¶ 67 The State argues that trial counsel's decision to pursue the instruction was strategic, even though ultimately unsuccessful, particularly given the overwhelming evidence against defendant. See People v. Edmondson, 2018 IL App (1st) 151381, ¶ 59 ("It suffices to say that any one of the available defense theories would have been a hard sell" in light of the overwhelming evidence and "[w]hich one(s) to argue was a matter best left to counsel's strategic judgment ***."); People v. Labosette, 236 Ill.App.3d 846, 856 (1992) ("Given the number of eyewitnesses to this murder, defense counsel's one viable strategy was to urge a defense in an attempt to reduce the possible conviction from first[-]degree murder to second[-]degree murder."). Moreover, the State points out, trial counsel used the testimony at issue not just to pursue a second-degree murder instruction, but also to argue in closing that defendant lacked the requisite intent for first-degree murder.

Where evidence in mitigation is presented, it is presumed that the trial court considered it absent some contrary evidence. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 862 (1992). Here, the court noted that the defendant had committed the present offense while on probation for a theft-related offense.

A trial counsel's decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion of other theories is generally considered a matter of trial strategy that will not support a claim of ineffective assistance. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 856 (1992). ¶ 49

It is well settled in Illinois that counsel's choice of jury instructions, and the decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion of others, is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846 (4th Dist. 1992); People v. Douglas, 839 N.E.2d 1039 (1st Dist. 2005). Accordingly, counsel's decision as to which jury instruction to tender can support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if that choice is objectively unreasonable.

Allegations arising from matters of judgment or trial strategy will not support a claim on ineffective assistance of counsel. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 856 (1992). The decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion of other theories is a matter of trial strategy.

¶37 An attorney's decision regarding what theory of defense to pursue is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Sims, 374 Ill. App. 3d 231, 267 (2007); People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 856 (1992). It is well-established that matters of trial strategy generally are immune from claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.

It is well settled in Illinois that counsel's choice of jury instructions, and the decision to rely on one theory of defense to the exclusion of others, is a matter of trial strategy. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 857 (1992); People v. Douglas, 362 Ill. App. 3d 65, 75 (2005). Accordingly, counsel's decision as to which jury instruction to tender can support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only if that choice is objectively unreasonable.

Absent a showing by a defendant to the contrary, the circuit court is presumed to have considered the mitigating factors presented by a defendant. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill.App.3d 846, 862, 177 Ill.Dec. 71, 602 N.E.2d 966 (1992). Here, during the sentencing hearing, the circuit court expressly stated that all of the evidence was considered.

Indeed, any rational trier of fact could have found defendant committed the murder of Sylvia in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner. See People v. Labosette, 236 Ill.App.3d 846, 860, 177 Ill.Dec. 71, 602 N.E.2d 966 (1992) (holding the evidence supported a finding of "cold," "calculated," and "premeditated" where the defendant had 17 hours to cool off and where he had threatened to kill the victim the night before the shooting).         Defendant relies upon People v. Carlson, 79 Ill.2d 564, 38 Ill.Dec. 809, 404 N.E.2d 233 (1980), and People v. Buggs, 112 Ill.2d 284, 97 Ill.Dec. 669, 493 N.E.2d 332 (1986), to support his argument that the trial court erred in finding that he was eligible for the death penalty.

This instruction has been held to cure any prejudice to the defendant because of the prosecutor's improper remarks. People v. Labosette, 236 Ill. App. 3d 846, 857, 602 N.E.2d 966, 974 (1992). The material in sections (6)(d), (6)(e), and (6)(f) is nonpublishable under Supreme Court Rule 23.