Opinion
4-23-0514 4-23-0515 4-23-0516
11-03-2023
In re C.C., T.V., and R.V., Minors The People of the State of Illinois, Petitioner-Appellee, v. Kristopher V., Respondent-Appellant.
This Order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Hancock County Nos. 19JA34 19JA35 20JA6 Honorable Rodney G. Clark, Judge Presiding.
JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Turner and Harris concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
CAVANAGH, JUSTICE
¶ 1 Held: The appellate court granted appellate counsel's motion to withdraw and affirmed the trial court's judgment terminating respondent's parental rights, concluding no meritorious issues could be raised on appeal.
¶ 2 On May 18, 2023, the trial court entered an order terminating the parental rights of respondent, Kristopher V., as to his minor children C.C. (born in 2017), T.V. (born in 2018), and R.V. (born in 2020). Respondent appealed and counsel was appointed to represent him. Appellate counsel now moves to withdraw, citing Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), on the basis that she cannot raise any potentially meritorious arguments on appeal. The record indicates counsel sent a copy of her motion and accompanying memorandum of law to respondent by mail. Respondent has not filed a response. After reviewing the record and counsel's memorandum, we grant the motion to withdraw and affirm the court's judgment.
¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND
¶ 4 A. Case Opening
¶ 5 On October 2, 2019, the State filed petitions seeking to adjudicate C.C. and T.V. neglected under the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2018)). That same day, the trial court entered an order granting temporary custody and guardianship with the Illinois Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS).
¶ 6 The State then filed amended petitions on January 22, 2020, alleging the minors were neglected based on their injurious environment due to (1) instances of domestic violence between respondent and Brooklyn C., who is not a party to this appeal; (2) Brooklyn C.'s failure to adequately supervise the minors' half-sibling, who is not subject to this appeal, by failing to pick him up from school on September 26, 2019; and (3) respondent was convicted of battery on March 1, 2018, for striking Brooklyn C. "multiple times about her body." That same day, respondent admitted the allegations in the amended petition. The trial court adjudicated the minors neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). The court made the minors wards of the court and continued their guardianship and custody with DCFS.
¶ 7 On February 18, 2020, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship in Adams County case No. 20-JA-24 regarding R.V., who was born during the pendency of C.C.'s and T.V.'s cases. That same day, the trial court entered an order granting temporary custody and guardianship with DCFS. The State again filed an amended petition on March 5, 2020, which alleged R.V. was in an environment injurious to her welfare in that (1) respondent's two older children were not in his care and respondent has "made little progress in having [his] older *** children returned to [him]" and (2) during her pregnancy with R.V., Brooklyn C. tested positive for amphetamines. The case was transferred to Hancock County on June 16, 2020. Respondent admitted the allegations in the amended petition on September 17, 2020, and the court adjudicated R.V. neglected pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2020)). The court made R.V. a ward of the court and continued her guardianship and custody with DCFS.
¶ 8 On June 21, 2022, the trial court changed the permanency goal to substitute care pending termination of respondent's parental rights. That same day, the State filed petitions to terminate respondent's parental rights regarding C.C., T.V., and R.V. The petitions alleged respondent was an unfit parent in that (1) he failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis for the minors removal from his care during a nine-month period after the minors were adjudicated neglected, namely, the periods of December 16, 2020, to September 15, 2021, and September 16, 2021, to June 15, 2022 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(i) (West 2022)); (2) he failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to his care during a nine-month period after the minors were adjudicated neglected, namely, the period of December 16, 2020, to September 15, 2021, and September 16, 2021, to June 15, 2022 (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)); and (3) he failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the minors' welfare (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(b) (West 2022)).
¶ 9 B. Fitness Hearing
¶ 10 In January 2023, the trial court held a hearing on the State's petition. Adam Adrian testified he was the minors' caseworker from October 2020 until April 2022. The service plan dated March 9, 2021, evaluated respondent's progress regarding his required services during the period from September 2020 to March 2021. During that time, respondent was rated unsatisfactory in the areas of domestic violence services, mental health services, employment, and cooperation with the agency. While respondent completed a substance abuse assessment on March 5, 2021, and no further treatment was recommended, there were concerns that respondent was not truthful during the assessment. Adrian indicated he attempted to get respondent engaged in domestic violence services by providing respondent with phone numbers and making phone calls to service providers on respondent's behalf. According to Adrian, respondent would have been required to pay for domestic violence classes.
