Opinion
1-20-0312
10-20-2021
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JAMAL LAUDERDALE, Defendant-Appellant.
This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County. No. 19 CR 5941 Honorable Vincent M. Gaughan, Judge, presiding.
JUSTICE BURKE delivered the judgment of the court. Justice McBride and Justice Ellis concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
BURKE JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: We affirm defendant's conviction for unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon where the trial court did not err in denying his motion to suppress a firearm and his statements to police over defendant's contentions police lacked probable cause to arrest him, police obtained his statements in violation of his Miranda rights, and his sixth amendment rights were violated by the arresting officers' lack of body cameras.
¶ 2 Following a bench trial, the trial court found defendant Jamal Lauderdale guilty of unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) and sentenced him to 8 years' imprisonment. On appeal, defendant contends the trial court should have suppressed a firearm recovered from his vehicle and three statements he made to police because: (1) police obtained the firearm and defendant's statements as products of his unlawful arrest; (2) police obtained defendant's statements in violation of. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (3) the arresting officers' lack of body cameras violated defendant's sixth amendment right to a fair trial. For the reasons that follow, we affirm defendant's conviction.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A grand jury charged defendant with two counts of UUWF and four counts of aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. Relevant here is Count I, which alleged that, on April 7, 2019, defendant knowingly possessed a handgun on or about his person when he had previously been convicted of UUWF in a 2009 case.
¶ 5 A. Motion to Suppress and Bench Trial
¶ 6 Defendant filed a motion to suppress, which alleged police arrested him incident to a traffic stop at approximately 11:45 p.m. on April 7, 2019. Police searched defendant's vehicle and recovered a firearm and a can of beer. Defendant made statements to police in which he admitted owning the firearm for his protection and admitted to possession of the beer can. Defendant argued police obtained the firearm and his inculpatory statements as products of their unlawful search and seizure of him and his vehicle. In addition, defendant contended police obtained his admission to possessing the beer can in violation of his Miranda rights. Defendant also argued he had "been deprived of his ability to mount a defense" because the arresting officers were not equipped with video recording equipment such as body cameras.
¶ 7 The court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress simultaneously with a bench trial.
¶ 8 1. State's Case
¶ 9 Chicago police officer Jonathan Dibiase testified he was on duty, wearing plain clothes, and driving a marked police vehicle at approximately 11:45 p.m. on April 7, 2019. He was part of a gang enforcement team that was never equipped with body cameras.
¶ 10 Dibiase was driving east on 79th Street, approaching the intersection with Union Avenue, when he saw a silver Chrysler traveling west disobey a stop sign at the intersection. Dibiase activated his emergency lights and curbed the Chrysler near the intersection. As Dibiase approached the driver side of the Chrysler, he saw defendant, whom he identified in court, in the driver's seat, a second individual in the front passenger seat, and a third individual in the rear seat. Through the open front driver-side window, Dibiase saw an open can of beer in the cupholder nearest to defendant. Dibiase "asked about the beer, and [defendant] said that it was his." Dibiase ordered defendant out of the Chrysler and placed him in custody. Other officers on scene removed the two other individuals from the Chrysler.
¶ 11 Dibiase entered the Chrysler through the front driver-side door and recovered the open beer can, which smelled like alcohol. He then saw "a blue steel or black in color Glock 23 .40-caliber between the driver's seat cushion and the center console," which he recovered. While holding the firearm, Dibiase walked toward defendant, who was standing at the rear driver side of the Chrysler with Officer Garibay. Defendant spontaneously stated to Garibay he "just ha[d] that for protection;" no one asked defendant a question about the firearm. Defendant was transported to a police station.
¶ 12 Dibiase spoke with defendant alone at the police station at approximately 12:15 a.m. on April 8, 2019. Dibiase advised defendant of his Miranda rights by reading a preprinted card and defendant indicated he understood his rights. Defendant did not sign a Miranda rights waiver form. Defendant stated, "I only have that gun because it is dangerous out here."
¶ 13 Dibiase inventoried firearm, the open beer can, and the alcohol in the can. In court, he identified the firearm, its magazine, and eight live .40-caliber rounds, and the State moved these items into evidence.
