Opinion
G028745.
7-30-2003
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRIAN DANIEL LANINGHAM, Defendant and Appellant.
Greg M. Kane, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Robert R. Anderson, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Meagan J. Beale and Adrianne S. Denault, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
A jury convicted Brian Daniel Laningham of various kidnapping charges and sex offenses, including forcible rape, arising from two separate abductions, nine days apart. On appeal, Laningham argues the court erred in denying his motion to exclude certain of his statements as involuntary. He also contends the court improperly denied his three motions for mistrial which concerned, respectively, the rape victims emotional outburst while testifying, the courts response to the outburst, and an allegation of prosecutorial misconduct involving the introduction of "irrelevant, highly prejudicial" DNA evidence. Finally, Laningham argues the cumulative effect of these errors deprived him of his right to a fair trial.
We find no merit in any of these claims. Consequently, we affirm the judgment.
FACTS
1. The first abduction
At around 10:30 p.m. on September 16, 1999, Ignacia G. got off a bus near the intersection of Harbor Blvd. and 19th Street in Costa Mesa. As she headed home on foot, Laningham walked up to her, grabbed her by the hair, and pressed what felt like a knife against her neck. Laningham dragged Ignacia to his car and pushed her inside. He asked where she lived and then drove her to her apartment complex where he parked in a dark area. Laningham threatened Ignacia with a knife that looked like a carpet cutting knife and forced her to orally copulate him. Laningham digitally penetrated her vagina about 12 times and then raped her. After he was finished assaulting her, Laningham told Ignacia to pull up her pants and get out of the car. She did so and then asked for her purse. Laningham refused to give it to her and drove off.
Ignacia went immediately to a nearby apartment and called 911. When the police arrived, she described the attack, her assailant, and his car. The police then took Ignacia to the hospital for examination and evidence collection. Vaginal swabs contained sufficient semen to permit DNA typing.
2. The second abduction
Nine days later, at 6:30 a.m., Griselda A. was waiting for a bus at the corner of Harbor Blvd. and 19th Street when Laningham pulled up in his car. He offered her a ride but she declined. He persisted and she ultimately accepted a ride to her job at Planet Hollywood, a few miles away. When they reached her destination Laningham sped past the restaurant. Griselda protested and Laningham told her to shut up. Brandishing a carpet cutting knife, he motioned for her to grope his genitals. Fearing for her life, Griselda complied, but then succeeded in jumping out of the car at a red light. Laningham grabbed her purse as she fled. Griselda called 911 from a gas station and described for police her assailant and his car.
Police drove Griselda back to the bus stop where she had accepted the ride from Laningham. She spotted her abductor pulling into a parking lot near the bus stop. She exclaimed, "Thats him," and police followed Laningham and quickly arrested him. In a field lineup, Griselda identified Laningham as her kidnapper, and she also identified his car and the knife he had used in the attack. Police found several carpet cutting knives in the car. Moreover, Laningham, his car, and the knives found in the car all matched the descriptions provided nine days earlier by Ignacia.
3. The interrogations
On the day of his arrest, September 25, police advised Laningham of his Miranda rights but he waived them, saying he wanted to talk so he could "get outta here." In this initial interrogation, Laningham flatly denied any involvement in the sexual assault on Griselda or the rape of Ignacia. He denied giving Griselda a ride in his car that morning. He initially denied having had sex in his car within the past two months. When police mentioned DNA testing of his car seats, Laningham admitted having had consensual sex in his car with "Mexican" women in a Santa Ana parking lot on two different nights during the week of Ignacias rape. But he denied having had sex in his car in Costa Mesa within the past two years. In fact, he insisted he had not even been in Costa Mesa during the previous two years.
Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602.
The two detectives interviewing Laningham tried in various ways to shake his story. They pointed out the evidence already amassed against him: the fact both victims provided detailed physical descriptions of their attacker and Laningham fit those descriptions; the fact Griselda had accurately described both Laninghams car and its contents, most notably a yellow sheet covering a big box in the rear seat; and the fact police found the knife Griselda described on the floorboard of the drivers side when they arrested him. Along with this evidence, the officers assured Laningham he would be identified as Ignacias rapist by DNA evidence taken from her vagina. They also said that a bloodhound would be able to detect if Griselda had been in Laninghams car. The detectives told Laningham they both knew he was lying and that police always eventually discover the true facts.