¶ 11 Bethany Greenwood testified she had been the minors' caseworker since April 2022. Greenwood indicated from April 2022 until June 15, 2022, respondent was not engaged in any services. Moreover, Greenwood was unable to verify whether respondent was employed during that time.
¶ 12 Brooklyn C. testified to unreported incidents of domestic violence between December 2020 and June 2022. At the time of the hearing, Brooklyn C. indicated there was a no contact order in place due to respondent "chasing [her] off the road."
¶ 13 Respondent testified he was "under the impression" that his employment had been verified with Adrian, because his "pay stubs were mailed to [his] house while [he] was gone." Regarding domestic violence services, respondent did not believe he had completed any services. Respondent further acknowledged that completing domestic violences services was a required task in his service plan.
¶ 14 On January 30, 2023, the trial court entered a written order finding respondent unfit for failure to make both reasonable progress and reasonable efforts during the time periods of December 16, 2020, to September 15, 2021, and September 16, 2021, to June 15, 2022. The court specifically noted respondent's failure to engage in domestic violence services.
¶ 15 C. Best Interests Hearing
¶ 16 The trial court conducted the best interests hearing on April 25, 2023. At the time of the hearing, C.C. was five years old, T.V. was four years old, and R.V. was three years old. The best interest report was admitted without objection. The report noted the minors had been placed with their maternal step-grandparents since the case openings. The foster parents ensured the minors' physical and emotional needs were met. The authors of the best interests report observed the minors were well bonded to foster parents Collin C. and Tina C.
¶ 17 Greenwood testified C.C. and T.V. had been in foster care since September 30, 2019, and R.V. had been in foster care since February 14, 2020. She opined respondent was unable to "provide for the physical safety and welfare" of the minors. Greenwood testified that respondent was currently living with his girlfriend. While Greenwood was unable to provide an assessment of respondent's home, she spoke with a DCFS investigator, who reported "the home did appear appropriate."
¶ 18 Regarding foster parents Collin and Tina, Greenwood stated she had no concerns about their ability to provide for the minors' physical safety and welfare. Greenwood indicated Collin and Tina's home was clean and appropriate. The minors felt loved and valued by Collin and Tina, and the minors sought them out when "they are needing something. They're not afraid to ask for help." Greenwood noted on one occasion during a scheduled visitation, T.V. "expressed that she wanted to go to grandma's on *** two or three occasions," and when "Tina and Collin showed up after the visit ended, the children were very happy to see them." In Greenwood's opinion, Collin and Tina's home would be the least disruptive placement for the minors.
¶ 19 Lori Waddell testified she was the court appointed special advocate volunteer assigned to the case. In her opinion, Collin and Tina's home was the least disruptive placement for the minors. On cross-examination, Waddell noted, during respondent's visits with the minors, "There were times that he would sleep during the visit; he would cover up with a sheet while the kids were there."
¶ 20 Tina testified C.C. and T.V. had been in her care since 2019 and R.V. had been in her care since R.V.'s birth. For the past three and a half years, Tina had been a stay-at-home mother in order to best tend to the minors' needs. She indicated once R.V. is old enough to enroll in school, she intended to seek remote employment. Further, Tina testified she and Collin wished to provide permanency for the minors and had completed adoption classes.
¶ 21 Respondent testified he was employed and currently resided with his girlfriend in Carthage, Illinois. At the time of the best interests hearing, respondent stated he had been "drug free" for approximately seven months. When asked why he did not send the minors "any letters or acknowledged special events," respondent indicated he was "unaware that [he] was able to do any of that." On cross-examination, respondent stated he would like to see the minors "grow up somewhere safe where they can be taken care of financially and stable and everything like that." Respondent further commented he "would really like for all this *** to get *** lifted off his back." When asked whether he was in a position to provide a home for the minors, respondent stated, "By no means, no." Rather, respondent agreed it was appropriate for the minors to stay with Collin and Tina because respondent "would not be ready for seven kids in a house."
