People v. Kronberg

23 Citing cases

  1. People v. Wolf

    98 N.Y.2d 105 (N.Y. 2002)   Cited 50 times
    In People v. Wolf, 98 N.Y.2d 105, 110, 772 N.E.2d 1124, 1127, 745 N.Y.S.2d 766, 769 (2002), the New York Court of Appeals stated that "the felony commercial bribery legislation requires proof of concrete economic loss suffered by the bribe receiver's employer, which would not have been incurred in the absence of the corrupt arrangement."

    Assuming without deciding that this wasRosario material, reversal is not warranted. The Rosario objection was raised for the first time in a motion to set aside the verdict brought purportedly under CPL 330.30(1). The factual assertions concerning this material were outside the record and for that reason could not be considered in a CPL 330.30(1) motion (see People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 135, 152, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880; People v. Herrington, 194 A.D.2d 379, 380, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 755). Therefore, we agree with the Appellate Division that the application was "at best a de facto CPL 440.10 motion" ( 284 A.D.2d at 104).

  2. People v. Santorelli

    95 N.Y.2d 412 (N.Y. 2000)   Cited 105 times   3 Legal Analyses
    Holding that district attorney did not violate Brady obligations by failing to turn over FBI 302s because the reports were not in the actual possession of the district attorney, the federal authorities refused to allow the district attorney access to the reports, and the trial court made a finding that the federal and state investigators acted independently

    As in the Brady context, the People cannot be charged with failure to disclose materials they themselves could not obtain from law enforcement officers answerable to another sovereign (see, People v Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 152 [no duty to turn over FBI 302 reports where "New York prosecutors were repeatedly rebuffed in their efforts to obtain the reports"]; People v Leo, 249 A.D.2d 251, 252 [no evidence of joint investigation and the People were not in control of federal file], lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 900; United States v Bermudez, 526 F.2d 89, 100 n9 [Jencks Act], cert denied 425 U.S. 970; contrast, People v Rutter, 202 A.D.2d 123, 131 [prosecutor was "afforded unfettered access" to documents generated by out-of-state police investigation], lv dismissed 85 N.Y.2d 866). People v DaGata ( 86 N.Y.2d 40) — concerned with the disclosure requirements of CPL 240.20(1)(c) — does not compel a different result. In DaGata, defendant sought notes the FBI used in preparing a scientific report for the District Attorney.

  3. People v. Thomas

    71 A.D.3d 1061 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010)   Cited 10 times

    The defendant contends that he was deprived of his right to due process, as required by People v Rosario ( 9 NY2d 286, cert denied 368 US 866), by the prosecutor's failure to produce a report of an interview of the complainant by New York City Police Detective Daniel Perez and the memo-book entries of the two police officers who transported the complainant to a showup identification. The defendant's Rosario objections were raised for the first time in a motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1). Since the factual assertions concerning this undisclosed material were based on matter outside of the record, the Supreme Court properly declined to consider them on the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1) ( see People v Ai Jiang, 62 AD3d 515; People v Kronberg, 243 AD2d 132, 135; People v Leka, 209 AD2d 723). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 330.30 (1) asserting Rosario violations ( see CPL 330.40 [e] [i]; People v Thomas, 55 AD3d 357; see also People v Herrington, 194 AD2d 379).

  4. People v. Ventura

    298 A.D.2d 172 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 1 times

    Defendant was not deprived of a fair suppression hearing by the court's denial of his request for the desk sergeant's log book and the request for analysis for the drugs seized from his accomplice. While defendant claimed these documents contained Rosario material, he did not establish that these documents recorded any statements by the testifying officer that were related to the subject matter of his testimony (see People v. Johnson, 286 A.D.2d 641, lv denied 97 N.Y.2d 683; People v. Kornberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 153, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 882). The court's questioning of the People's witness merely expedited the hearing and did not unduly prejudice defendant (see People v. West, 210 A.D.2d 147, lv denied 85 N.Y.2d 944), and it properly exercised its discretion in imposing reasonable limits on cross-examination by precluding matters beyond the scope of the direct testimony and collateral to the subject of the hearing (see People v. Perciballi, 291 A.D.2d 360, lv denied 98 N.Y.2d 654). THIS CONSTITUTES THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION, FIRST DEPARTMENT.

