People v. Kunath

28 Citing cases

  1. People v. Juarbe

    318 Ill. App. 3d 1040 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001)   Cited 27 times
    In Juarbe, the defendants argued that their detention was unconstitutionally prolonged because they had to wait for approximately one hour for a canine unit to arrive on the scene.

    Consequently, Soto lacks standing to challenge the search. Nevertheless, Soto argues that he had standing to challenge the search because the totality of police conduct amounted to an unlawful seizure of his person under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, relying on People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 205, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981). In Kunath, this court opined, "Rakas did not deal with the question of standing to contest an unconstitutional stop."

  2. Lewis v. State

    664 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)   Cited 128 times
    Holding the trial court's statement that the jury would determine evidence was not sufficient for error preservation

    1983). The Illinois Court of Appeals, when faced with this same issue, stated in People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 54 Ill. Dec. 621, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981): "The court in Rakas made clear . . . that it was concerned only with the search of the vehicle itself and not with the legality of the stop . . .

  3. People v. Bunch

    327 Ill. App. 3d 979 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002)   Cited 9 times   1 Legal Analyses
    Finding police officer lacked probable cause to arrest the defendant without a warrant, stating "[s]uspicions, no matter how reasonable, do not add up to probable cause to arrest"

    We find defendant's liberty was infringed when he was an occupant of a vehicle stopped by the police and therefore he has standing to challenge the stop. People v. Fullwiley, 304 Ill. App.3d 44, 49, 710 N.E.2d 491 (1999); see also People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 205, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981). Defendant contends the stop was illegal because the officer was mistaken about the vehicle's brake lights not working.

  4. People v. Cartwright

    72 Cal.App.4th 1362 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)   Cited 57 times
    Holding that passenger in a routine traffic stop was not detained until she was told to sit on the curb, which occurred after law enforcement stopped the car, asked her the driver's name, asked her for identification, asked her if there was anything illegal in the car, and—having received her response that someone had left methamphetamine in her purse—asked for and received consent to search her purse

    To determine whether passengers arrested for being under the influence of controlled substances had "standing" under Rakas v. Illinois (1978) 439 U.S. 128 [ 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 99 S.Ct. 421] to contest the stop of the car in which they were riding, the court in Lionberger sought guidance from appellate courts in Iowa, Rhode Island, and Illinois. It began by quoting People v. Kunath (1981) 99 Ill. App.3d 201 [ 425 N.E.2d 486, 489], in which the Illinois court held, "[A] passenger . . . can challenge the stopping of the vehicle since his [or her] personal liberty and freedom were intruded upon by that act. [Citations.] The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution forbid unreasonable searches and seizures, and it is clear that stopping an automobile and . . . its occupants constitutes a `seizure' of those persons. [Citations.

  5. State v. Goodlow

    84 Ohio App. 3d 529 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)   Cited 3 times
    Distinguishing Rakas to find that passengers of vehicle, who argued that "the initial seizure of their persons was unreasonable and unconstitutional * * * had the requisite standing" to challenge subsequent search of the vehicle

    Thus, the decision in Rakas presumably does not mean that a mere passenger automatically lacks standing to challenge the search of a vehicle, even if the search has come about by exploitation of an infringement of his personal Fourth Amendment rights. See Lewis v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1984), 664 S.W.2d 345; People v. Kunath (1981), 99 Ill.App.3d 201 [54 Ill.Dec. 621], 425 N.E.2d 486. "At fn. 1 of our recent decision in State v. McClendon (Jan. 14, 1985), Fayette App. No. CA84-06-006, unreported, [1985 WL 8146], this court stated:

  6. State v. Beja

    451 So. 2d 882 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)   Cited 17 times
    In State v. Beja, 451 So.2d 882 (Fla.4th DCA 1984), cause dismissed, 469 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1985), this court held that before an officer can stop an individual, he must have a founded suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime.

    According to appellee, a passenger has standing to challenge the initial stop and where the stop is found to be illegal, the evidence seized thereafter must be suppressed. While evidence seized as a result of an illegal stop must be suppressed, Mullins v. State, 366 So.2d 1162 (Fla. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979); Whitley v. State, 349 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), the Second District Court of Appeal found in Kayes v. State, 409 So.2d 1075 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 424 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1982), that the individual who rented and drove the car had the requisite expectation of privacy and therefore had standing to challenge the search, but the passenger did not. We believe the reasoning in People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 54 Ill.Dec. 621, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981), to be the better position. In Kunath, the court stated:

  7. People v. Flowers

    111 Ill. App. 3d 348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982)   Cited 20 times
    Finding reasonable basis for stopping car when brake lights were not operating and for arresting driver for failing to produce license

    • 3 Defendant has also argued that the stopping of the car and detention of its occupants for a routine traffic offense was an unreasonable seizure of his person under the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution requiring suppression of evidence seized as a result thereof. ( Delaware v. Prouse (1979), 440 U.S. 648, 59 L.Ed.2d 660, 99 S.Ct. 1391; People v. Kunath (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486, appeal denied (1981), 85 Ill.2d 580.) Although we have found defendant did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the car and thus could not raise a challenge to its search, he clearly may test the reasonableness of the stop of the vehicle and his detention as it affected his personal liberty.

  8. State v. Hodges

    252 Kan. 989 (Kan. 1993)   Cited 12 times
    In Hodges, a Riley County police officer had been assigned to the surveillance of a Manhattan business district which had been burglarized.

    237 Kan. at 717-18. The cases cited were: United States v. Santia-Manriquez, 603 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 556 P.2d 784 (1976); People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981); and State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984). All but the Arizona case were decided after Rakas, and, of course, Epperson was decided after Rakas.

  9. State v. Harms

    233 Neb. 882 (Neb. 1989)   Cited 16 times
    Noting agreements to waive child support are against public policy and are ineffective

    Parkhurst at 1374. In People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981), the court held that the defendant, as an occupant of the vehicle stopped by police, could challenge the stop of the vehicle, since it entailed an infringement of his personal freedom. See, also, State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho 405, 679 P.2d 1123 (1984); State v. Beja, 451 So.2d 882 (Fla. App. 1984); State v. Losee, 353 N.W.2d 876 (Iowa App. 1984); State v. Epperson, 237 Kan. 707, 703 P.2d 761 (1985); State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984).

  10. State v. Epperson

    237 Kan. 707 (Kan. 1985)   Cited 88 times
    Concluding under a Fourth Amendment analysis that officer unlawfully detained defendant when officer called out to him to wait as he walked away from his car, he stopped walking in response, and officer immediately began asking general questions about his reasons for being in the area

    Many cases have held that a passenger has standing to challenge a search of a motor vehicle, where the motor vehicle and its passengers were improperly stopped. See, for example, United States v. Santia-Manriquez, 603 F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Hocker, 113 Ariz. 450, 556 P.2d 784 (1976); People v. Kunath, 99 Ill. App.3d 201, 425 N.E.2d 486 (1981); and State v. Scott, 59 Or. App. 220, 650 P.2d 985 (1982), appeal after remand 68 Or. App. 386, 681 P.2d 1188 (1984). Here, without reasonable or articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the officer decided to stop the defendants, to search the car in which they had been riding, and ultimately to search the individuals.