include chimpanzees and issued a judgment refusing to sign an order to show cause. Petitioner appeals.
As Supreme Court's judgment finally determined the matter by refusing to issue an order to show cause to commence a habeas corpus proceeding, it is appealable as of right ( seeCPLR 7011; see generally People ex rel. Seals v. New York State Dept. of Correctional Servs., 32 A.D.3d 1262, 1263, 822 N.Y.S.2d 351 [2006]; People ex rel. Tatra v. McNeill, 19 A.D.2d 845, 846, 244 N.Y.S.2d 463 [1963] ).
During the pendency of this appeal, this Court granted petitioner's motion for a preliminary injunction enjoining respondents from removing Tommy to Florida (2014 N.Y. Slip Op 77524[U] [2014] ).
This appeal presents the novel question of whether a chimpanzee is a “person” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus. Notably, we have not been asked to evaluate the quality of Tommy's current living conditions in an effort to improve his welfare. In fact, petitioner's counsel stated at oral argument that it does not allege that respondents are in violation of any state or federal statutes respecting the domestic possession of wild animals ( see e.g. ECL 11–0512). According to petitioner, while respondents are in compliance with state and federal statutes, the statutes themselves are inappropriate. Yet, rather than challenging any such statutes, petitioner requests that this Court enlarge the common-law definition of “person” in order to afford legal rights to an animal. We decline to do so, and conclude that a chimpanzee is not a “person” entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the writ of habeas corpus.
The common law writ of habeas corpus, as codified by CPLR article 70, provides a summary procedure by which a “person” who has been illegally imprisoned or otherwise restrained in his or her liberty can challenge the legality of the detention (CPLR 7002[a] ). The statute does not purport to define the term “person,” and for good reason. The “Legislature did not intend to change the instances in which the writ was available,” which has been determined by “the slow process of decisional accretion” (People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d 257, 263, 273 N.Y.S.2d 897, 220 N.E.2d 653 [1966] ) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). Thus, we must look to the common law surrounding the historic writ of habeas corpus to ascertain the breadth of the writ's reach.
Not surprisingly, animals have never been considered persons for the purposes of habeas corpus relief, nor have they been explicitly considered as persons or entities capable of asserting rights for the purpose of state or federal law ( see e.g. Lewis v. Burger King, 344 Fed.Appx. 470, 472 [10th Cir.2009], cert. denied558 U.S. 1125, 130 S.Ct. 1083, 175 L.Ed.2d 907 [2010]; Cetacean Community v. Bush, 386 F.3d 1169, 1178 [9th Cir.2004]; Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Sea World Parks & Entertainment, Inc., 842 F.Supp.2d 1259, 1263 [S.D.Cal.2012]; Citizens to End Animal Suffering & Exploitation, Inc. v. New England Aquarium, 836 F.Supp. 45, 49–50 [D.Mass 1993] ). Petitioner does not cite any precedent-and there appears to be none-in state law, or under English common law, that an animal could be considered a “person” for the purposes of common-law habeas corpus relief. In fact, habeas corpus relief has never been provided to any nonhuman entity ( see e.g. United States v. Mett, 65 F.3d 1531, 1534 [9th Cir.1995], cert. denied519 U.S. 870, 117 S.Ct. 185, 136 L.Ed.2d 124 [1996]; Waste Management of Wisconsin, Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 139–140 [7th Cir.1980], cert. denied449 U.S. 1060, 101 S.Ct. 782, 66 L.Ed.2d 603 [1980]; Sisquo.c Ranch Co. v. Roth, 153 F.2d 437, 441 [9th Cir.1946]; Graham v. State of New York, 25 A.D.2d 693, 693, 267 N.Y.S.2d 1009 [1966] ).
The lack of precedent for treating animals as persons for habeas corpus purposes does not, however, end the inquiry, as the writ has over time gained increasing use given its “great flexibility and vague scope” (People ex rel. Keitt v. McMann, 18 N.Y.2d at 263, 273 N.Y.S.2d 897, 220 N.E.2d 653) [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ). While petitioner proffers various justifications for affording chimpanzees, such as Tommy, the liberty rights protected by such writ, the ascription of rights has historically been connected with the imposition of societal obligations and duties. Reciprocity between rights and responsibilities stems from principles of social contract, which inspired the ideals of freedom and democracy at the core of our system of government ( see Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments From “Marginal” Cases, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 12–14 [2013]; Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/ Contractualist Critique, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 27, 69–70 [2009]; see also Matter of Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 20–21, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 [1967]; United States v. Barona, 56 F.3d 1087, 1093–1094 [9th Cir.1995], cert. denied516 U.S. 1092, 116 S.Ct. 813, 133 L.Ed.2d 759 [1996] ). Under this view, society extends rights in exchange for an express or implied agreement from its members to submit to social responsibilities. In other words, “ rights [are] connected to moral agency and the ability to accept societal responsibility in exchange for [those] rights” (Richard L. Cupp Jr., Children, Chimps, and Rights: Arguments From “Marginal” Cases, 45 Ariz. St. L.J. 1, 13 [2013]; see Richard L. Cupp Jr., Moving Beyond Animal Rights: A Legal/Contractualist Critique, 46 San Diego L. Rev. 27, 69 [2009] ).