  5. People v. Villegas

    298 A.D.2d 122 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002)   Cited 5 times

    20; People v. Arroyo, 54 N.Y.2d 567, cert denied 456 U.S. 979). Since defendant's motions, made at the time of sentencing, to set aside the verdict on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel were based on factual assertions outside the record, these motions constituted, at best, motions to vacate judgment pursuant to CPL 440.10 (see People v. Wolf, 98 N.Y.2d 105, 119; People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 135, 152, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880), and since defendant failed to obtain permission from this Court to appeal, the issues raised in his motions are unreviewable (CPL 460.15). In any event, were we to consider these motions as having been made pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), we would find that they were properly denied since that type of motion is limited to grounds appearing in the record.

  6. People v. Johnson

    286 A.D.2d 641 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 2 times

    Before: Nardelli, J.P., Williams, Tom, Andrias, Marlow, JJ. Defendant has not established a violation of People v. Rosario ( 9 N.Y.2d 286). The record does not support defendant's claim that the log book kept by an intake clerk in the police ballistics section contained the recorded statements of the arresting officer, or that such statements, if any, related to the subject matter of his testimony (see,People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 153, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880; see also, People v. Watkins, 157 A.D.2d 301). In any event, even if we were to find that there was a Rosario violation, we would find that there was no reasonable possibility that nondisclosure of the log book entry materially contributed to the result of the trial (CPL 240.75).

  7. People v. Wolf

    284 A.D.2d 102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 11 times

    Moreover, a showing of prejudice would have been required regardless of the new enactment. Since the alleged error was not one "appearing in the record," defendant's motion was improperly brought pursuant to CPL 330.30(1), and was, at best, a de facto CPL 440.10 motion (see, People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 135, 152, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880; People v. Herrington, 194 A.D.2d 379, lv denied 82 N.Y.2d 755). Accordingly, it would be necessary for defendant to demonstrate prejudice (see, People v. Machado, 90 N.Y.2d 187, 192).

  8. People v. Wilson

    283 A.D.2d 339 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 15 times

    Thus, it is not a real "pistol" within the meaning of the statute, but is a "imitation pistol" because, as the court charged without objection, it "so resemble[d] a real pistol that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed it to have been real." Defendant's contention that certain medical records of the complainant purportedly constituting Brady material (Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83) were improperly withheld is dehors the trial record and should have been raised as a CPL 440.10 motion (see, People v. Love, 57 N.Y.2d 998; see also, People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 152, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 882). The absence of these records prevents this Court from determining whether they were exculpatory, and, if so, whether they could have affected the verdict. To the extent the existing record permits review, we find that these records could not have affected the verdict.

  9. People v. Button

    276 A.D.2d 229 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 3 times

    Here, defendant's right to Rosario material is in direct conflict with the FBI's right to refuse to produce the material. The Court of Appeals has held that, where there is no joint investigation and the People "did not possess or control — actually or constructively — the additional materials defendant sought", the People had no duty to disclose those materials ( see, People v. Santorelli, 95 N.Y.2d 412 [decided Oct. 26, 2000]; see also, People v. Leo, 249 A.D.2d 251, 252, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 900; People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, 152, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880). The Court wrote: "The duty to disclose information in those circumstances, of course, cannot be greater than the power to acquire it" ( People v. Santorelli, supra). Where, as here, the investigation is a joint investigation, with cooperation between Federal and State law enforcement agencies, a different analysis is required.

  10. People v. Kronberg

    277 A.D.2d 182 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000)   Cited 10 times

    The verdict acquitting defendants of conspiracy in the fifth degree and convicting them of scheme to defraud in the first degree was not repugnant, and the court properly denied defendants' objection to the verdict made on that basis. The fact pattern is outlined in our prior decision in this case (People v. Kronberg, 243 A.D.2d 132, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 880). Contrary to defendants' argument, the theory that defendants acted in concert was not identical to conspiracy (see, People v. McGee, 49 N.Y.2d 48, cert denied 446 U.S. 942). As the court instructed the jury, the crime of conspiracy included elements not present in scheme to defraud, and these instructions provided the jury with various bases, logical or otherwise, upon which it could have reached its verdict, including, inter alia, that defendants acted in concert without forming an agreement to do so (see, People v. Lurcock, 219 A.D.2d 797, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 881; People v. Kellogg, 210 A.D.2d 912, 913, lv denied 88 N.Y.2d 881), or that each defendant acted alone. It is settled law that repugnancy is analyzed solely on the basis of the court's instructions, and not on whether a reasonable view of the evidence supported the mixed verdict (People v. Tucker, 55 N.Y.2d 1). Defendant Kronberg was not deprived of her right to a speedy trial.