Consequently, Soto lacks standing to challenge the search. Nevertheless, Soto argues that he had standing to challenge the search because the totality of police conduct amounted to an unlawful seizure of his person under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, relying on People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 205, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981). In Kunath, this court opined, "Rakas did not deal with the question of standing to contest an unconstitutional stop."
1983). The Illinois Court of Appeals, when faced with this same issue, stated in People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 54 Ill. Dec. 621, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981): "The court in Rakas made clear . . . that it was concerned only with the search of the vehicle itself and not with the legality of the stop . . .
We find defendant's liberty was infringed when he was an occupant of a vehicle stopped by the police and therefore he has standing to challenge the stop. People v. Fullwiley, 304 Ill. App.3d 44, 49, 710 N.E.2d 491 (1999); see also People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 205, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981). Defendant contends the stop was illegal because the officer was mistaken about the vehicle's brake lights not working.
To determine whether passengers arrested for being under the influence of controlled substances had "standing" under Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 99 S.Ct. 421] to contest the stop of the car in which they were riding, the court in Lionberger sought guidance from appellate courts in Iowa, Rhode Island, and Illinois. It began by quoting People v. Kunath (1981) 99 Ill. App.3d 201 [ 425 N.E.2d 486, 489], in which the Illinois court held, "[A] passenger . . . can challenge the stopping of the vehicle since his [or her] personal liberty and freedom were intruded upon by that act. [Citations.] The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution forbid unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is clear that stopping an automobile and . . . its occupants constitutes a `seizure' of those persons. [Citations.
Thus, the decision in Rakas presumably does not mean that a mere passenger automatically lacks standing to challenge the search of a vehicle, even if the search has come about by exploitation of an infringement of his personal Fourth Amendment rights. See Lewis v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1984), 664 S.W.2d 345; People v. Kunath (1981), 99 Ill.App.3d 201 [54 Ill.Dec. 621], 425 N.E.2d 486. "At fn. 1 of our recent decision in State v. McClendon (Jan. 14, 1985), Fayette App. No. CA84-06-006, unreported, [1985 WL 8146], this court stated:
According to appellee, a passenger has standing to challenge the initial stop and where the stop is found to be illegal, the evidence seized thereafter must be suppressed. While evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop must be suppressed, Mullins v. State, 366 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979); Whitley v. State, 349 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the Second District Court of Appeal found in Kayes v. State, 409 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982), that the individual who rented and drove the car had the requisite expectation of privacy and therefore had standing to challenge the search, but the passenger did not. We believe the reasoning in People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 54 Ill.Dec. 621, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981), to be the better position. In Kunath, the court stated:
• 3 Defendant has also argued that the stopping of the car and detention of its occupants for a routine traffic offense was an unreasonable seizure of his person under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requiring suppression of evidence seized as a result thereof. ( Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391; People v. Kunath (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill.2d 580.) Although we have found defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and thus could not raise a challenge to its search, he clearly may test the reasonableness of the stop of the vehicle and his detention as it affected his personal liberty.
237 Kan. at 717-18. The cases cited were: United States v. Santia-Manriquez, 603 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 556 P.2d 784 (1976); People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981); and State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984). All but the Arizona case were decided after Rakas, and, of course, Epperson was decided after Rakas.
Parkhurst at 1374. In People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981), the court held that the defendant, as an occupant of the vehicle stopped by police, could challenge the stop of the vehicle, since it entailed an infringement of his personal freedom. See, also, State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984); State v. Beja, 451 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1984); State v. Losee, 353 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa App. 1984); State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 703 P.2d 761 (1985); State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984).
Many cases have held that a passenger has standing to challenge a search of a motor vehicle, where the motor vehicle and its passengers were improperly stopped. See, for example, United States v. Santia-Manriquez, 603 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 556 P.2d 784 (1976); People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981); and State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984). Here, without reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer decided to stop the defendants, to search the car in which they had been riding, and ultimately to search the individuals.