Several times one of the detectives, Bob Fate, alternated his approach by playing the "good cop" who wanted to "help" Laningham. Fate said, for example, "I want to help you get over why you are doing this, but until you want to do that, then obviously, there is no help for you[.]" Fate said Laningham needed to tell the truth "the first step towards getting help is being honest with yourself." Despite these entreaties, Laningham stuck by his story that he had no involvement in either crime.
The next day Laningham asked to speak again with the detectives, saying he wanted to change his story. A day later, on September 27, after being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, Laningham told the detectives he had sex with Ignacia in Costa Mesa on September 16 but insisted the sex was consensual. He said she claimed "rape" out of anger at his ejaculating inside her when he had promised not to do so. Laningham also admitted giving Griselda a ride but denied pulling a knife on her or attempting a sexual assault. He asserted Griselda panicked and irrationally jumped out of the car when he mistakenly passed by the spot at which she wanted to be let out. He said he never touched her or made her touch him. In a second interview later that day, Laningham essentially reiterated this new account of his involvement with both women, adding certain details.
Police had videotaped all three interviews. Before trial, Laninghams counsel moved to exclude as involuntary the statements Laningham made during the latter two interviews. The court denied the motion.
The jury convicted Laningham of two counts of kidnapping for rape, kidnapping, second degree robbery, forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and genital penetration by foreign object. The jury also found true various enhancements, including that Laningham used a deadly or dangerous weapon in committing all the offenses, used a knife in the commission of some, and that he committed a sex offense under various aggravated circumstances set forth in Penal Code section 667.61, subdivisions (a) through (e). The court sentenced Laningham to a total term of 26 years to life.
DISCUSSION
1. The trial court properly denied Laninghams motion to exclude his statements.
Laningham argues the court erred in denying his motion to exclude his statements from the two September 27 interviews. He argues these statements were involuntary because police enticed him into talking by promising to provide "help" for the problem that caused him to rape women and, additionally, by promising to release him if he convinced them he was innocent. He argues these "false offers of leniency . . . were psychologically coercive," rendering his resulting statements involuntary. After having carefully reviewed the unedited transcript containing these "promises," we conclude Laninghams statements were voluntary and properly admitted at trial.
"A defendants admission or confession challenged as involuntary may not be introduced into evidence at trial unless the prosecution proves by a preponderance of the evidence that it was voluntary. [Citations.] A confession or admission is involuntary, and thus subject to exclusion at trial, only if it is the product of coercive police activity. [Citations.] On appeal, we review independently the trial courts determination on the ultimate legal issue of voluntariness. [Citation.]" (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 659, 941 P.2d 752.) In determining voluntariness, "the question is whether defendants choice to confess was not essentially free because his will was overborne. [Citation.]" (People v. Memro (1995) 11 Cal. 4th 786, 827, 905 P.2d 1305.) The facts here easily demonstrate Laninghams will was not overborne.
We note, first, that Laningham did not confess. In the September 27 interviews he continued to deny that he raped Ignacia or that he sexually assaulted Griselda. He did acknowledge having had personal encounters with each woman, but he willfully manufactured stories that put those encounters in an innocent light. He described consensual sex with Ignacia that led to an unjust claim of rape, and a gentlemanly transport of Griselda that, too, resulted in an unreasonable accusation of sexual assault.
The transcript from Laninghams initial interrogation reveals the reason he made these ultimately incriminating statements: The detectives convinced him that police would soon have overwhelming circumstantial evidence that he had been with the two women, evidence which included DNA testing of the semen taken from Ignacias vagina, a bloodhounds supposed "smell test" of Griseldas presence in his car, and the fact he, his car, and his knives fit the descriptions provided by both women. It took Laningham about a day to figure out he had better come up with innocent explanations for his encounters with these women. Common sense alone tells us Laninghams attempt to manipulate the facts to his benefit actually proves his will was not overborne by police. He was intent on deceiving police rather than capitulating to their demands that he tell the truth.
Moreover, we reject Laninghams characterization of Detective Fates promises as "psychologically coercive." The detectives offer to "help" Laningham with his "problem" of raping women was surely not a compelling reason to admit he had sexually attacked Ignacia and Griselda. And, as already pointed out, this promise did not succeed in eliciting such an admission.
