Apparently what the defendant means by the reference to a less culpable state of mind is that under the instruction complained of — Instruction No. 8 — the elements of accountability set out in section 5-2 of the Criminal Code need not be proved since the instruction objected to only requires that the defendant "voluntarily attached himself to a group bent on illegal acts, with knowledge of its design," and this is less culpable than soliciting, aiding or abetting the planning or commission of the crime. Several of the cases cited by the defendant in support of his contention ( People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18; People v. Hill, 39 Ill.2d 125; People v. Rybka, 16 Ill.2d 394) do not appear to us to be helpful to the defendant. People v. Stanko, 402 Ill. 558, is not relevant as there the instruction given was with regard to a crime the defendant was not actually charged with — abortion — rather than attempted abortion — and the possible confusion of the jury was clearly prejudicial.
These alleged discrepancies were before the jury and were properly a matter for their consideration. ( People v. Kriston (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 22, 297 N.E.2d 206.) Minor discrepancies and inconsistencies in testimony do not render that testimony unworthy of belief, or destroy the credibility of that witness, but go only to the weight to be given that testimony. ( People v. Hanna (1969), 42 Ill.2d 323, 329, 247 N.E.2d 610.)
Moreover, all of defendant's alleged improbabilities were before the jury and were properly a matter for their consideration. People v. Kriston (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 22, 297 N.E.2d 206, 209. Having reviewed all of defendant's arguments in support of his first contention and finding them without merit we conclude that defendant was proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
A defendant's relationship to the witnesses who testified in his behalf is a proper subject for a jury to consider. People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 297 N.E.2d 206. • 4 Defendant's marriage to two of his witnesses both of whom are daughters of a third witness is clearly a relevant subject of inquiry particularly in light of the financial and emotional ties between the witnesses and defendant.
• 3 Defendant urges additionally that because the State's witnesses were related, their testimony should not have been believed, in contrast to the allegedly more credible testimony offered by defendant's friends. The relationship of witnesses is admissible to show bias ( People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 23, 297 N.E.2d 206), but we note that it was fully brought out here without curtailment on the right of defendant to do so. The effect of the kinship of the witnesses and the resolution of the conflicting accounts of the incident presented questions of credibility which, as we have stated above, were for the trial judge in a bench trial.
• 3 In any event, all defendants' alleged improbabilities, whether real or imagined, were before the jury and were properly a matter for their consideration. ( People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 297 N.E.2d 206.) Minor discrepancies and inconsistencies in testimony do not render that testimony unworthy of belief, but go only to the weight to be given that testimony. ( People v. Hanna, 42 Ill.2d 323, 247 N.E.2d 610; People v. Cooper, 69 Ill. App.2d 18, 216 N.E.2d 168.)
Even if the testimony of Richart and Wilhelms were taken as true and the jury believed that defendant did not leave the Petta car at the time of the theft in the first parking lot, the verdict would still be supported by the evidence on an accountability theory as to which the jury was properly instructed. (See People v. Kriston (1973), 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 23; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 5-2.) The entire circumstances were sufficient to show defendant's participation in the common plan even if the jury were to believe that there were no express words of agreement between the participants.
• 4 In order for a person to be legally accountable for the conduct of another the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: One, that defendant solicited, aided, abetted, agreed or attempted to aid another person in the planning or commission of an offense; two, that participation took place either before or during the commission of the offense and three, that it was with the concurrent specific intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense. Section 5-2(c) of the Criminal Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 5-2(c)), People v. Ramirez, 93 Ill. App.2d 404, 236 N.E.2d 284, People v. Tillman, 130 Ill. App.2d 743, 265 N.E.2d 904, People v. Adams, 8 Ill. App.3d 62, 289 N.E.2d 53, and People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18, 297 N.E.2d 206. Citing People v. Williams, 104 Ill. App.2d 329, 244 N.E.2d 347, the State argues that proof of acts in furtherance of a common design or purpose to commit a crime need not be supported by words of agreement but may be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the commission of the act by the group.
Also, the general physical descriptions given shortly after the robbery matched those of defendants. Such facts reveal a sufficiently independent and uninfluenced source to stand as the basis for the witness' in-court identification, and we find the trial court properly allowed the admission of such testimony. • 6-8 As to whether defendants were proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the rule is well established that a positive identification by even one witness, who had a good opportunity to observe an accused in terms of length of time, proximity and lighting conditions, is sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty. ( People v. Solomon, 24 Ill.2d 586; People v. Kriston, 12 Ill. App.3d 18.) Obviously, the jury in the case before us did not believe defendants' alibis, nor were they obliged to. ( People v. Taylor, 8 Ill. App.3d 727.) In the exercise of their function to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses, they apparently did believe Newell, and it is not within our perogative sitting as a court of review, to reverse their finding on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence unless there is a reasonable and well founded doubt of guilt, and the verdict is found to be palpably contrary to the weight of the evidence.