Opinion
H050817
09-18-2024
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 21JV45266A)
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, ACTING P. J.
I. INTRODUCTION
In May 2022, the juvenile court adjudged the minor, K.U., a ward of the court after the minor admitted an allegation of forcible rape. The juvenile court returned the minor to the custody of his parents on probation.
In February 2023, the minor moved the juvenile court to dismiss the earlier wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. The juvenile court ordered the minor's probation dismissed and sealed the record regarding the petition, but it denied the motion to dismiss the petition.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
The minor asserts that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the motion by failing to assign proper weight to evidence of mitigating circumstances in his case. For the reasons stated below, we will affirm the juvenile court's order denying the motion to dismiss the petition.
II. BACKGROUND
According to a probation officer's report taken from police records, the minor forcibly raped a 15-year-old victim in her bedroom after she invited him over to help her with a school project. During the rape, the victim physically tried to resist the minor, repeatedly told him no, and cried. When a friend of the victim confronted the minor, the minor made videos apologizing for his actions. The minor was 17 years old at the time of his actions.
A juvenile wardship petition alleged two counts: forcible rape of a victim 14 years of age or older (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2)) and forcible sexual penetration of a victim 14 years of age or older (id., § 289, subd. (a)(1)(C)). Pursuant to a plea agreement, the minor admitted the forcible rape allegation and the remaining count was dismissed. In May 2022, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a ward of the court and returned the minor to the custody of his parents on probation, imposing several conditions on the minor.
Section 782 provides that the juvenile court may dismiss a petition "if the court finds that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition require that dismissal, or if it finds that they are not in need of treatment or rehabilitation." (Id., subd. (a)(1).) Effective January 1, 2023, Assembly Bill No. 2629 (2022-2023 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 2629) amended section 782 to provide that when exercising its discretion to dismiss a petition: "[T]he court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence offered by a person to prove mitigating circumstances are present, including, but not limited to, satisfactory completion of a term of probation, that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of the court, that dismissal of the petition would not endanger public safety, or that the underlying offense is connected to mental illness, prior victimization, or childhood trauma. Proof of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition." (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(A), as amended by Stats. 2022, ch. 970, § 1, subd. (a)(2)(A).)
In February 2023, the minor moved the juvenile court to dismiss the petition pursuant to amended section 782. The minor also asked the court to seal the records from his proceedings pursuant to section 786. The minor's motion cited a probation officer's report that recommended the minor's probation be terminated, stating that the minor had performed well academically, had maintained employment and appropriate behavior at home, and was engaged in a treatment program, among other considerations. Noting the recent amendments to section 782, the minor argued that the statute "creates a rebuttable presumption that dismissal 'is in the furtherance of justice (and that its dismissal is required)' once a mitigating circumstance has been demonstrated." The minor asserted: "Unless it is likely that doing so 'would result in physical injury or other serious danger to others,' the presence of a mitigating factor warrants dismissal. [Citation.]" The minor contended that he provided evidence of two mitigating circumstances: his satisfactory completion of probation programs including sex behavioral therapy, and his performance in the community including his academic performance and maintenance of employment.
In relevant part, this provision states: "If a person who has been alleged to be a ward of the juvenile court has their petition dismissed by the court, . . . the court shall order sealed all records pertaining to the dismissed petition in the custody of the juvenile court, and in the custody of law enforcement agencies, the probation department, or the Department of Justice." (§ 786, subd. (e).)
The People did not object to sealing the minor's records pursuant to section 781,but objected to dismissing the petition under section 782. The People's opposition asserted that while amended section 782 requires the juvenile court to consider and afford great weight to evidence offered to prove mitigating circumstances are present, "[t]he presence of mitigating circumstances . . . do[es] not mandate dismissal" and other factors "may weigh against dismissal under . . . section 782." The People asserted that dismissing the petition in the instant matter was not appropriate because doing so would undermine public safety.
Section 781 provides in relevant part that a request to seal the record relating to an offense listed in section 707, subdivision (b) that was committed after attaining 14 years of age and that resulted in adjudication of wardship may be filed when "[t]he person was not committed to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities, has attained 18 years of age, and has completed any period of probation supervision related to that offense imposed by the court." (§ 781, subd. (a)(1)(D)(i), (a)(1)(D)(i)(II).)