¶ 14 The parties stipulated defendant was convicted of UUWF in a 2009 case.
¶ 15 2. Defense's Case
¶ 16 Vincent Royal testified he was in defendant's Chrysler on 79th Street between 11:30 and 11:45 p.m. on April 7, 2019. Defendant, whom Royal identified in court, was driving and Royal was sitting behind him in the rear driver-side passenger seat. Two other men were in the front passenger seat and the rear passenger-side seat. Defendant was driving west on 79th toward Halsted Street. Defendant did not violate any traffic laws and did not disobey a stop sign at 79th and Union. After defendant drove past 79th and Union, five or six police vehicles pulled the Chrysler over.
¶ 17 Two to six officers approached the Chrysler and ordered the occupants to exit the vehicle; the officers did not have their firearms drawn. Defendant lowered the front driver-side window as the officers approached. The officers ordered defendant to exit the Chrysler and he complied. Royal did not hear defendant or the officers say anything about a beer, no one in the Chrysler was drinking, and there were no open containers of beer in the vehicle. Royal did not see a firearm in the Chrysler and did not know whether there was a firearm in the vehicle. The officers ordered all four men, including defendant, out of the Chrysler and handcuffed them.
¶ 18 When Royal was standing near the rear driver side of the Chrysler, he saw one officer enter the vehicle through the driver's door and search the vehicle for 40 to 45 seconds. Through the rear windshield, Royal saw the officer open the passenger-side glove compartment with a key and remove a firearm. The officer returned to the rear of the Chrysler and said "he had a gun," then asked defendant, "Why didn't you tell me you had a gun on you?" Defendant did not respond; officers place him in a police vehicle. Royal was released and drove the Chrysler away from the scene.
¶ 19 3. Closing Argument and Ruling
¶ 20 In closing, defendant argued the officers conducted a "pretextual" and "illegal stop, arrest and search" of him and his vehicle, and any evidence "flowing from that pretextual stop" should be suppressed. Defendant acknowledged that his first statement regarding the firearm was voluntary, but argued the State failed to introduce a Miranda waiver form for his statement at the police station. The State contended Dibiase's discovery of the firearm "evolved" from a lawful traffic stop.
¶ 21 The court denied defendant's motion to suppress and found him guilty of UUWF. The court resolved both the motion hearing and the trial as credibility contests in favor of the State and, specifically, found Dibiase's testimony regarding the firearm's location credible.
¶ 22 B. Posttrial and Sentencing
¶ 23 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the denial of his motion to suppress and for a new trial, which argued the court committed plain error by crediting Dibiase's testimony over Royal's, and the evidence was insufficient to support the court's guilty finding. Defendant requested the court reconsider and grant his motion to suppress "the firearm and statements." The court denied this motion.
¶ 24 The court sentenced defendant to eight years' imprisonment.
¶ 25 Defendant filed a motion to reconsider sentence, which the court denied.
¶ 26 Defendant timely appealed.
¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 28 On appeal, defendant argues: (1) the trial court should have suppressed the firearm and his inculpatory statements because they were "fruits of the poisonous tree" of his unlawful arrest; (2) the court should have suppressed his statements because his Miranda rights were violated; and (3) the arresting officers' lack of body cameras violated his sixth amendment right to a fair trial.
¶ 29 At a hearing on a motion to suppress, the defendant has the burden to make a prima facie case establishing the evidence in question was obtained by an illegal search or seizure. People v. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22. A prima facie case means the defendant has the primary responsibility for establishing the factual and legal bases for the motion to suppress. Id. When the defendant alleges evidence was the product of an unlawful seizure, he must establish that there was a seizure and that it was unlawful. People v. Juarbe, 318 Ill.App.3d 1040, 1049 (2001). If a defendant makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the State to present evidence to counter the defendant's prima facie case. Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22. The ultimate burden of proof remains with the defendant. Id.
¶ 30 We review the denial of a motion to suppress using a two-part standard. Id. ¶ 21. We give great deference to the trial court's findings of fact, which we reverse only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. Id. We review de novo issue of whether police had probable cause, i.e., whether the evidence in question should have been suppressed. Id. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we consider the evidence adduced at trial as well as at the suppression hearing. People v. Hannah, 2013 IL App (1st) 111660, ¶ 41.