Further, although the dispositive inquiry is whether chimpanzees are entitled to the right to be free from bodily restraint such that they may be deemed “persons” subject to the benefits of habeas corpus, legal personhood has consistently been defined in terms of both rights and duties. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term “person” as “[a] human being” or, as relevant here, “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties [of] a human being” (emphasis added). It then goes on to provide:
“So far as legal theory is concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and duties.... Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. It is only in this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this is the exclusive point of view from which personality receives legal recognition” (Black's Law Dictionary [7th ed. 1999], citing John Salmond, Jurisprudence 318 [10th ed. 1947]; see John Chipman Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law [2d ed.], ch. II, at 27 [stating that the legal meaning of a “person” is “a subject of legal rights and duties”] ).
Case law has always recognized the correlative rights and duties that attach to legal personhood ( see e.g. Smith v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 2013 Ark. 502, 431 S.W.3d 200, 203–204 [Ark.2013], citing Calaway v. Practice Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2010 Ark. 432, *4 [2010] [defining a “person” as “a human being or an entity that is recognized by law as having the rights and duties of a human being”]; Wartelle v. Women's & Children's Hosp., 704 So.2d 778, 780 [La.1997] [finding that the classification of a being or entity as a “person” is made “solely for the purpose of facilitating determinations about the attachment of legal rights and duties”]; Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 225, 501 A.2d 1085, 1098 [1985, Zappala, J., concurring] [noting that “ ‘[p]ersonhood’ as a legal concept arises not from the humanity of the subject but from the ascription of rights and duties to the subject”] ).
Associations of human beings, such as corporations and municipal entities, may be considered legal persons, because they too bear legal duties in exchange for their legal rights ( see e.g. Pembina Consol. Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.S. 181, 189, 8 S.Ct. 737, 31 L.Ed. 650 [1888]; Western Sur. Co. v. ADCO Credit, Inc., 251 P.3d 714, 716 [Nev.2011]; State v. A.M.R., 147 Wash.2d 91, 94, 51 P.3d 790, 791 [2002]; State v. Zain, 207 W.Va. 54, 61–65, 528 S.E.2d 748, 755–759 [1999], cert. denied529 U.S. 1042, 120 S.Ct. 1541, 146 L.Ed.2d 354 [2000] ).
To be sure, some humans are less able to bear legal duties or responsibilities than others. These differences do not alter our analysis, as it is undeniable that, collectively, human beings possess the unique ability to bear legal responsibility. Accordingly, nothing in this decision should be read as limiting the rights of human beings in the context of habeas corpus proceedings or otherwise.
Needless to say, unlike human beings, chimpanzees cannot bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities or be held legally accountable for their actions. In our view, it is this incapability to bear any legal responsibilities and societal duties that renders it inappropriate to confer upon chimpanzees the legal rights—such as the fundamental right to liberty protected by the writ of habeas corpus—that have been afforded to human beings.
Our rejection of a rights paradigm for animals does not, however, leave them defenseless. The Legislature has extended significant protections to animals, subject to criminal penalties, such as prohibiting the torture or unjustifiable killing of animals ( seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 353), the abandonment of animals in a public place ( seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 355), the transportation of animals in cruel or inhuman manners ( seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 359[1] ) or by railroad without periodically allowing them out for rest and sustenance ( seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 359[2] ), and the impounding of animals and then failing to provide them sustenance ( seeAgriculture and Markets Law § 356). Notably, and although subject to certain express exceptions, New Yorkers may not possess primates as pets ( seeECL 11–0103[6][e][1]; 11–0512). Thus, while petitioner has failed to establish that common-law relief in the nature of habeas corpus is appropriate here, it is fully able to importune the Legislature to extend further legal protections to chimpanzees.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.