In a hearing on the minor's motion, the victim presented a statement, detailing the trauma she experienced from the rape. The juvenile court then ruled on the motion, noting that under amended section 782, the question before it was whether dismissing the petition was in the interests of justice. The juvenile court stated that the phrase "great weight" in section 782 had not been defined. The juvenile court noted that in the context of a motion to dismiss a sentencing enhancement pursuant to Penal Code section 1385- which also requires a trial court to "consider and afford great weight" to evidence of mitigating circumstances (id., subd. (c)(2))-one Court of Appeal had held that the presence of one or mitigating circumstances creates a rebuttable presumption that dismissal of an enhancement is warranted. However, the juvenile court noted that in People v. Ortiz (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 1087 (Ortiz), this court held that Penal Code section 1385 does not create a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing an enhancement when mitigating circumstances exist. The juvenile court stated that it considered the evidence of mitigating circumstances set forth by the minor, along with the interests of the People: the "interest of society" including maintaining a strike that the plea agreement in this matter provided for, the "nature and circumstances of the current offense," and "the statements made by the victim this afternoon." The juvenile court then stated: "On balance, the Court -- on balancing these different factors, the Court is denying the request to dismiss the petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 782. The analysis the Court has undergone today is that that is called upon to be conducted when there is a request to dismiss in the interest of justice or furtherance of justice. [¶] The Court did want to recognize specifically that it agrees with People v. Ortiz where essentially giving great weight to a factor does not mean it is conclusively [sic]. The Court is just called upon to give it its due weight, its great weight, in balancing ultimately whether to exercise discretion or not." Therefore, the juvenile court denied the minor's motion to dismiss the petition. However, the juvenile court sealed the records regarding the offense pursuant to section 781, and it dismissed the minor's probation.
This appeal followed.
III. DISCUSSION
"A section 782 dismissal is . . . subject to review for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] If the juvenile court's action is arbitrary, or does not comport with section 782's requirements that the dismissal serve the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor, it can be reversed on appeal as an abuse of discretion." (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 413-414 (Greg F.).) "The abuse of discretion standard of review 'asks in substance whether the ruling in question "falls outside the bounds of reason" under the applicable law and the relevant facts.' [Citation.] We '" 'indulge all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court and will not disturb its findings when there is substantial evidence to support them.'" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (In re Tony R. (2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 395, 414 (Tony R.).)
The minor argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion by not applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing the petition, as he argued is appropriate in the Penal Code section 1385 context. The Attorney General counters that the juvenile court correctly relied on Ortiz to give evidence of mitigating circumstances great weight without applying a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal. In reply, the minor acknowledges that the comparison between section 782 and Penal Code section 1385 "is not a perfect analogy," but he asserts that case law interpreting Penal Code section 1385 is relevant to the instant appeal because "Penal Code section 1385 is the closest analogous statute in the adult criminal system."
While this appeal was pending, the California Supreme Court issued its decision in People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024 (Walker), resolving the split between the Courts of Appeal concerning the correct standard in a Penal Code section 1385 motion to dismiss an enhancement. Our Supreme Court adopted Ortiz's position, stating: "We conclude that the plain language of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) contemplates that a trial court will exercise its sentencing discretion in a manner consistent with the Ortiz court's understanding. Specifically, absent a finding that dismissal would endanger public safety, a court retains the discretion to impose or dismiss enhancements provided that it assigns significant value to the enumerated mitigating circumstances when they are present. (See Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098....) In other words, if the court does not find that dismissal would endanger public safety, the presence of an enumerated mitigating circumstance will generally result in the dismissal of an enhancement unless the sentencing court finds substantial, credible evidence of countervailing factors that 'may nonetheless neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance, such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of justice.' (Ibid.)" (Walker, supra, at p. 1029.)
Because the minor's opening brief relied on the analogy between a Penal Code section 1385 motion to dismiss an enhancement and a section 782 motion to dismiss a juvenile wardship petition, we requested supplemental briefing addressing the impact of the California Supreme Court's decision in Walker on the minor's position. The Attorney General asserts that because Walker "reaffirmed" the interpretation of Penal Code section 1385 set forth in Ortiz, Walker "foreclose[es] any avenue of relief for appellant in the denial of his motion for resentencing." The Attorney General observes that section 782 and Penal Code section 1385 contain "a nearly identical phrase" requiring the court to consider and afford great weight to evidence of mitigating circumstances, and that despite any difference in the language between the two statutes, Walker's adoption of the Ortiz approach "appears to place the level of discretion on par for both situations." The minor recognizes that the California Supreme Court's analysis in Walker should "guide" this court's interpretation of the" 'great weight'" and" 'weighs greatly in favor of'" language in amended section 782. However, the minor argues: "That the California Supreme Court adopted the interpretation of the amended language in Penal Code section 1385 set forth by this Court in Ortiz[] does not end the analysis here given that Welfare and Institutions section 782 is a distinct dismissal statute operating in the context of juvenile law." The minor further asserts that even if this court concludes pursuant to Walker that section 782 does not require a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal where mitigating circumstances exist, the juvenile court erred by not granting sufficient weight to the evidence of mitigating circumstances in his case.