Nor are we troubled by Fates supposed "false promise" that Laningham would be released from custody if the detectives were persuaded of his innocence. Laningham argues this "promise" was a deceptive ploy to get him to admit consensual sex with Ignacia, which he did, to his ultimate detriment. Laningham suggests this promise was "particularly persuasive" because Fate cited two alleged rape cases in which the accused rapist was ultimately not charged because Fate believed the suspect rather than the victim. But Laningham takes the detectives statements out of context and mischaracterizes them as designed to elicit a false admission from Laningham. Instead, Fates comments incontestably delivered the message that police are interested only in the truth.
Fate referred to these two cases with "uncharged suspects" in order to refute Laninghams assertion that a man accused of rape will always get convicted because its his word against the womans. Fate responded: "No, no it isnt. [P] . . . Its what the evidence says." Fate then went on to describe the two cases in which the evidence refuted the victims story. His point was that detectives focus on the evidence and are intent on discovering the truth behind a victims claims and a suspects explanations. Fate declared: "I dont believe anybody, I dont [believe] anything anybody tells me until its proven, and thats the only fair way I can do this. Its the only way I can be fair to you, its the only way I can be fair to her." We conclude Detective Fate made no promise of leniency and did not encourage Laningham to make a false admission of consensual sex with Ignacia.
There is no basis in the record for finding Laninghams statements were involuntary. Laningham himself initiated the follow-up interviews at which he made the incriminating statements. Moreover, his decision to make these statements did not result from any coercion or overreaching on the part of police. Consequently, we conclude the trial court properly denied the motion to exclude the statements from trial.
The court properly denied the two motions for mistrial related to Ignacias emotional outburst at trial and the courts handling of the event.
Laningham contends the court erred in denying his two motions for mistrial related to a highly emotional outburst from Ignacia during her testimony and the courts response to the outburst. After reviewing the record, we find the court properly denied the motions.
Factual background
The outburst came during the prosecutors direct examination of Ignacia concerning the circumstances of the rape. When the prosecutor asked Ignacia to describe the position of her head and body in relation to the passenger seat and door, Ignacia exclaimed, "I dont want to!" and pounded her fist on the witness stand and screamed in Spanish. The court promptly called a 10-minute recess. As the jurors left the box, they could see the victim-witness counselor run up to Ignacia and hug her.
After the jury left the courtroom, the court spoke to Ignacia. The court explained the role of the court and the prosecution, and the reason she, as a complaining witness, had to answer questions about the alleged crime committed against her. The court stated, "Did someone explain to you that unless you come into court and explain [what happened to you on September 16] to the jury, that the government cannot do anything to this man? Do you understand that?" The witness answered, "Yes." The court continued, "We know its painful for you to have to remember this tragic event. . . . [P] But in spite of that pain, our law requires that this procedure take place. It cant be done any other way."
After Ignacia agreed to continue her testimony, the defense counsel asked that she be excused. The defense counsel then moved for a mistrial on the ground her outburst was contrived and planned, pointing to a similar outburst she made at the preliminary hearing, using the same words, fist pounding, and screams, at the same point in her testimony. Defense counsel further argued the outburst was highly prejudicial and consigned Laningham to a trial by emotion.
The court disagreed with both points. The court found Ignacias courtroom display of emotions was genuine rather than "staged or contrived. . . . It appeared, based upon all the questioning, that she seemed to be very reluctant to talk about the incident at all. And it was only after dragging the information out of her by the prosecutor that she was able to get certain points out. And that the pausing . . . just before the outburst, it seemed to me that this incident was welling up in her and maybe having to relive it in her mind, and thats what appeared to cause a somewhat natural breakdown." The court further found that any resulting prejudice to defendant from the outburst could be cured by jury admonishment. The court denied the motion for mistrial.
When the jury returned, the court admonished it "not to consider sympathy for a party or witness, or passion or prejudice against them." The court told jurors they "should not decide the case based on perhaps an outward show of emotion" and that an "emotional reaction . . . is not something that you should base your decision on. [P] So were going to try to get through this testimony with a minimum amount of emotional distraught. I have had a chance to talk with Miss [G.] to try to explain the circumstances of why youre here, why she has to tell the story to you, because our law requires it. I think she understands that, and hopefully we can get through the description of this incident necessary for your benefit as jurors to decide the facts of the case."