¶ 31 A. Probable Cause for Defendant's Arrest
¶ 32 Defendant first argues the trial court should have suppressed the firearm and his inculpatory statements because they were the "fruits of the poisonous tree" of his unlawful arrest.Specifically, defendant contends his arrest was unlawful because: (1) Dibiase arresting him based on the open beer can in his vehicle was merely a pretext to search the vehicle; and (2) Dibiase did not know whether defendant legally possessed the firearm he recovered from defendant's vehicle.
Although defendant's brief claims "the police officers lacked probable cause to arrest [defendant] and search his automobile," he does not analyze Dibiase's search of his vehicle, which produced the firearm. Defendant only addresses the legality of his arrest.
¶ 33 Both the United States Constitution and the Illinois Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures by police. U.S. Const., amend. IV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6. A warrantless arrest is reasonable only if it is supported by probable cause. People v. Grant, 2013 IL 112734, ¶ 11. Probable cause to arrest exists when the facts known to the officer at the time of the arrest would lead a reasonable person to believe the arrestee had committed a crime. Id. "The existence of probable cause depends upon the totality of the circumstances at the time of arrest." Id. Whether probable cause exists is determined by common sense considerations, and the standard is the probability of criminal activity, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. Probable cause for arrest may be based on a traffic offense. People v. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 19 ("since 1962, Illinois has consistently recognized that police are allowed to conduct a custodial search after an arrest for a traffic or petty offense.").
¶ 34 1. The Firearm
¶ 35 We find Dibiase had probable cause to arrest defendant. Dibiase approached defendant's vehicle after lawfully stopping him for disobeying a stop sign. He immediately saw an open beer can in plain view through the open front driver-side window in the cupholder nearest defendant. Dibiase's observation of this open beer can supported a reasonable belief defendant violated the Illinois Vehicle Code. Specifically, the Vehicle Code prohibits possession of "any alcoholic liquor within the passenger area of any motor vehicle upon a highway in this State except in the original container and with the seal unbroken." 625 ILCS 5/11-502(a) (West 2018). The beer can was in the front passenger area of defendant's motor vehicle and its seal was broken; thus, Dibiase had probable cause to believe defendant committed illegal transportation of alcohol. Probable cause to arrest may be based on a Vehicle Code violation. Fitzpatrick, 2013 IL 113449, ¶ 19. Defendant's arrest was lawful; thus, the firearm was not the product of an illegal arrest and should not have been suppressed on that basis.
¶ 36 Defendant insists "[t]he mere presence of a beer can in a cup holder is insufficient probable cause to handcuff four individuals and search the vehicle," but he cites no authority for this claim. On the contrary, an open beer can in plain view inside a vehicle supports probable cause to arrest the driver for illegal transportation of alcohol. People v. Hill, 2020 IL 124595, ¶ 36.
¶ 37 Defendant also contends the open beer can provided a "pretext" to arrest him and search the Chrysler. However, probable cause is determined by an objective standard (People v. Hill, 2012 IL App (1st) 102028, ¶ 36), and Dibiase's arrest of defendant based on seeing an open beer can in his vehicle was objectively reasonable.
¶ 38 Defendant's claim that the "[t]he lack of any investigation related to alcohol contradicts PO Dibiase's testimony that the open beer can was the reason for removing [defendant] from the vehicle and placing him into custody" (emphasis in original) is essentially a challenge to Dibiase's credibility, and we will not disturb the trial court's finding that Dibiase was credible. See People v. Slater, 228 Ill.2d 137, 149 (2008) (trial court's "credibility determinations *** are accorded great deference and will be reversed only if they are against the manifest weight of the evidence.").
¶ 39 Defendant also argues his "arrest as to the gun" was unlawful because "[t]he mere possession of a firearm is not sufficient to establish probable cause." He cites People v. Aguilar, 2013 IL 112116, which held that possession of a firearm in public is not categorically illegal. However, as explained above, defendant was lawfully arrested for illegal transportation of alcohol, not possession of the firearm. Dibiase recovered the firearm after defendant was arrested. Thus, Aguilar has no bearing on Dibiase's probable cause to arrest defendant.