We agree with the minor that juvenile delinquency proceedings are different in some respects from adult criminal proceedings. "Although juvenile delinquency proceedings have been called 'quasi-criminal' [citation], we have also observed that they are' "fundamentally different" from adult criminal proceedings' and require 'that a "balance" be struck between the "informality" and "flexibility"' necessary in juvenile proceedings and attention to the juvenile's constitutional rights. [Citation.]" (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 403.) "In contrast to the more punitive aims of the adult criminal justice system, 'the purpose of the juvenile justice system is "(1) to serve the 'best interests' of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and 'enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and community,' and (2) to 'provide for the protection and safety of the public ....' [Citations.]" [Citation.]' [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 417.)
Despite these differences, we conclude in reliance on our Supreme Court's decision in Walker that section 782 does not require a juvenile court to apply a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing a petition based on the presence of specified mitigating circumstances. The California Supreme Court in Walker stated that the "plain text" of Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) "belies" the reading that the statute requires a trial court to rebuttably presume that where one or more specified mitigating circumstances are present, dismissal of an enhancement is in the furtherance of justice and therefore dismissal is required. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) Our Supreme Court stated: "The second sentence of section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) provides that '[p]roof of the presence of one or more of these circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety.' . . . If the Legislature envisioned a rebuttable presumption, it could have said so by expressly saying that the presence of a mitigating circumstances 'creates a presumption in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless ....' [Citations.] It did not." (Ibid.) The California Supreme Court noted that Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2) states that a trial court shall dismiss an enhancement" 'if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so,'" and that under the statute, the trial court shall consider and afford great weight to evidence of specified mitigating circumstances" '[i]n exercising its discretion under this subdivision ....'" (Walker, supra, at p. 1032.) Thus, our Supreme Court stated: "Looking at subparagraph (2) of subdivision (c) sequentially, it is clear that the structure does not 'presume' [citation] an enhancement should be dismissed whenever an enumerated mitigating circumstance is present, but instead 'the ultimate question before the trial court remains whether it is in the furtherance of justice to dismiss an enhancement' (Ortiz, supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p. 1098. . .) and this 'furtherance of justice' [citation] inquiry requires a trial court's ongoing exercise of 'discretion' [citation]. Thus, notwithstanding the presence of a mitigating circumstance, trial courts retain their discretion to impose an enhancement based on circumstances 'long deemed essential to the "furtherance of justice" inquiry.' [Citations.]" (Id. at p. 1033.)
Section 782, subdivision (a) contains language nearly identical to that in Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), and thus our Supreme Court's decision in Walker establishes that a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing the petition does not apply in the instant case. The operative language in the two statutes is substantively indistinguishable. Section 782 provides that "[w]hen exercising its discretion" to dismiss a petition, the juvenile court "shall consider and afford great weight" to evidence of specified mitigating circumstances, and that "[p]roof of the presence of one or more mitigating circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the petition." (Id., subd. (a)(2)(A).) Similarly, Penal Code section 1385 states that "[i]n exercising its discretion" to dismiss an enhancement, the trial court "shall consider and afford great weight" to evidence of specified mitigating circumstances, and that "[p]roof of the presence of one or more [mitigating] circumstances weighs greatly in favor of dismissing the enhancement, unless the court finds that dismissal of the enhancement would endanger public safety." (Id., subd. (c)(2).) Thus, the "plain text" of section 782 "belies" the minor's argument that the juvenile court must rebuttably presume that where one or more specified mitigating circumstances are present, dismissal of the petition is in the interests of justice and therefore dismissal is required. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1033.) In addition, section 782 specifies that certain terms in the statute, including" 'endanger public safety,'" have the same meanings as those terms in Penal Code section 1385. (§ 782, subd. (a)(2)(D).) Thus, the plain text of section 782 demonstrates that similar standards apply to both Penal Code section 1385 and section 782 determinations, and that the holding in Walker provides helpful guidance in interpreting section 782.
We note that Penal Code section 1385 states that a trial court "shall" dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do so, while section 782 states that the juvenile court "may" dismiss a petition if the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor require that dismissal. (Pen. Code, § 1385, subd. (c)(1); § 782, subd. (a)(1).)
