At a discharge hearing, the court must determine whether the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. ( People v. Lang (1992), 225 Ill. App.3d 229, 234.) As in the case of criminal convictions, the State is required to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, although the trial court's determination that the State has met its burden of proof does not constitute a technical determination of guilt.

He is serving a life sentence as an habitual criminal, which was levied after his 1997 conviction for armed robbery. His appeal challenged only the sufficiency of the evidence and was unsuccessful in the Appellate Court. His Petition for Leave to Appeal was denied by the Supreme Court on February 3, 1999. He filed a timely post-conviction petition, which centered around one basic claim: that he was found unfit for trial and was not given the timely discharge hearing mandated by 725 ILCS 5/122-23 et seq., which implements the holdings of Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972) and the Donald Lang cases. See, e.g., People v. Lang, 498 N.E.2d 1105 (1986); People v. Lang, 391 N.E.2d 350 (1979); People v. Lang, 587 N.E.2d 490 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992); and Ernest Tidyman, Dummy (1974). Sutton claimed denial of due process on the grounds that he did not get the discharge hearing; the prosecution did not alert the trial court that the one-year deadline for a new hearing had arrived; the trial court did not admonish the prosecutor about the time limit for a discharge hearing; his continued institutionalization without the hearing transgressed his rights; the state court did not rule on or consider his motion for a hearing or hold a discharge hearing; the prosecution misled the court to cause it to deny dismissal of the criminal charges for failure to give the discharge hearing; and, lastly, on the ground that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on appeal.

According to defendant, the "fact that Cager was apparently the last person to see [the victim] alive is significant circumstantial evidence that Cager was involved in [the victim's] disappearance and/or murder, particularly combined with his false alibi." See, e.g., People v. Milka, 211 Ill. 2d 150, 179-83 (2004); People v. Lang, 225 Ill. App. 3d 229, 235 (1992). The evidence, however, including Vado's testimony and the cell-site activation analysis supported the conclusion that defendant and Vado, not Cager, were the last people to see the victim alive.