Ignacia then returned to the witness stand and calmly completed her testimony for the day. The next morning, defense counsel again moved for a mistrial. This time, the basis for the motion was the courts purportedly improper and ineffective response to Ignacias outburst the day before.
Defense counsel argued that the courts colloquy with Ignacia immediately after her outburst communicated to her that the court believed her story, and that this expression of support "emboldened" her as a witness. Defense counsel pointed, in particular, to the courts statements to Ignacia that "unless you come into court and explain this to the jury . . . the government cannot do anything to this man" and "We know its painful to have to remember this tragic event." Defense counsel further argued the courts admonition to the jury also intimated that the court believed Ignacias testimony. Counsel complained, specifically, of the courts statement to the jury that it had explained to Ignacia "why she has to tell the story to you, because our law requires it."
The court responded to this second mistrial motion by putting Ignacia on the stand and questioning her about the effect of its words to her after the outburst. The court told Ignacia that it was concerned its use of the phrase "tragic event" in referring to the alleged rape may have suggested to Ignacia that the court was taking sides and believed her story rather than Laninghams. The court admonished Ignacia that "the court obviously cannot take sides in this case[.] . . . My job is to be impartial to both you and to Mr. Laningham here and not take sides, and conduct a fair trial, so that the jury and only the jury can make the factual determinations necessary to determine the case[.]" After eliciting responses from Ignacia indicating she did not think the court had decided the facts in her favor, the court announced it found Ignacia had not been "emboldened" by the courts previous admonition, and "any potential harm in that respect has been dissipated." The court further concluded there was nothing improper in its earlier admonition to the jury about Ignacias outburst. The court thus denied the second mistrial motion.
Analysis
"[A] mistrial should be granted if the court is apprised of prejudice that it judges incurable by admonition or instruction. [Citation.] Whether a particular incident is incurably prejudicial is by its nature a speculative matter, and the trial court is vested with considerable discretion in ruling on mistrial motions. [Citation.]" (People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 985-986, 997 P.2d 1044.) On appeal, then, we review the trial courts rulings on the mistrial motions under the deferential abuse of discretion standard. (People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 153, 210, 940 P.2d 710.)
Laningham launches a two-pronged attack on the courts denial of the first mistrial motion. He challenges the courts factual finding that Ignacias emotional outburst was genuine rather than contrived, and he disputes the courts conclusion that the resulting prejudice could be cured by jury admonition. Both challenges fail.
A cold transcript is no vehicle for judging the sincerity of emotions expressed on the witness stand. It is axiomatic that the trial court is in a far better position than the appellate court to judge the credibility of a witness. For that reason, we defer to the trial courts finding that Ignacia was emotionally overwrought at having to recount the details of her rape, rather than merely "acting," when she began crying and screaming on the witness stand. Such strong emotions are certainly within the realm of normal human reactions for a rape victim testifying at trial.
We likewise defer to the trial courts finding that the outburst was not incurably prejudicial. If all courtroom displays of raw emotion created incurable prejudice, courts would find it nearly impossible to try certain rape or murder cases. We must trust in the curative power of appropriate jury admonitions. (See People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 980-981, 281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131; People v. Ryan (1981) 116 Cal. App. 3d 168, 184, 171 Cal. Rptr. 854.) We believe the trial courts prompt admonition to the jury that it must not "consider sympathy for a party or witness" or "decide the case based on . . . an outward show of emotion" or on a witnesss "action" or "emotional reaction" "affirming . . . the charges or the incident" was adequate to neutralize the prejudicial effect of Ignacias emotional display. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion in the courts denial of the motion for mistrial based on the occurrence of that outburst.
The court also acted within its discretion in denying Laninghams second motion for mistrial based on its handling of Ignacias outburst. When defense counsel argued the courts colloquy with Ignacia emboldened her as a witness by implying the court believed her story, the court forthrightly dealt with the concern raised. The court carefully admonished Ignacia that it could not take sides and was not accepting her version of events over Laninghams. The court questioned Ignacia to ensure she understood this admonition. These actions were adequate to dissipate any slight advantage that might have adhered to the prosecution from the courts original admonition of Ignacia.