¶ 22 Following closing arguments, the trial court took the matter under advisement.
¶ 23 The trial court issued its written order on May 3, 2023. At the outset, the court noted the minors had been in their current placement for "over 1100 days." While the court acknowledged "[t]here is no doubt *** that both parents love the children" and respondent desired to maintain the parent-child relationship with the minors, that "desire cannot be the focus at this stage of the proceedings." The court observed that the minors had been placed with Collin and Tina for over three years and were bonded with them. Collin and Tina provided a sense of love and stability and met the minors' emotional and physical needs. The court further highlighted the minors' ties to the community Collin and Tina resided in, and their ability to "maintain those ties" in their current placement. The court concluded, "[b]ased on the factors and the evidence of the case," it was in the minors' best interests that respondent's parental rights be terminated. On May 18, 2023, the court entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights.
¶ 24 On June 7, 2023, respondent filed a timely notice of appeal. This court docketed respondent's appeals in Hancock County case No. 19-JA-34 as appellate court case No. 4-23-0514 (C.C.'s case), Hancock County case No. 19-JA-35 as appellate court case No. 4-23-0515 (T.V.'s case), and Hancock County case No. 20-JA-6 as appellate court case No. 4-23-0516 (R.V.'s case). On July 19, 2023, this court granted respondent's motion to consolidate the appeals.
¶ 25 This appeal followed.
¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 27 On appeal, appellate counsel seeks to withdraw on the basis that she cannot raise any arguments of potential merit.
¶ 28 The procedure for appellate counsel to withdraw set forth in Anders applies to findings of parental unfitness and termination of parental rights. In re S.M., 314 Ill.App.3d 682, 685 (2000). According to this procedure, counsel's request to withdraw must "be accompanied by a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the appeal." Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Counsel must "(a) sketch the argument in support of the issues that could conceivably be raised on appeal, and then (b) explain why he believes the arguments are frivolous." S.M., 314 Ill.App.3d at 685. Counsel must then conclude the case presents no viable grounds for appeal. S.M., 314 Ill.App.3d at 685. In doing so, counsel should review both the unfitness finding and the best interests determination and indicate in the brief that she has done so. S.M., 314 Ill.App.3d at 685-86.
¶ 29 In the instant case, counsel asserts she has reviewed the record on appeal, including the report of proceedings of the termination hearing, and has concluded there are no appealable issues of merit. Counsel states she has considered raising the argument that the trial court erred in finding respondent failed to make reasonable efforts during the relevant nine-month period. She also indicates she has considered raising the argument that the court erred in finding respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-month period. Moreover, counsel considered raising an argument challenging the court's best interests finding. We address each argument in turn and ultimately agree with counsel's conclusion there are no issues of arguable merit to be raised on appeal.
¶ 30 A. Unfitness Finding
¶ 31 We first address appellate counsel's assertion no meritorious argument can be made that the trial court erred in finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-month period.
¶ 32 Termination of parental rights under the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2022)) is a two-step process. In re Julian K., 2012 IL App (1st) 112841, ¶ 1. Parental rights may not be terminated without the parent's consent unless the trial court first determines, by clear and convincing evidence, the parent is unfit as defined in section 1(D) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D) (West 2022)). In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill.2d 340, 354 (2005). Pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022)), a parent may be found unfit if he fails to "make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of neglected *** minor." A "parent's failure to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan and correct the conditions that brought the child into care during any 9-month period following the adjudication" constitutes a failure to make reasonable progress for purposes of section 1(D)(m)(ii). 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). "As the grounds for unfitness are independent, the trial court's judgment may be affirmed if the evidence supports the finding of unfitness on any one of the alleged statutory grounds." In re H.D., 343 Ill.App.3d 483, 493 (2003).
¶ 33 We will not disturb a finding of unfitness unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. "A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the evidence clearly calls for the opposite finding [citation], such that no reasonable person could arrive at the circuit court's finding on the basis of the evidence in the record [citation]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) J.H., 2020 IL App (4th) 200150, ¶ 68. "This court pays great deference to a trial court's fitness finding because of [that court's] superior opportunity to observe the witnesses and evaluate their credibility." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re O.B., 2022 IL App (4th) 220419, ¶ 29.