¶ 40 To the extent defendant suggests that, under Aguilar, Dibiase was not justified in seizing the firearm because its presence in defendant's vehicle was not necessarily illegal, defendant has forfeited that argument by failing to raise it in the trial court. Had defendant raised this claim in the trial court, the State would have had the opportunity to elicit additional testimony to justify seizure of the firearm. For example, under section 108-1.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2018)), an officer making a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), to which a traffic stop is analogous (People v. Bass, 2021 IL 125434, ¶ 15), may search a person for weapons if he reasonably suspects that he is in danger of attack. If the officer discovers a weapon, "he may take it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall either return the weapon, if lawfully possessed, or arrest the person so questioned." 725 ILCS 5/108-1.01 (West 2018). Because defendant did not create an adequate record regarding the lawfulness of Dibiase's seizure of the firearm, we cannot address a new theory claiming that seizure was unlawful under Aguilar. See People v. Hughes, 2015 IL 117242, ¶ 46
¶ 41 Defendant's citation to People v. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 162791, is misplaced. In Thomas, police arrested the defendant immediately after seeing a firearm in his parked vehicle, then recovered the firearm from the vehicle. Thomas, 2019 IL App (1st) 162791, ¶¶ 8-9. The officers' arrest of defendant was based solely on his apparent possession of a firearm, which was not categorically illegal under Aguilar, so this court found the officers did not have probable cause to arrest the defendant. Id. ¶ 23. By contrast, in this case, the open beer can supplied probable cause to arrest defendant, and Dibiase did not discover the firearm until after defendant was under arrest. Accordingly, we find the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to the firearm.
¶ 42 2. Defendant's Inculpatory Statements
¶ 43 Defendant also contends his inculpatory statements were the "fruit of the poisonous tree" of his unlawful arrest. Defendant does not identify these statements with specificity; he makes a general challenge the admissibility of statements he made while under arrest. The record indicates defendant made two statements while under arrest: one to Garibay while on scene and one to Dibiase at the police station. In both statements, defendant admitted to possessing the firearm.
¶ 44 We find defendant's statements to Garibay and Dibiase were not the products of an unlawful arrest. As explained above, Dibiase had probable cause to arrest defendant for illegal transportation of alcohol. Thus, defendant's arrest was lawful. Because defendant's arrest was lawful, his later statements referring to the firearm should not have been suppressed on that basis. See People v. Moore, 328 Ill.App.3d 1047, 1055 (2002) ("[B]ecause defendant's arrest was lawful, defendant's later statements referring to the gun are admissible."). Accordingly, the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress with respect to his claim his arrest was not supported by probable cause.
¶ 45 B. Defendant's Miranda Rights
¶ 46 Defendant next contends the trial court should have suppressed three statements he made because his Miranda rights were violated: (1) his response to Dibiase's question indicating that the open beer can was his; (2) his on-scene statement to Garibay that he owned the firearm for protection; and (3) his statement to Dibiase at the police station in which he admitted to owning the firearm.
¶ 47 The State argues defendant failed to preserve these Miranda issues by not raising them in his motion to suppress or in his posttrial motion. We disagree. Defendant's motion to suppress cited Miranda in connection with his admission to possessing the beer can and alleged due process violations relating to his admissions to owning the firearm. His posttrial motion sought reconsideration of the denial of the motion to suppress and cited Miranda. Thus, we find defendant sufficiently preserved Miranda issues for review. See People v. Johnson, 334 Ill.App.3d 666, 672 (2002) (to preserve an argument for review, a defendant must present it at the motion to suppress stage and in a posttrial motion).
¶ 48 In Miranda, the United States Supreme Court held that an individual subject to a custodial interrogation must be notified of certain rights. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-79. If police officers fail to provide the requisite Miranda warnings and fail to obtain a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, an individual's statements during custodial interrogation are generally inadmissible. Id. at 444.
¶ 49 1. On-scene Statements
¶ 50 Defendant did not receive Miranda warnings on scene. Thus, the issue is whether defendant's on-scene admissions to possessing the open beer can and the firearm were the products of custodial interrogation such that Miranda warnings were required.
