People v. Lamon Vann

Full title: THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAHN LAMON VANN, Defendant and…

Court: California Court of Appeals, Second District, Sixth Division

Date published: Apr 17, 2024

2d Crim. B329414 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2024)

Opinion

2d Crim. B329414

04-17-2024

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JAHN LAMON VANN, Defendant and Appellant.

Richard Lennon, Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

YEGAN, J.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Superior Court County of Ventura No. CR14658 Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

Richard Lennon, Olivia Meme, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

YEGAN, J.

Jahn Lamon Vann appeals from the trial court's denial of his petition for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.¹ He contends the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie stage because the record of conviction does not conclusively establish his ineligibility for relief. The People concede the issue. We agree with the parties and therefore reverse and remand this matter for further proceedings.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

Facts and Procedural Background ²

2 These facts are derived from the prosecution's brief in opposition to the resentencing petition.

In 1979, appellant and his accomplice, Randall Cowans, planned to rob marijuana dealer, Daniel Nack, at his home. Cowans brought a loaded .25 caliber pistol, which he brandished as he burst through Nack's front door. Appellant followed Cowans into Nack's home, which was occupied by Nack, and two other people. Cowans and appellant ordered everyone to lie down on the floor. Appellant took the pistol from Cowans to keep the victims at bay while Cowans rummaged the place for loot. Nack lunged at appellant to disarm him. A struggle ensued, and appellant fired the pistol at least twice. Nack was struck by one of the bullets and died two days later.

In 1980, a jury convicted appellant of first degree murder (§ 187, count 1) and two counts of attempted robbery. (§§ 664/211, counts 2 &3.) The jury found true the special circumstance allegation that appellant murdered Nack while he was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, or attempted commission of, a robbery. As to counts 1 through 3, the jury also found true the allegation that appellant personally used a firearm in the commission, or attempted commission of the offenses. The jury acquitted appellant of assault with intent to commit murder and found not true the allegation that he intentionally inflicted great bodily injury upon Nack during the commission of the crime.

The trial court sentenced appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for count 1 and imposed additional terms to be served concurrently for the firearm enhancement and counts 2 and 3.

We affirmed the judgment on appeal.

Petition for Resentencing

In 2022, appellant filed a form petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court appointed counsel. The prosecution filed an opposition, arguing appellant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was the actual killer. The prosecution cited portions of the transcripts from appellant's trial as well as an excerpt from a 2019 Comprehensive Risk Assessment (CRA) that was prepared for appellant's upcoming parole hearing. The excerpt included findings made by a forensic psychologist who met with appellant and conducted a non-confidential interview to assess appellant's suitability for parole. During the interview, appellant admitted he was "responsible," that Cowans had "no role" in the murder, and added, "I killed Dan."

The trial court summarily denied the petition before holding an evidentiary hearing. The trial court explained, "[i]t appears from what I'm reading that [appellant] was, in fact, the actual killer . . . and, as such, would not be eligible for the relief that he's requesting."

Discussion

Appellant contends the trial court erred when it denied his petition at the prima face stage because the CRA was not part of the record of conviction, and without its inclusion, it is reasonably probable the trial court would have found appellant made a prima facie case for relief. The People agree.

Section 1172.6

Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 1437) "to amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine . . . to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life." (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, §1, subd. (f); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).)

Senate Bill 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95, which created a procedural mechanism for those who could not be convicted under the law as amended to seek retroactive relief. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 959.) This is accomplished by the filing of a petition for resentencing. (§ 1172.6, subds. (a), (b)(1).)

When the trial court receives a petition containing the necessary information, it must evaluate the petition "'to determine whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.'" (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) It may summarily deny or dismiss the petition without a hearing "[i]f the petition and record in the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief ...." (Ibid.)

If the petitioner makes the prima facie case for relief, "the court shall issue an order to show cause" and "hold a hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder . . . conviction ...." (§ 1172.6, subds. (c), (d)(1).) At the prima facie stage, the trial court is limited to reviewing the record of conviction and may not engage in factfinding or weighing the evidence. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 972; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 720.)

Here, nothing in the petition or the record of conviction conclusively established appellant's ineligibility for relief. This is particularly true given that appellant was not the sole perpetrator and nothing in the record indicates the jury found appellant guilty as the actual killer.

Rather, it appears the trial court relied on the CRA and appellant's statements contained therein as the basis for its finding that appellant was the "actual killer." But the CRA is not part of the record of conviction and may not be considered at the prima facie stage.

On these facts, appellant may establish a prima facie showing of eligibility for sentencing relief. (See Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 970-972 [where the record of conviction does not refute the claims of eligibility in the section 1172.6 petition, petitioner has made a prima facie showing for relief].)

Because we agree reversal and remand of this matter is appropriate, we do not address appellant's alternative contentions.

Disposition

The trial court's order denying appellant's section 1172.6 petition for resentencing is reversed. The matter is remanded for the trial court to issue an order to show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing in accordance with section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(1).

We concur: GILBERT, P. J., BALTODANO, J.