¶ 34 Here, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that respondent failed to make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors during the relevant nine-month periods, as alleged in the State's petition to terminate. Pursuant to respondent's integrated assessment, he was to engage in, inter alia, domestic violence perpetrator services. The March 9, 2021, service plan indicated respondent was rated unsatisfactory in the areas of domestic violence services, mental health services, employment, and communication with the agency. At the time of the fitness hearing, respondent still had not completed the required domestic violence perpetrator services. Respondent acknowledged he understood completing domestic violence services was a required task in his service plan. The trial court observed that "the reason this case came to the attention of the Court was due to domestic violence and substance abuse in the home." The court continually highlighted the importance of respondent's need to participate in domestic violence services in order to correct the conditions that were the basis for the removal of the minors. In its written order, the court noted the financial costs associated with the domestic violence services. However, when respondent "did have employment and appeared to be making enough money to pay for the counseling, he still failed to engage."
¶ 35 Based on this evidence, respondent did not "substantially fulfill his *** obligations under the service plan" and therefore did not make reasonable progress toward the return of the minors to his care. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2022). Because the State proved one ground of unfitness by clear and convincing evidence, we agree with appellate counsel no meritorious argument can be made that the trial court's finding of unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence. See H.D., 343 Ill.App.3d at 493.
¶ 36 B. Best Interests Determination
¶ 37 Appellate counsel next asserts she can make no meritorious argument that the trial court's best interests determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
¶ 38 When a trial court finds a parent to be unfit, "the court then determines whether it is in the best interests of the minor that parental rights be terminated." In re D. T., 212 Ill.2d 347, 352 (2004). "[A]t a best-interests hearing, the parent's interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the child's interest in a stable, loving home life." D. T., 212 Ill.2d at 364. In making the best interests determination, the court must consider the factors set forth in section 1-3(4.05) of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2022)). These factors include:
"(1) the child's physical safety and welfare; (2) the development of the child's identity; (3) the child's background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious; (4) the child's sense of attachments, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of affection, and the least-disruptive placement alternative; (5) the child's wishes; (6) the child's community ties; (7) the child's need for permanence, including the need for stability and continuity of relationships with parental figures and siblings; (8) the uniqueness of every family and child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the persons available to care for the child." In re Jay. H., 395 Ill.App.3d 1063, 1071 (2009) (citing 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2008)).
"The court's best interest determination [need not] contain an explicit reference to each of these factors, and a reviewing court need not rely on any basis used by the trial court below in affirming its decision." In re Tajannah O., 2014 IL App (1st) 133119, ¶ 19.
¶ 39 A reviewing court will not disturb a trial court's finding that termination is in the minors' best interests unless it was against the manifest weight of the evidence. T.A., 359 Ill.App.3d at 961.
¶ 40 At the time of the best interests hearing, the minors had been living together with Collin and Tina for over three years. The minors were well bonded with Collin and Tina, who were able to provide for the minors' physical and emotional needs. According to her testimony, Tina quit her job to become a stay-at-home mother for the minors in order to best accommodate their needs. Collin and Tina agreed to provide permanence for the minors and had completed adoption classes in preparation for such. Greenwood and Waddell testified Collin and Tina would be the least disruptive placement for the minors. Moreover, the best interests report noted the minors were thriving in their current placement. Further, respondent acknowledged he was unable to provide a home for the minors; specifically, he noted he was not "ready for seven kids in a house." Rather, respondent admitted Collin and Tina's home was an appropriate placement for the minors. The minors deserve a permanent, stable, safe, and loving environment. According to the evidence, Collin and Tina provided those things. In its written order, the trial court concluded, "These children deserve to know they have a home they can count on."
¶ 41 Based on our review of the record on appeal, we agree with appellate counsel no meritorious argument can be made that the trial court's best interests determination was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we grant counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the court's judgment.
¶ 42 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 43 For the reasons stated, we grant appellate counsel's motion to withdraw and affirm the trial court's judgment.
¶ 44 Affirmed.