¶ 51 An individual must be in custody before Miranda warnings are required. Slater, 228 Ill.2d at 149-50. Whether a defendant was in custody when he made the statement in question requires two inquiries:" 'first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.'" Id. at 150 (quoting People v. Braggs, 209 Ill.2d 492, 505- 06 (2003)). In determining whether a defendant was in custody when he made a statement, we consider: "(1) the location, time, length, mood, and mode of the questioning; (2) the number of police officers present during the interrogation; (3) the presence or absence of family and friends of the individual; (4) any indicia of a formal arrest procedure, such as the show of weapons or force, physical restraint, booking or fingerprinting; (5) the manner by which the individual arrived at the place of questioning; and (6) the age, intelligence, and mental makeup of the accused." Id.
¶ 52 a. Statement Regarding the Open Beer Can
¶ 53 We find defendant's admission to possessing the open beer can was not custodial; thus, Miranda warnings were not required. "The non-coercive nature of ordinary traffic stops supports the conclusion that persons temporarily detained as the result of a traffic stop are not 'in custody' for purposes of. Miranda." People v. Briseno, 343 Ill.App.3d 953, 958 (2003) (quoting Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 440 (1984)). This is because a" 'traffic stop, although restraining the driver's freedom of action, does not sufficiently impair the driver's exercise of the privilege against self-incrimination so as to require that the driver be warned of his Miranda rights.'" People v. Tayborn, 2016 IL App (3d) 130594, ¶ 20 (quoting Briseno, 343 Ill.App.3d at 959). Miranda becomes applicable during a traffic stop when a suspect's freedom of action is curtailed to the same degree as a formal arrest. Id.
¶ 54 Dibiase pulled defendant over for disobeying a stop sign, i.e., he made an ordinary traffic stop of defendant. Immediately thereafter, while defendant was still in his vehicle, Dibiase asked defendant about the open beer can and defendant said it was his. Only after defendant made this statement did Dibiase order him out of the vehicle and place him into custody. Thus, defendant's admission to possessing the open beer can occurred during an ordinary traffic stop, prior to his arrest, and was non-custodial. Miranda warnings were not required, and the lack of Miranda warnings prior to defendant admitting the open beer can was his did not warrant suppression of defendant's statement. See Briseno, 343 Ill.App.3d at 959.
¶ 55 In addition, the Slater factors support a conclusion defendant was not in custody when he told Dibiase the open beer can was his. Defendant was sitting in his own vehicle having a brief conversation with a single officer. Two or three friends were in the vehicle with him. No indicia of arrest were present, and nothing about defendant's age or intelligence suggests a lack of understanding about the nature of the traffic stop. Thus, the Slater factors do not support a conclusion defendant was in custody when he admitted to possessing the open beer can.
¶ 56 Defendant argues he was in custody when he told Dibiase the open beer can was his because he "could not have terminated the encounter and just drove away." However, defendant does not cite any authority in support of this argument, and he does not address authority such as Briseno and Berkemer holding that ordinary traffic stops are not custodial for purposes of Miranda. Accordingly, defendant has not established the trial court erred in admitting this statement.
¶ 57 b. Statement to Garibay
¶ 58 Defendant's on-scene statement to Garibay that he kept the firearm for his protection occurred in custody. When defendant made that statement, Dibiase had ordered him out of his vehicle and placed him in custody, and he was standing at the rear of his vehicle under Garibay's guard. A reasonable person in defendant's position would not have felt free to leave; thus, defendant was in custody for purposes of Miranda.
¶ 59 However, defendant's statement to Garibay was spontaneous, not the product of interrogation. Unprompted by any questioning, defendant stated he "just ha[d] that [firearm] for protection" when he saw Dibiase approaching holding the firearm." 'Volunteered or spontaneous statements, as opposed to admissions elicited by custodial interrogation, are expressly excepted from the requirements of Miranda.' " People v. Martin, 2020 IL App (1st) 181217, ¶ 16 (quoting People v. Columbo, 118 Ill.App.3d 882, 936 (1983)) (not released for publication and subject to revision or withdrawal). Although defendant was in custody when he spontaneously told Garibay he owned the firearm, he was not being interrogated. Thus, Miranda warnings were not required, and the lack of Miranda warnings prior to defendant telling Garibay he owned the firearm was not a basis for suppression. See Id.