We are also untroubled by the courts admonition to the jury in the wake of the outburst. Laningham argues this admonition "telegraphed" the courts belief in Ignacias story and failed to counteract the "monumentally prejudicial" effect of seeing the victim-witness counselor hug Ignacia. Neither assertion has merit. The courts statement that "our law requires" the complaining witness in the case to testify does not suggest the court finds the witness credible. Nor does allowing "court personnel" to comfort a crying witness suggest to the jury that the court finds the witnesss emotional display sincere and testimony true. We conclude the court acted within its discretion in denying this motion for mistrial as well.
The trial court properly denied the motion for mistrial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.
Laningham argues the court was wrong yet again in denying his third motion for mistrial based on the prosecutors alleged misconduct in eliciting "irrelevant, highly prejudicial" evidence from the Peoples DNA expert. We find no prosecutorial misconduct and thus no ground for granting a mistrial.
The prosecutor questioned the criminalist about three semen stains found on the passenger seat of Laninghams car. Using charts prepared by the prosecutor, the criminalist explained that one of the stains contained DNA of only Laningham, another stain contained DNA of both Laningham and Ignacia, and a third stain contained DNA of Laningham and "another source." There was no further discussion of this third or "rogue" DNA stain.
The criminalists exact testimony was as follows: "And then in stain 10, which is also from the right front seat, again the sperm fraction is consistent with Laningham, and the epithelial or nonsperm fraction is a mixture. Again, Laningham cannot be excluded. However, there is another source of DNA in there."
After the criminalist finished testifying and the jury was dismissed, the defense moved for a mistrial, arguing the jury had just been told Laningham may have raped another woman. Defense counsel reasoned that the jury would be "looking for evidence of a multiple rapist," given Laningham stood accused of sexually attacking two women, and thus the jury would infer from the rogue DNA stain another rape had occurred in the car. Defense counsel also bitterly complained of being "snookered" by the prosecutor, who had agreed evidence of the rogue stain would not be included in the charts or mentioned by the criminalist. Defense counsel accused the prosecutor of misconduct in intentionally getting this irrelevant and highly prejudicial evidence before the jury.
The trial court questioned the criminalist and also heard from the prosecutor. The criminalist explained the prosecutor had asked her not to mention anything about an "unidentified female source" of DNA. She also explained the rogue DNA could have been contributed by a male. The criminalist thought her testimony concerning "another source" complied with the prosecutors request. The prosecutor, for her part, explained that the introduction of the objectionable evidence was not intentional. She mistakenly thought that because the unknown source was "XY" it was more likely male, and thus neither the chart, nor the criminalists testimony, suggested an unidentified female source.
The court impliedly found the prosecutor did not intentionally violate her agreement with defense counsel to keep undisclosed the evidence of an unidentified female source of DNA. Moreover, the court concluded the evidence of the rogue DNA was not prejudicial to the defendant. The court ruled only pure speculation supported an inference from the rogue DNA that Laningham had raped another woman in the car. The criminalist had testified the car seats were old and very dirty and there was no evidence of the age of the stains. Additionally, the jury learned of Laninghams statement to police that he had consensual sex with women in his car. Consequently, the rogue DNA could have been deposited years before and could have resulted from consensual sex. The court found no evidence to support the inference that the rogue stain had resulted from a rape. Having found neither prosecutorial misconduct nor a "highly prejudicial" introduction of irrelevant evidence, the court denied the motion for mistrial.
We find no abuse of discretion. The courts finding of no prosecutorial misconduct is certainly reasonable based on the record. A prosecutors introduction of inadmissible evidence is misconduct only if done knowingly. (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1020.) Substantial evidence supports the courts implied factual finding the prosecutor here did not knowingly introduce evidence of another female DNA source. Moreover, we agree with the trial courts conclusion that evidence of the rogue stain does not support an inference of another rape. The motion for mistrial was properly denied.
4. Laninghams claim of cumulative errors is baseless.
Finally, Laningham asserts the cumulative effect of "the numerous, highly prejudicial errors" in this case effectively deprived him of due process of law. We have found no errors. Consequently, this claim has no merit.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J. FYBEL, J.