U.S. Const., amend. IV. The Illinois Constitution provides this same protection. People v. Kratovil , 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030, 286 Ill.Dec. 868, 815 N.E.2d 78 (2004) (citing Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 6 ). The compulsory testing of a defendant's blood or other bodily fluids is a search within the meaning of the fourth amendment.

See People v. Kucavic, 367 Ill. App. 3d 176, 179 (2006). We misstated this standard in People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1033 (2004) ("the defendant reasonably believed that her conduct was necessary to avoid a public or private injury greater than the injury that might have resulted from literal compliance with the law"). Defendant argues that he was without blame for the entire incident.

; People v. Grabow, 2022 IL App (2d) 210151, ¶ 20 (same); People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1035 (2004) (same).

Therefore, defendant must present “some evidence” in support of his claim. People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1033, 286 Ill.Dec. 868, 815 N.E.2d 78 (2004). While the threshold of establishing some evidence is relatively low (see People v. Kite, 153 Ill.2d 40, 45, 178 Ill.Dec. 769, 605 N.E.2d 563 (1992) ), the evidence deemed to be adequate to raise an affirmative defense must be evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt.

As discussed, consent is not voluntary where it is the product of official coercion, intimidation, or deception. People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030 (2004). Where an officer expresses his intent to engage in a certain course of conduct, that communication does not vitiate a person's consent to search, so long as the officer has actual grounds for carrying out the intended course of conduct.

This is because the defense of necessity "is viewed as involving the choice between two admitted evils where other optional courses of action are unavailable." Janik, 127 Ill. 2d at 399; accord People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1034 (2004); People v. Cord, 258 Ill. App. 3d 188, 192-93 (1994) ("[s]imply stated, the defense of necessity involves a choice that can be made only between two admitted evils, other options being unavailable"); People v. Hayes, 223 Ill. App. 3d 126, 128 (1991); People v. Dworzanski, 220 Ill. App. 3d 185, 192 (1991); Perez, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 281. Thus, conduct that would otherwise be illegal is justified by necessity, but only if the conduct was the sole reasonable alternative available under the circumstances.

We conclude that it did. Voluntary consent to search is an exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030 (2004). To be effective, however, the consent must be voluntary, meaning that it was given "absent any coercion, express or implied," and was not "the result of official coercion, intimidation, or deception."

When other alternatives exist, which if carried out would cause less harm, then the accused is not justified in breaking the law." People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1034 (2004). Defendant cannot support his argument no alternative existed that would have caused less harm.

Voluntary consent to search is an exception to the fourth amendment's warrant requirement. People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill.App.3d 1023, 1030, 286 Ill.Dec. 868, 815 N.E.2d 78, 86 (2004). To be effective, however, the consent must be voluntary, meaning that it was given "absent any coercion, express or implied," and was not "the result of official coercion, intimidation, or deception."

I base my special concurrence on the resolution of this issue. ¶ 38 "Both the United States and Illinois Constitutions protect individuals from unreasonable searches and seizures." People v. Kratovil, 351 Ill. App. 3d 1023, 1030 (2004). "Reasonableness in this context generally requires a warrant supported by probable cause."