¶ 60 Defendant argues Dibiase visibly holding the firearm was tantamount to an interrogation because Dibiase knew defendant seeing the firearm was likely to elicit an incriminating statement. The cases defendant cites in support of this argument do not stand for the proposition that an officer holding a firearm in view of an arrestee constitutes an interrogation. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980) (no interrogation where police had brief conversation with the defendant regarding the safety of children); People v. Olivera, 164 Ill.2d 382 (1995) (the defendant's question to police about the results of a lineup did not constitute waiver of his right to remain silent). Accordingly, suppression of defendant's spontaneous admission to owning the firearm was not warranted.
¶ 61 2. Statement at the Police Station
¶ 62 Defendant next argues the trial court should have suppressed his statement to Dibiase at the police station in which he admitted to owning the firearm because he did not waive his Miranda rights prior to making that statement.
¶ 63 "A valid waiver of Miranda rights must be knowingly and intelligently made." Braggs, 209 Ill.2d at 515. "The [suspect] need not understand far-reaching legal and strategic effects of waiving his or her rights or appreciate how widely or deeply an interrogation may probe; however, the [suspect] must at least understand basically what those rights encompass and minimally what their waiver will entail." Id. When determining whether a defendant understood his Miranda rights and made a knowing and intelligent waiver of them, we must consider the totality of the circumstances. People v. Richardson, 2015 IL App (1st) 113075, ¶ 18. Factors include the suspect's background, experience, and conduct. Braggs, 209 Ill.2d at 515.
¶ 64 We find defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights when speaking to Dibiase at the police station was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. Dibiase informed defendant of his Miranda rights by reading those rights to defendant from a preprinted card. Defendant indicated he understood his rights. Immediately thereafter, defendant made a one-sentence statement in which he said he possessed the firearm to protect himself. The record supports a reasonable inference defendant was voluntarily trying to provide an innocuous explanation for why the firearm was in his vehicle, just as he did on-scene when speaking to Garibay. Moreover, defendant's prior conviction for UUWF suggests he was familiar with police and the criminal justice system, particularly in the context of illegal possession of firearms. Defendant had the burden of establishing he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his Miranda rights (see Brooks, 2017 IL 121413, ¶ 22), and the only evidence he introduced on this point was the lack of a signed waiver form. The record simply does not support a conclusion defendant's statement at the police station was anything other than a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights, so suppression of that statement was not warranted.
¶ 65 Defendant argues he did not "affirmatively" waive his Miranda rights. However, when the State establishes that Miranda warnings were provided and that the defendant understood those warnings, the defendant's subsequent uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of the right to remain silent. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 384 (2010). That is what occurred here. Dibiase's testimony, which the trial court found credible, establish defendant was provided his Miranda rights, indicated he understood them, and then made a statement. Thus, defendant implicitly waived his Miranda rights, and no proof of affirmative waiver was necessary. See Id. Accordingly, we find the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress with respect to his statement at the police station.
¶ 66 C. Body Cameras
¶ 67 Finally, defendant argues the arresting officers' lack of body cameras violated his sixth amendment right to a fair trial because it deprived him of video recorded evidence of this incident.
We analyze this argument as part of defendant's appeal of the denial of his motion to suppress because that motion made the same argument. However, the motion did not indicate what evidence defendant sought to suppress based on this alleged sixth amendment violation.
¶ 68 We agree with the State that defendant has forfeited this argument by failing to cite to authority. Defendant argues the arresting officers' lack of body cameras contravened the general purpose of the Law Enforcement Body-Worn Camera Act (50 ILCS 706/10-5 (West 2018)). However, defendant cites no authority for his contention the sixth amendment requires police to be equipped with body cameras, in violation of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h) (7). See Ill. S.Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (the appellant's brief must contain "citation of the authorities"). We have found no such authority. Moreover, defendant does not explain what evidence should have been suppressed because of this alleged constitutional violation. Accordingly, we find defendant has forfeited this argument. See In re Marriage of Reicher, 2021 IL App (2d) 200454, ¶ 33 (appellant's failure to cite pertinent authority violates Rule 341 (h) (7) and results in forfeiture).
¶ 69 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm defendant's conviction.
¶ 71 Affirmed.