Opinion
May 10, 2000.
Appeal from Judgment of Supreme Court, Ontario County, Lamont, J. — Burglary, 2nd Degree.
Judgment unanimously affirmed.
Before: Wisner, J. P., Hurlbutt, Balio and Lawton, JJ.
Memorandum:
Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because defense counsel failed to move to suppress defendant's incriminating statement to the police based on defendant's warrantless arrest and because defense counsel indicated to Supreme Court that he was not prepared for trial. "To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must demonstrate the absence of strategic or other legitimate explanations for counsel's failure to pursue "colorable' claims" ( People v. Garcia, 75 N.Y.2d 973, 974). Defendant has not demonstrated that he has a colorable claim based on his warrantless arrest. A police investigator testified at defendant's Huntley hearing that defendant was under police surveillance at the time defendant burglarized a home. After defendant drove away from the scene of the burglary, the police confirmed that a crime had been committed, stopped the vehicle driven by defendant, and arrested him. Because the police had reasonable cause to believe that defendant had committed the burglary, the warrantless arrest was proper ( see, CPL 140.10[b]; People v. Greene, 153 A.D.2d 439, 443, lv denied 76 N.Y.2d 735, cert denied 498 U.S. 947; People v. Hill, 146 A.D.2d 823, 824-825, lv denied 73 N.Y.2d 1016). Thus, the failure of defense counsel to challenge the arrest did not render his representation ineffective ( see, People v. Garcia, supra, at 974). The statement of defense counsel to the court that he was not prepared for trial, "without more, does not establish ineffectiveness" ( People v. Dalton, 140 A.D.2d 993, 994, lv denied 72 N.Y.2d 917). The evidence, the law, and the circumstances of this case establish that defense counsel provided meaningful representation, including filing and arguing appropriate pretrial motions, conducting skillful examinations of witnesses at the Huntley hearing, and securing defendant a favorable plea offer ( see, People v. Baldi, 54 N.Y.2d 137, 147; see also, People v. Dillard, 262 A.D.2d 1044, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 1017).
We further conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an adjournment on the first day of trial based on defense counsel's lack of preparation ( cf., People v. Spears, 64 N.Y.2d 698). Defense counsel stated that he had attempted to prepare for trial by meeting with defendant during the previous weekend, but that defendant was uncooperative. In addition, defendant did not specify how he would be prejudiced if the trial were not adjourned ( see, People v. Queeglay, 237 A.D.2d 896, lv denied 90 N.Y.2d 866). We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's request for an adjournment ( see, People v. Conyers, 227 A.D.2d 793, 794, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 982).
Finally, we have reviewed the remaining contentions raised in defendant's pro se supplemental brief and conclude that they are without merit.