Beyond the plain language of section 782, subdivision (a), the legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629 supports the conclusion that a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal does not apply in the instant situation. As the minor acknowledges in his opening brief, an earlier version of the bill stated that in exercising a juvenile court's discretion to dismiss a petition, "there shall be a presumption that the interests of justice and the welfare of the person who is the subject of the petition favor that dismissal. This presumption shall not be overcome unless there is clear and convincing evidence that dismissal of the petition would endanger public safety." (Assem. Bill. No. 2629 (20212022 Reg. Sess.) § 1, subd. (a)(2)(A) as introduced Mar. 24, 2022.) This version of the bill was later replaced with the "consider and afford great weight" language, demonstrating that the Legislature decided against a rebuttable presumption that would favor dismissing a petition when specified mitigating circumstances are present. The California Supreme Court in Walker noted a similar development in the legislative history leading to the amendments to Penal Code section 1385, and the court stated that this legislative history supported the conclusion that a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissal does not apply. (Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 1034.) Thus, the legislative history of Assembly Bill 2629 supports the conclusion that an approach consistent with Walker and Ortiz is applicable to section 782 determinations.
The types of proceedings in which section 782 and Penal Code section 1385 operate-juvenile versus adult criminal proceedings-serve somewhat different purposes. However, this does not mean section 782 should be interpreted differently from Penal Code section 1385. "Section 782, like Penal Code section 1385, is a general dismissal statute," and once a juvenile court determines in its discretion that dismissal of a petition is warranted, "such a dismissal is intended to erase a prior adjudication-not merely reduce or mitigate it-and to thereby protect the person from any and all future adverse consequences based on that adjudication. [Citations.]" (In re David T. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 866, 877, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in In re Taylor C. (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 492, 498.) Here, the minor moved to dismiss an entire petition-one that established a strike-rather than a sentence enhancement. As the Court of Appeal stated in In re J.P. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 74, 79 (J.P.) when interpreting prior versions of section 782 and Penal Code section 1385, "Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 typically functions similarly to Penal Code section 1385." Thus, the court in J.P. rejected an argument that section 782 did not permit a juvenile court to dismiss parts of a petition without dismissing the entire petition, noting that any differences between the two statutes "do not mean we must read Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 more narrowly than we read similar language in Penal Code section 1385." (J.P., supra, at p. 80.) The J.P. court stated: "To the contrary, the additional considerations required under Welfare and Institutions Code section 782 arguably grant juvenile courts even more discretion than Penal Code section 1385 grants adult criminal courts." (Ibid.) Juvenile courts are generally understood to possess considerable discretion in matters such as dismissing a juvenile wardship petition. "The statutory scheme governing juvenile delinquency is designed to give the court 'maximum flexibility to craft suitable orders aimed at rehabilitating the particular ward before it.' [Citation.] Flexibility is the hallmark of juvenile court law, in both delinquency and dependency interventions. [Citation.] As noted, the juvenile court has long enjoyed great discretion in the disposition of juvenile matters [citation], and that discretion is codified in section 782." (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 411.) Consistent with this rationale, we see nothing about the differences between the types of proceedings in which the two statutes apply that would call for a different interpretation of section 782 from our Supreme Court's interpretation in Walker of Penal Code section 1385.
Because the juvenile court correctly determined that section 782 does not require a rebuttable presumption in favor of dismissing a petition, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the minor's motion to dismiss the petition. The minor argues in supplemental briefing that the juvenile court failed to give proper weight to evidence of his mitigating circumstances even under the Ortiz test that the California Supreme Court approved in Walker. However, the juvenile court specifically stated that it was adopting the Ortiz approach by giving great weight to the evidence of the minor's mitigating circumstances without necessarily giving those circumstances conclusive effect. The juvenile court weighed the mitigating circumstances by discussing the minor's completion of therapy, his acceptance of responsibility, his continuing education efforts, and his lack of new violations. The juvenile court stated that it "has given this information its due weight." Later, the juvenile court stated that it recognized its responsibility to give the evidence of mitigating circumstances "its due weight, its great weight, in balancing ultimately whether to exercise discretion or not." The juvenile court reasonably determined that based on the interests of society, the nature and circumstances of the minor's offense, and the victim's statement that dismissal was not in the interests of justice. The juvenile court's ruling is not "arbitrary," and it "comport[s] with section 782's requirements that the dismissal serve the interests of justice and the welfare of the minor . . . ." (Greg F., supra, 55 Cal.4th at pp. 413-414.) Indulging in" '" 'all reasonable inferences to support the decision of the juvenile court,'" '" substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's findings. (Tony R., supra, 98 Cal.App.5th at p. 414.) Thus, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to dismiss the petition.
IV. DISPOSITION
The juvenile court's order denying the minor's motion to dismiss the petition is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: GROVER, J. LIE, J.